Translations · Text 65 · 1000001

De ipsa natura sive de vi insita actionibusque creaturarum, 1698

Reference
GP IV 504–516
Date
1698
Original
Latin
Earlier English
Loemker; Ariew and Garber; Woolhouse and Francks 1998; this is a new translation
Principal workMetaphysicsDynamicsMonads
View

Editor’s note

"On nature itself, or on the inherent force and actions of creatures, in confirmation and illustration of his Dynamics." Published in the Acta Eruditorum, September 1698, as a reply to Johann Christoph Sturm's defence of his dissertation De idolo naturae. Greek words that the OCR garbles are restored and marked in the notes.

Original
English
1
De ipsa natura sive de vi insita actionibusque Creaturarum, pro Dynamicis suis confirmandis illustrandisque.
On nature itself, or on the inherent force and actions of Creatures, in confirmation and illustration of his Dynamics.
2
(1) Accepi nuper missu celeberrimi et de rebus mathematicis ac physicis praeclare meriti Viri Johannis Christophori Sturmii, quam Altorfii edidit, Apologiam pro sua de Idolo Naturae Dissertatione, impugnata a Medico Kiloniensium primario et χαριεστάτῳ, Gunthero Christophoro Schelhamero, in libro de Natura. Cum igitur idem argumentum versassem et ego olim, nonnihilque etiam concertationis per literas mihi cum praeclaro autore Dissertationis intercedat, cujus mentionem mihi perhonorificam ipse nuper fecit, publice memoratis nonnullis inter nos actis in Physicae Electivae Tomo primo [lib. I, sect. I, cap. 3, Epilog. § 5, pag. 119–120]:
(1) I recently received, sent to me by Johann Christoph Sturm, a very celebrated man of great merit in mathematics and physics, the Apology he published at Altdorf for his Dissertation On the Idol of Nature, which had been attacked by Günther Christoph Schelhammer, the leading and most accomplished physician of Kiel, in his book On Nature. Since I too had once treated the same argument, and since there has been some dispute by letter between me and the distinguished author of the Dissertation, who has lately made very honourable mention of me, publicly recording some of what passed between us in the first Volume of his Physica Electiva [book I, section I, chapter 3, Epilogue § 5, pages 119–120],
3
eo libentius animum attentionemque adhibui argumento per se egregio, necessarium judicans, ut mens mea pariter et tota res ex iis, quae aliquoties jam indicavi, principiis distinctius paulo proponeretur. Cui instituto commodam occasionem praestare illa visa est Apologetica dissertatio, quod judicare liceret, Autorem ibi, quae maxime ad rem facerent, paucis uno sub conspectu exhibuisse. De caetero litem ipsam inter praeclaros Viros non facio meam.
I gave my mind and attention all the more willingly to a subject excellent in itself, judging it necessary that my view, and the whole matter, be set out a little more distinctly from the principles I have already indicated several times. The Apologetic dissertation seemed to offer a convenient occasion for this, since one could see that the Author had there set out briefly, in a single view, what is most to the point. For the rest, I do not make the quarrel between these distinguished men my own.
