Translations · Text 66 · 1000010

Meditationes de cognitione, veritate et ideis, 1684

Reference
GP IV 422–426
Date
1684
Original
Latin
Earlier English
Loemker; Ariew and Garber; this is a new translation
Catalogue
A VI,4
Principal workLogic and knowledgeMetaphysics
View

Editor’s note

"Meditations on knowledge, truth and ideas", signed "G. G. L." in the Acta Eruditorum, November 1684. Leibniz's first published statement of his theory of knowledge, written into the Arnauld–Malebranche dispute over ideas. Translated from Gerhardt; the Akademie number is a cross-reference.

Original
English
1
Quoniam hodie inter Viros egregios de veris et falsis ideis controversiae agitantur, eaque res magni ad veritatem cognoscendam momenti est, in qua nec ipse Cartesius usquequaque satisfecit, placet quid mihi de discriminibus atque criteriis Idearum et cognitionum statuendum videatur, explicare paucis. Est ergo cognitio vel obscura vel clara, et clara rursus vel confusa vel distincta, et distincta vel inadaequata vel adaequata, item vel symbolica vel intuitiva: et quidem si simul adaequata et intuitiva sit, perfectissima est.
Since controversies are being carried on today among distinguished men about true and false ideas, and since the matter is of great importance for knowing the truth, and Descartes himself did not give full satisfaction on it, I wish to set out briefly what I think should be established about the distinctions and criteria of Ideas and of knowledge. Knowledge, then, is either obscure or clear; clear knowledge is either confused or distinct; distinct knowledge is either inadequate or adequate, and also either symbolic or intuitive; and if it is at once adequate and intuitive, it is the most perfect.
2
Obscura est notio, quae non sufficit ad rem repraesentatam agnoscendam, veluti si utcunque meminerim alicujus floris aut animalis olim visi, non tamen quantum satis est, ut oblatum recognoscere et ab aliquo vicino discernere possim; vel si considerem aliquem terminum in scholis parum explicatum, ut Entelechiam Aristotelis, aut causam prout communis est materiae, formae, efficienti et fini, aliaque ejusmodi, de quibus nullam certam definitionem habemus: unde propositio quoque obscura fit, quam notio talis ingreditur.
A notion is obscure when it is not enough to recognize the thing represented: as when I remember, somehow, a flower or an animal I once saw, but not well enough to recognize it when it is presented and to tell it from something similar; or when I consider some term poorly explained in the schools, such as Aristotle's Entelechy, or cause as common to matter, form, efficient and end, and other such things of which we have no definite definition. Hence a proposition into which such a notion enters also becomes obscure.
3
Clara ergo cognitio est, cum habeo unde rem repraesentatam agnoscere possim, eaque rursus est vel confusa vel distincta. Confusa, cum scilicet non possum notas ad rem ab aliis discernendam sufficientes separatim enumerare, licet res illa tales notas atque requisita revera habeat, in quae notio ejus resolvi possit: ita colores, odores, sapores, aliaque peculiaria sensuum objecta satis clare quidem agnoscimus et a se invicem discernimus, sed simplici sensuum testimonio, non vero notis enuntiabilibus;
Knowledge is clear, then, when I have the means to recognize the thing represented; and this in turn is either confused or distinct. It is confused when I cannot enumerate one by one the marks sufficient to distinguish the thing from others, although the thing really has such marks and requisites, into which its notion could be resolved. So we recognize colours, smells, tastes and the other particular objects of the senses clearly enough, and tell them apart, but by the simple testimony of the senses, not by marks that can be stated.
4
ideo nec caeco explicare possumus, quid sit rubrum, nec aliis declarare talia possumus, nisi eos in rem praesentem ducendo, atque ut idem videant, olfaciant aut gustent efficiendo, aut saltem praeteritae alicujus perceptionis similis eos admonendo: licet certum sit, notiones harum qualitatum compositas esse et resolvi posse, quippe cum causas suas habeant. Similiter videmus pictores aliosque artifices probe cognoscere, quid recte, quid vitiose factum sit, at judicii sui rationem reddere saepe non posse, et quaerenti dicere, se in re quae displicet desiderare nescio quid.
So we cannot explain to a blind man what red is, nor make such things known to others except by bringing them to the thing itself and making them see, smell or taste the same, or at least by reminding them of some similar past perception; though it is certain that the notions of these qualities are composite and can be resolved, since they have their causes. Likewise we see that painters and other artists know very well what is done rightly and what badly, yet often cannot give the reason for their judgment, and say to anyone who asks that in the thing that displeases them they miss a certain I-know-not-what.
5
At distincta notio est qualem de auro habent Docimastae, per notas scilicet et examina sufficientia ad rem ab aliis omnibus corporibus similibus discernendam: tales habere solemus circa notiones pluribus sensibus communes, ut numeri, magnitudinis, figurae, item circa multos affectus animi, ut spem, metum, verbo circa omnia quorum habemus Definitionem nominalem, quae nihil aliud est, quam enumeratio notarum sufficientium.
But a distinct notion is like the one assayers have of gold, that is, through marks and tests sufficient to distinguish the thing from all other similar bodies. We usually have such notions of things common to several senses, such as number, size and shape, and also of many affections of the mind, such as hope and fear; in a word, of everything of which we have a nominal Definition, which is nothing other than an enumeration of sufficient marks.
6
Datur tamen et cognitio distincta notionis indefinibilis, quando ea est primitiva sive nota sui ipsius, hoc est, cum est irresolubilis ac non nisi per se intelligitur, atque adeo caret requisitis. In notionibus autem compositis, quia rursus notae singulae componentes interdum clare quidem, sed tamen confuse cognitae sunt, ut gravitas, color, aqua fortis, aliaque quae auri notas ingrediuntur, hinc talis cognitio auri licet distincta sit, inadaequata est tamen.
There is, however, also distinct knowledge of an indefinable notion, when it is primitive, or its own mark, that is, when it is irresolvable and understood only through itself, and so lacks requisites. But in composite notions, since the individual component marks are sometimes known clearly but confusedly, such as weight, colour, aqua fortis and the others that enter into the marks of gold, such knowledge of gold, though distinct, is nevertheless inadequate.
7
Cum vero id omne quod notitiam distinctam ingreditur, rursus distincte cognitum est, seu cum analysis ad finem usque producta habetur, cognitio est adaequata, cujus exemplum perfectum nescio an homines dare possint; valde tamen ad eam accedit notitia numerorum.
But when everything that enters into a distinct notion is in turn distinctly known, that is, when the analysis has been carried through to the end, the knowledge is adequate. I do not know whether men can give a perfect example of it; but the knowledge of numbers comes very close to it.
8
Plerumque autem, praesertim in Analysi longiore, non totam simul naturam rei intuemur, sed rerum loco signis utimur, quorum explicationem in praesenti aliqua cogitatione compendii causa solemus praetermittere, scientes aut credentes nos eam habere in potestate: ita cum Chiliogonum seu Polygonum mille aequalium laterum cogito, non semper naturam lateris et aequalitatis et millenarii (seu cubi a denario) considero, sed vocabulis istis (quorum sensus obscure saltem atque imperfecte menti obversatur) in animo utor loco idearum quas de iis habeo, quoniam memini me significationem istorum vocabulorum habere, explicationem autem nunc judico necessariam non esse;
Mostly, however, and especially in a longer Analysis, we do not intuit the whole nature of the thing at once, but use signs in place of things, whose explanation we usually omit in any present thought for the sake of brevity, knowing or believing that we have it in our power. So when I think of a Chiliagon, or Polygon of a thousand equal sides, I do not always consider the nature of a side, of equality and of a thousand (the cube of ten), but in my mind I use those words (whose sense presents itself to the mind at least obscurely and imperfectly) in place of the ideas I have of them, since I remember that I have the meaning of these words, and I judge that their explanation is not necessary now.
9
qualem cogitationem caecam vel etiam symbolicam appellare soleo, qua et in Algebra et in Arithmetica utimur, imo fere ubique. Et certe cum notio valde composita est, non possumus omnes ingredientes eam notiones simul cogitare: ubi tamen hoc licet, vel saltem in quantum licet, cognitionem voco intuitivam. Notionis distinctae primitivae non alia datur cognitio, quam intuitiva, ut compositarum plerumque cogitatio non nisi symbolica est.