4
(2) Duo potissimum quaeri puto, primum, in quo consistat Natura, quam rebus tribuere solemus, cujus attributa passim recepta aliquid Paganismi redolere judicat celeberrimus Sturmius; deinde utrum aliqua sit in creaturis ἐνέργεια, quam videtur negare. Quod primum attinet, de ipsa natura, si dispiciamus, et quid non sit, et quid sit, assentior quidem, nullam dari animam Universi; concedo etiam, miranda illa, quae occurrunt quotidie, de quibus dicere merito solemus, opus naturae esse opus intelligentiae, non esse adscribenda creatis quibusdam Intelligentiis, sapientia et virtute proportionali ad rem tantam praeditis;
(2) Two questions above all, I think, are asked: first, in what consists the Nature we commonly attribute to things, whose generally accepted attributes the celebrated Sturm judges to smack somewhat of Paganism; second, whether there is in creatures any ἐνέργεια (activity), which he seems to deny. As to the first, nature itself, if we consider both what it is not and what it is, I agree that there is no soul of the Universe. I grant too that those wonders which occur daily, of which we rightly say that the work of nature is the work of an intelligence, are not to be ascribed to certain created Intelligences endowed with wisdom and power proportioned to so great a task;
5
sed naturam universam esse, ut sic dicam, artificium Dei, et tantum quidem, ut quaevis machina naturalis (quod verum parumque observatum naturae artisque discrimen est) organis constet prorsus infinitis, infinitamque adeo sapientiam potentiamque autoris rectorisque postulet. Itaque et calidum omniscium Hippocratis, et Cholcodeam animarum datricem Avicennae, et illam sapientissimam Scaligeri aliorumque virtutem plasticam, et principium hylarchicum Henrici Mori, partim impossibilia, partim superflua puto;
but that the whole of nature is, so to speak, God's handiwork, and so much so that every natural machine (and this is the true and little-noticed difference between nature and art) consists of organs that are wholly infinite, and so requires an infinite wisdom and power in its author and ruler. And so I regard the all-knowing heat of Hippocrates, the Cholcodea of Avicenna, the giver of souls, the most wise plastic virtue of Scaliger and others, and the hylarchic principle of Henry More, as partly impossible and partly superfluous;
6
satisque habeo, machinam rerum tanta sapientia esse conditam, ut ipso ejus progressu admiranda illa contingant, organicis praesertim (ut arbitror) ex praedelineatione quadam sese evolventibus. Itaque quod Vir Cl. naturae cujusdam creatae, sapientis, corporum machinas formantis gubernantisque figmentum rejicit, probo. Sed nec consequi inde nec rationi consentaneum puto, ut omnem vim creatam actricem insitam rebus denegemus.
and I hold it enough that the machine of things is built with such wisdom that those wonders come about through its very course, organic things especially (as I believe) unfolding themselves from a certain preformation. So I approve the distinguished author's rejection of the fiction of some created, wise nature that forms and governs the machines of bodies. But I do not think it follows from this, nor that it is reasonable, that we should deny to things every created active force inherent in them.
7
(3) Diximus quid non sit; videamus jam etiam paulo propius, quid sit illa Natura, quam Aristoteles non male principium motus et quietis appellavit, quanquam Philosophus ille mihi latius accepto vocabulo non solum motum localem aut in loco quietem, sed generaliter mutationem, et στάσιν seu persistentiam intelligere videatur. Unde etiam, ut obiter dicam, definitio quam Motui assignat, etsi obscurior justo, non tam inepta tamen est, quam iis videtur, qui perinde sumunt, ac si motum localem tantummodo definire voluisset: sed ad rem.
(3) We have said what it is not; let us now look a little more closely at what that Nature is which Aristotle not badly called the principle of motion and of rest. That Philosopher, however, seems to me to take the word more broadly, meaning not only local motion or rest in a place but change in general, and στάσις, or persistence. Hence also, to say it in passing, the definition he gives of Motion, though more obscure than it should be, is not so inept as it seems to those who take it as if he had meant to define local motion alone. But to the matter.
8
Robertus Boylius, Vir insignis et in naturae observatione cum cura versatus, de ipsa natura libellum scripsit, cujus mens eo redit, si bene memini, ut naturam judicemus esse ipsum corporum mechanismum, quod quidem ὡς ἐν πλάτει probari potest; sed rem rimanti majore ἀκριβείᾳ distinguenda erant in ipso mechanismo principia a derivatis: ut in explicando horologio non satis est, si mechanica ratione impelli dicas, nisi distinguas, pondere an elastro concitetur.