Such thinking I usually call blind, or also symbolic; we use it in Algebra and in Arithmetic, and indeed almost everywhere. And certainly, when a notion is very composite, we cannot think all the notions that enter into it at once; but where this is possible, or at least insofar as it is, I call the knowledge intuitive. Of a distinct primitive notion there is no knowledge other than intuitive, just as the thought of composite notions is for the most part only symbolic.
10
Ex his jam patet, nos eorum quoque quae distincte cognoscimus, ideas non percipere, nisi quatenus cogitatione intuitiva utimur. Et sane contingit, ut nos saepe falso credamus habere in animo ideas rerum, cum falso supponimus aliquos terminos, quibus utimur, jam a nobis fuisse explicatos: nec verum aut certe ambiguitati obnoxium est, quod ajunt aliqui, non posse nos de re aliqua dicere, intelligendo quod dicimus, quin ejus habeamus ideam.
From this it is now plain that, even of things we know distinctly, we perceive the ideas only insofar as we use intuitive thought. And indeed it often happens that we falsely believe we have ideas of things in our mind, when we falsely suppose that some terms we use have already been explained by us. Nor is it true, or at least it is open to ambiguity, as some say, that we cannot speak of anything, understanding what we say, without having an idea of it.
11
Saepe enim vocabula ista singula utcunque intelligimus, aut nos antea intellexisse meminimus, quia tamen hac cogitatione caeca contenti sumus et resolutionem notionum non satis prosequimur, fit ut lateat nos contradictio, quam forte notio composita involvit.
For often we understand each of the words somehow, or remember having understood them before; but because we are content with this blind thinking and do not pursue the resolution of notions far enough, a contradiction that the composite notion may involve escapes us.
12
Haec ut considerarem distinctius, fecit olim argumentum, dudum inter Scholasticos celebre, et a Cartesio renovatum, pro Existentia Dei, quod ita habet: Quicquid ex alicujus rei idea sive definitione sequitur, id de re potest praedicari. Existentia ex DEI (sive Entis perfectissimi, vel quo majus cogitari non potest) idea sequitur. (Ens enim perfectissimum involvit omnes perfectiones, in quarum numero est etiam existentia). Ergo existentia de DEO potest praedicari.
What once led me to consider these things more distinctly was the argument for the Existence of God, long celebrated among the Scholastics and renewed by Descartes, which runs: Whatever follows from the idea or definition of a thing can be predicated of the thing. Existence follows from the idea of GOD (or of the most perfect Being, or that than which nothing greater can be thought). (For the most perfect Being involves all perfections, among which is existence.) Therefore existence can be predicated of GOD.
13
Verum sciendum est, inde hoc tantum confici: si DEUS est possibilis, sequitur quod existat; nam definitionibus non possumus tuto uti ad concludendum, antequam sciamus eas esse reales, aut nullam involvere contradictionem. Cujus ratio est, quia de notionibus contradictionem involventibus simul possent concludi opposita, quod absurdum est.
But it should be known that from this only the following is established: if GOD is possible, it follows that he exists. For we cannot safely use definitions to draw conclusions before we know that they are real, that is, that they involve no contradiction. The reason is that from notions involving a contradiction opposites could be concluded at the same time, which is absurd.
14
Soleo autem ad hoc declarandum uti exemplo motus celerrimi qui absurdum implicat; ponamus enim rotam aliquam celerrimo motu rotari, quis non videt, productum aliquem rotae radium extremo suo celerius motum iri, quam in rotae circumferentia clavum; hujus ergo motus non est celerrimus, contra hypothesin. Interim prima fronte videri possit nos ideam motus celerrimi habere; intelligimus enim utique quid dicamus, et tamen nullam utique habemus ideam rerum impossibilium.
To make this clear I usually use the example of the fastest motion, which implies an absurdity. Suppose a wheel turns with the fastest motion: who does not see that a spoke of the wheel, extended beyond the rim, would have its end moving faster than a nail on the wheel's circumference? So the nail's motion is not the fastest, contrary to the hypothesis. Yet at first sight it might seem that we have an idea of the fastest motion, for we certainly understand what we are saying; and yet we have no idea at all of impossible things.