Robert Boyle, a distinguished man practised in the careful observation of nature, wrote a little book on nature itself, whose sense comes to this, if I remember rightly: that we should judge nature to be the very mechanism of bodies. This can indeed be approved ὡς ἐν πλάτει (broadly speaking); but anyone searching the matter with greater ἀκρίβεια (precision) should distinguish, within the mechanism itself, principles from what is derived from them. So in explaining a clock it is not enough to say it is driven by a mechanical cause unless you distinguish whether it is set going by a weight or by a spring.
9
Et a me aliquoties jam est proditum (quod profuturum puto, ne mechanicae naturalium rerum explicationes ad abusum trahantur in praejudicium pietatis, tanquam per se materia stare possit, et mechanismus nulla intelligentia aut substantia spirituali indigeat) originem ipsius Mechanismi non ex solo materiali principio mathematicisque rationibus, sed altiore quodam et, ut sic dicam, Metaphysico fonte fluxisse.
And I have already published several times (which I think will be useful, so that mechanical explanations of natural things are not abused to the prejudice of piety, as if matter could stand by itself and mechanism needed no intelligence or spiritual substance) that the origin of Mechanism itself flowed not from a material principle and mathematical reasons alone, but from a higher and, so to speak, Metaphysical source.
10
(4) Cujus inter alia indicium insigne praebet fundamentum naturae legum, non petendum ex eo, ut conservetur eadem motus quantitas, uti vulgo visum erat, sed potius ex eo, quod necesse est servari eandem quantitatem potentiae actricis, imo (quod pulcherrima ratione evenire deprehendi) etiam eandem quantitatem actionis motricis, cujus alia longe aestimatio est ab illa, quam Cartesiani concipiunt sub quantitate motus.
(4) A notable sign of this, among others, is given by the foundation of the laws of nature. It is not to be sought in the conservation of the same quantity of motion, as was commonly thought, but rather in the fact that the same quantity of active power must be conserved, and indeed (which I found comes about in a most beautiful way) also the same quantity of motive action, whose measure is far different from what the Cartesians conceive under the name of quantity of motion.
11
Eaque de re cum duo Mathematici ingenio facile inter primos mecum partim per literas partim publice contulissent, alter penitus in castra mea transiit, alter eo devenit, ut objectiones suas omnes post multam et accuratam ventilationem desereret, et ad meam quandam demonstrationem nondum sibi responsionem suppetere candide fateretur.
Two Mathematicians, easily among the first in ability, discussed this with me partly by letter and partly in public. One came over entirely to my camp; the other, after long and careful airing of the question, abandoned all his objections and candidly admitted that he did not yet have an answer to a certain demonstration of mine.
12
Eoque magis miratus sum, Virum praeclarum in Physicae suae Electivae parte edita, explicantem leges motus, vulgarem de illis sententiam (quam tamen nulla demonstratione, sed quadam tantum verisimilitudine niti ipse agnovit, repetiitque etiam hic novissima dissertatione cap. 3. §. 2) quasi nulla dubitatione libatam assumsisse; nisi forte scripsit antequam prodirent mea, et scripta deinde recensere vel non vacavit, vel in mentem non venit, praesertim cum leges motus arbitrarias esse crederet, quod mihi non usquequaque consentaneum videtur.
All the more was I surprised that the distinguished man, in the published part of his Physica Electiva, explaining the laws of motion, took up the common opinion of them as if untouched by any doubt, although he himself admitted that it rests on no demonstration but only on a certain likelihood, and repeated this in his latest dissertation, chapter 3, § 2. Perhaps he wrote before my work appeared, and afterwards either had no leisure to revise what he had written or it did not occur to him, especially as he believed the laws of motion to be arbitrary, which does not seem to me altogether right.
13
Puto enim determinatis sapientiae atque ordinis rationibus, ad eas quae in natura observantur ferendas leges venisse Deum: et vel hinc apparere, quod a me aliquando Opticae Legis occasione est admonitum et Cl. Molineuxio in Dioptricis postea valde se probavit, Finalem causam non tantum prodesse ad virtutem et pietatem in Ethica et Theologia naturali, sed etiam in ipsa Physica ad inveniendum et detegendum abditas veritates.
For I think God came to lay down the laws observed in nature for determinate reasons of wisdom and order; and that from this alone it appears, as I once pointed out on the occasion of the Optical Law, and as the distinguished Molyneux afterwards strongly approved in his Dioptrics, that the Final cause is useful not only for virtue and piety in Ethics and natural Theology, but also in Physics itself, for finding and uncovering hidden truths.
14
Itaque cum celeberrimus Sturmius in Physica sua Eclectica, ubi de causa Finali agit, sententiam meam retulisset inter Hypotheses, optarem ut in Epicrisi satis expendisset; haud dubie enim inde occasionem fuisset sumturus, multa pro argumenti praestantia et ubertate dicendi praeclara et ad pietatem quoque profutura.
So, since the celebrated Sturm in his Physica Eclectica, where he treats of the Final cause, listed my view among the Hypotheses, I could wish he had weighed it sufficiently in his Epicrisis; for he would doubtless have taken occasion from it to say many fine things, worthy of the excellence and richness of the subject, and useful for piety as well.
15
(5) Sed jam considerandum est, quid ipse de Naturae notione in hac sua Apologetica dissertatione dicat, et quid dictis deesse adhuc videatur. Concedit cap. 4. §. 2, 3, et alibi passim, motus qui nunc fiunt, consequi vi aeternae legis semel a Deo latae, quam legem mox vocat volitionem et jussum; nec opus esse novo Dei jussu, nova volitione, nedum novo conatu, aut laborioso quodam negotio d. §. 3. et a se repellit tanquam male imputatam ex adverso sententiam, quod Deus moveat res ut faber lignarius bipennem, et molitor dirigit molam arcendo aquas, vel immittendo rotae.
(5) But now we must consider what he himself says of the notion of Nature in this Apologetic dissertation, and what still seems lacking in what he says. He grants (chapter 4, §§ 2, 3, and here and there elsewhere) that the motions which now occur follow by virtue of an eternal law once laid down by God, which law he soon calls a volition and a command; and that there is no need of a new command of God, a new volition, still less a new effort or some laborious business (§ 3). And he rejects, as wrongly imputed to him by his opponent, the view that God moves things as a carpenter moves his axe, or as a miller governs his mill by holding back the waters or letting them onto the wheel.
16
Verum enimvero, ut mihi quidem videtur, nondum sufficit haec explicatio. Quaero enim, utrum volitio illa vel jussio, aut si mavis lex divina olim lata extrinsecam tantum tribuerit rebus denominationem, an vero aliquam contulerit impressionem creatam in ipsis perdurantem, vel, ut optime Dn. Schelhammerus judicii non minus quam experientiae egregius vocat, legem insitam (etsi plerumque non intellectam creaturis, quibus inest) ex qua actiones passionesque consequantur. Prius autorum systematis causarum occasionalium, acutissimi imprimis Malebranchii, dogma videtur, posterius receptum est, et ut ego arbitror, verissimum.
But in truth, as it seems to me, this explanation is not yet enough. For I ask whether that volition or command, or if you prefer that divine law laid down long ago, gave things only an extrinsic denomination, or whether it really conferred some created impression lasting in them, or, as Mr Schelhammer, excellent in judgment no less than in experience, very well calls it, an inherent law (though mostly not understood by the creatures in which it is), from which actions and passions follow. The former seems to be the doctrine of the authors of the system of occasional causes, above all of the very acute Malebranche; the latter is the received view and, as I think, the truest.
17
(6) Nam jussio illa praeterita cum nunc non existat, nihil nunc efficere potest, nisi aliquem tunc post se reliquerit effectum subsistentem, qui nunc quoque duret et operetur: et qui secus sentit, omni, si quid judico, distinctae rerum explicationi renunciat, quidvis ex quovis consequi pari jure dicturus, si id quod loco temporeve est absens, sine interposito, hic et nunc operari potest.