15
Eodem igitur modo non sufficit nos cogitare de Ente perfectissimo, ut asseramus nos ejus ideam habere, et in hac allata paulo ante demonstratione possibilitas Entis perfectissimi aut ostendenda aut supponenda est, ut recte concludamus. Interim nihil verius est, quam et nos DEI habere ideam, et Ens perfectissimum esse possibile, imo necessarium; argumentum tamen non satis concludit, et jam ab Aquinate rejectum est.
In the same way, then, it is not enough to think of the most perfect Being in order to assert that we have an idea of it; and in the demonstration just cited, the possibility of the most perfect Being must either be shown or be supposed if we are to conclude rightly. Meanwhile nothing is truer than that we have an idea of GOD and that the most perfect Being is possible, indeed necessary. Still, the argument does not conclude sufficiently, and was already rejected by Aquinas.
16
Atque ita habemus quoque discrimen inter definitiones nominales, quae notas tantum rei ab aliis discernendae continent, et reales, ex quibus constat rem esse possibilem, et hac ratione satisfit Hobbio, qui veritates volebat esse arbitrarias, quia ex definitionibus nominalibus penderent, non considerans realitatem definitionis in arbitrio non esse, nec quaslibet notiones inter se posse conjungi. Nec definitiones nominales sufficiunt ad perfectam scientiam, nisi quando aliunde constat rem definitam esse possibilem.
And so we also have the difference between nominal definitions, which contain only marks for distinguishing the thing from others, and real definitions, from which it is established that the thing is possible. In this way Hobbes is answered, who wanted truths to be arbitrary because they depend on nominal definitions, not considering that the reality of a definition is not up to our choice, and that not just any notions can be joined together. Nor are nominal definitions enough for perfect knowledge, except when it is established from elsewhere that the thing defined is possible.
17
Patet etiam, quae tandem sit Idea vera, quae falsa, vera scilicet cum notio est possibilis, falsa cum contradictionem involvit. Possibilitatem autem rei vel a priori cognoscimus, vel a posteriori. Et quidem a priori, cum notionem resolvimus in sua requisita, seu in alias notiones cognitae possibilitatis, nihilque in illis incompatibile esse scimus; idque fit inter alia, cum intelligimus modum, quo res possit produci, unde prae caeteris utiles sunt Definitiones causales: a posteriori vero, cum rem actu existere experimur, quod enim actu existit vel extitit, id utique possibile est.
It is plain too, then, what a true Idea is and what a false one: true when the notion is possible, false when it involves a contradiction. We know the possibility of a thing either a priori or a posteriori. A priori, when we resolve the notion into its requisites, that is, into other notions of known possibility, and know that there is nothing incompatible in them; this happens, among other ways, when we understand the way in which the thing can be produced, which is why causal Definitions are useful above others. A posteriori, when we experience that the thing actually exists; for what actually exists or has existed is certainly possible.
18
Et quidem quandocunque habetur cognitio adaequata, habetur et cognitio possibilitatis a priori; perducta enim analysi ad finem, si nulla apparet contradictio, utique notio possibilis est. An vero unquam ab hominibus perfecta institui possit analysis notionum, sive an ad prima possibilia ac notiones irresolubiles, sive (quod eodem redit) ipsa absoluta Attributa DEI, nempe causas primas atque ultimam rerum rationem, cogitationes suas reducere possint, nunc quidem definire non ausim. Plerumque contenti sumus, notionum quarundam realitatem experientia didicisse, unde postea alias componimus ad exemplum naturae.
And whenever we have adequate knowledge, we also have a priori knowledge of possibility; for when the analysis has been carried to the end, if no contradiction appears, the notion is certainly possible. But whether men can ever carry out a perfect analysis of notions, that is, whether they can reduce their thoughts to the first possibles and irresolvable notions, or (what comes to the same) to the absolute Attributes of GOD themselves, namely the first causes and the ultimate reason of things, I would not now dare to decide. For the most part we are content to have learned the reality of certain notions from experience, from which we afterwards compose others on the pattern of nature.
19
Hinc ergo tandem puto intelligi posse, non semper tuto provocari ad ideas, et multos specioso illo titulo ad imaginationes quasdam suas stabiliendas abuti; neque enim statim ideam habemus rei, de qua nos cogitare sumus conscii, quod exemplo maximae velocitatis paulo ante ostendi. Nec minus abuti video nostri temporis homines jactato illo principio: quicquid clare et distincte de re aliqua percipio, id est verum seu de ea enuntiabile.
From this, then, I think it can at last be understood that it is not always safe to appeal to ideas, and that many abuse that fine-sounding title to prop up certain fancies of their own; for we do not at once have an idea of a thing just because we are conscious of thinking of it, as I showed a little earlier by the example of the greatest speed. No less do I see the people of our time abuse that much-vaunted principle: whatever I perceive clearly and distinctly about a thing is true, or can be asserted of it.
20
Saepe enim clara et distincta videntur hominibus temere judicantibus, quae obscura et confusa sunt. Inutile ergo axioma est, nisi clari et distincti criteria adhibeantur, quae tradidimus, et nisi constet de veritate idearum. De caetero non contemnenda veritatis enuntiationum criteria sunt regulae communis Logicae, quibus et Geometrae utuntur, ut scilicet nihil admittatur pro certo, nisi accurata experientia vel firma demonstratione probatum;
For things often seem clear and distinct to men who judge rashly, which are obscure and confused. The axiom is useless, then, unless the criteria of clear and distinct that we have given are applied, and unless the truth of the ideas is established. For the rest, the rules of common Logic, which Geometers also use, are criteria of the truth of statements not to be despised: namely, that nothing be admitted as certain unless proved by careful experience or firm demonstration.
21
firma autem demonstratio est, quae praescriptam a Logica formam servat, non quasi semper ordinatis Scholarum more Syllogismis opus sit (quales Christianus Herlinus et Conradus Dasypodius in sex priores Euclidis libros exhibuerunt), sed ita saltem ut argumentatio concludat vi formae, qualis argumentationis in forma debita conceptae exemplum, etiam calculum aliquem legitimum esse dixeris; itaque nec praetermittenda est aliqua praemissa necessaria, et omnes praemissae jam ante vel demonstratae esse debent, vel saltem instar hypotheseos assumtae, quo casu et conclusio hypothetica est. Haec qui observabunt diligenter, facile ab Ideis deceptricibus sibi cavebunt.
And a firm demonstration is one that keeps the form prescribed by Logic; not that syllogisms arranged in the manner of the Schools are always needed (such as Christian Herlin and Conrad Dasypodius set out for the first six books of Euclid), but at least so that the argument concludes by virtue of its form. Any legitimate calculation, too, may be called an example of argument conceived in due form. So no necessary premise may be omitted, and all premises must either have been demonstrated already or at least be assumed as a hypothesis, in which case the conclusion too is hypothetical. Those who observe this carefully will easily guard themselves against deceptive Ideas.
22
His autem satis congruenter ingeniosissimus Pascalius in praeclara dissertatione de Ingenio Geometrico (cujus fragmentum extat in egregio Libro celeberrimi Viri Antonii Arnaldi de arte bene cogitandi) Geometrae esse ait definire omnes terminos parumper obscuros, et comprobare omnes veritates parumper dubias. Sed vellem definiisset limites, quos ultra aliqua notio aut enuntiatio non amplius parumper obscura aut dubia est. Verumtamen quid conveniat, ex attenta eorum quae hic diximus consideratione erui potest, nunc enim brevitati studemus.
Quite in agreement with this, the most ingenious Pascal, in his excellent essay on the Geometrical Mind (a fragment of which survives in the excellent book of the celebrated Antoine Arnauld on the art of thinking well), says it is the Geometer's business to define all terms that are even slightly obscure and to prove all truths that are even slightly doubtful. But I wish he had defined the limits beyond which a notion or statement is no longer even slightly obscure or doubtful. Still, what is fitting can be drawn from careful consideration of what we have said here; for now we aim at brevity.
23
Quod ad controversiam attinet, utrum omnia videamus in DEO (quae utique vetus est sententia, et si sano sensu intelligatur, non omnino spernenda) an vero proprias ideas habeamus, sciendum est, etsi omnia in DEO videremus, necesse tamen esse ut habeamus et ideas proprias, id est non quasi icunculas quasdam, sed affectiones sive modificationes mentis nostrae, respondentes ad id ipsum quod in DEO perciperemus: utique enim aliis atque aliis cogitationibus subeuntibus aliqua in mente nostra mutatio fit; rerum vero actu a nobis non cogitatarum Ideae sunt in mente nostra, ut figura Herculis in rudi marmore.
As for the controversy whether we see all things in GOD (which is certainly an old opinion, and, if understood in a sound sense, not wholly to be despised) or whether we have ideas of our own, it should be known that, even if we saw all things in GOD, it would still be necessary that we also have ideas of our own: not as little images, so to speak, but as affections or modifications of our mind corresponding to the very thing we would perceive in GOD. For as one thought after another comes on, some change certainly takes place in our mind; and the Ideas of things not actually thought of by us are in our mind as the figure of Hercules is in the rough marble.
24
At in DEO non tantum necesse est actu esse ideam extensionis absolutae atque infinitae, sed et cujusque figurae, quae nihil aliud est quam extensionis absolutae modificatio. Caeterum cum colores aut odores percipimus, utique nullam aliam habemus quam figurarum et motuum perceptionem, sed tam multiplicium et exiguorum, ut mens nostra singulis distincte considerandis in hoc praesenti suo statu non sufficiat, et proinde non animadvertat perceptionem suam ex solis figurarum et motuum minutissimorum perceptionibus compositam esse, quemadmodum confusis flavi et caerulei pulvisculis viridem colorem percipiendo, nil nisi flavum et caeruleum minutissime mixta sentimus, licet non animadvertentes et potius novum aliquod ens nobis fingentes.
But in GOD there must actually be not only the idea of absolute and infinite extension but also that of every figure, which is nothing other than a modification of absolute extension. For the rest, when we perceive colours or smells, we certainly have no perception other than that of figures and motions, but of figures and motions so many and so tiny that our mind, in its present state, is not equal to considering each distinctly, and so does not notice that its perception is composed only of perceptions of the tiniest figures and motions. So when we perceive the colour green from a mixture of fine yellow and blue powders, we sense nothing but yellow and blue very finely mixed, though we do not notice it and rather imagine some new thing for ourselves.

Notes on text 66.

  1. Occasion. Acta Eruditorum, November 1684, pp. 537–542, signed "G. G. L.". The "controversies among distinguished men" are Arnauld's Des vraies et des fausses idées (1683) against Malebranche. Gerhardt prints it at GP IV 422–426; the Akademie text is A VI,4 N. 141, which is cited only as a cross-reference.
  2. Readings. OCR errors corrected silently (for example "tuto" for OCR "Luto", "rotari" for "(ari"). The Latin "cognitio" is rendered "knowledge" throughout, and "notio" "notion", to keep the scale of terms (obscure, clear, confused, distinct, inadequate, adequate, symbolic, intuitive) stable.
  3. Persons. Christian Herlin and Conrad Dasypodius published Analyseis geometricae sex librorum Euclidis (Strasbourg 1566), Euclid recast in syllogisms. Pascal's De l'esprit géométrique appeared in part in the Port-Royal Logic (Arnauld and Nicole, La logique ou l'art de penser).
  4. Sources and themes in the text.
    • The assayer and aqua fortis. Leibniz's model of distinct knowledge is the assayer's (Docimasta) knowledge of gold, by tests such as weight, colour and aqua fortis (nitric acid, used in parting gold from silver). The same example recurs in the Discours (XXIV, text 62) and the Nouveaux essais. It is the language of the assay furnace, which Leibniz knew from the Harz mines and from his early Nuremberg contact with chymists.
    • "Cogitatio caeca vel symbolica". Blind or symbolic thinking, using signs in place of ideas, is the epistemology behind the universal characteristic, and so behind Leibniz's interest in Egyptian hieroglyphs, the Chinese characters and the Kabbalah's claim to a language of things.
    • The analysis into the "absolute Attributes of GOD". Leibniz here identifies the first irresolvable notions with the divine attributes, the root of his "alphabet of human thoughts". The structure, a few divine perfections from whose combinations all concepts arise, has often been compared with the Sefirot and with Lull's dignities.
    • "We see all things in God". Called "an old opinion" and not to be despised if rightly understood, it is Malebranche's thesis with its Augustinian and Platonic ancestry, which Leibniz accepts only as a correspondence between our ideas and God's.
This text in the whole · 1684, a year from which 22 pieces are catalogued166316901716