(6) For since that past command does not exist now, it can effect nothing now unless it left behind it at that time some subsisting effect which still lasts and operates now. Whoever thinks otherwise renounces, if I am any judge, every distinct explanation of things, and could say with equal right that anything follows from anything, if what is absent in place or time can operate here and now without anything in between.
18
Itaque satis non est dici, Deum initio res creantem voluisse, ut certam quandam legem in progressu observarent, si voluntas ejus fingatur ita fuisse inefficax, ut res ab ea non fuerint affectae, nec durabilis in iis effectus sit productus. Et pugnat profecto cum notione divinae potentiae voluntatisque, purae illius et absolutae, velle Deum et tamen volendo producere aut immutare nihil, agereque semper, efficere nunquam, neque opus vel ἀποτέλεσμα relinquere ullum.
So it is not enough to say that God, creating things in the beginning, willed that they should observe a certain law in their course, if his will is imagined to have been so ineffective that things were not affected by it and no lasting effect was produced in them. And it surely conflicts with the notion of the divine power and will, pure and absolute as it is, that God should will and yet by willing produce or change nothing, always act and never effect anything, and leave behind no work or ἀποτέλεσμα (accomplished result).
19
Certe si nihil creaturis impressum est divino illo verbo: producat terra, multiplicemini animalia; si res perinde post ipsum fuere affectae, ac si nullum jussum intervenisset, consequens est (cum connexione aliqua inter causam et effectum opus sit, vel immediata, vel per aliquod intermedium) aut nihil fieri nunc consentaneum mandato, aut mandatum tantum valuisse in praesens, semper renovandum in futurum; quod Cl. Autor merito a se amolitur.
Certainly, if nothing was impressed on creatures by that divine word, "Let the earth bring forth", "Be fruitful and multiply", if after it things were affected just as if no command had intervened, then it follows (since some connection between cause and effect is needed, either immediate or through some intermediary) either that nothing now happens in accordance with the command, or that the command was valid only for the present and must always be renewed for the future, which the distinguished Author rightly rejects.
20
Sin vero lex a Deo lata reliquit aliquod sui expressum in rebus vestigium, si res ita fuere formatae mandato, ut aptae redderentur ad implendam jubentis voluntatem, jam concedendum est, quandam inditam esse rebus efficaciam, formam vel vim, qualis naturae nomine a nobis accipi solet, ex qua series phaenomenorum ad primi jussus praescriptum consequeretur.
But if the law laid down by God left some expressed trace of itself in things, if things were so formed by the command as to be made fit to fulfil the will of the one commanding, then it must be granted that some efficacy, form or force has been placed in things, such as we usually understand by the name of nature, from which the series of phenomena would follow according to the prescription of the first command.
Original (continued)
English
21
(7) Haec autem vis insita distincte quidem intelligi potest, sed non explicari imaginabiliter; nec sane ita explicari debet, non magis quam natura animae; est enim Vis ex earum rerum numero, quae non imaginatione, sed intellectu attinguntur. Itaque quod petit Vir Cl. c. 4. §. 6 dissertationis Apologeticae, imaginabiliter explicari modum, quo lex insita in corporibus legis ignaris operetur, sic accipio, ut desideret exponi intelligibiliter, ne scilicet credatur postulare ut soni pingantur, vel colores audiantur.
(7) This inherent force can indeed be understood distinctly, but it cannot be explained in terms of the imagination; nor should it be so explained, any more than the nature of the soul. For Force is among the things grasped not by the imagination but by the intellect. So when the distinguished author asks (chapter 4, § 6 of the Apologetic dissertation) that the way an inherent law operates in bodies ignorant of the law be explained imaginably, I take it that he wants it set out intelligibly, so that he is not thought to demand that sounds be painted or colours heard.
22
Deinde si explicandi difficultas ad res rejiciendas sufficit, consequetur, quod ipse sibi injuria imputari queritur, cap. 4. §. 2, quod scilicet omnia non nisi divina virtute moveri statuere malit, quam aliquid admittere naturae nomine, cujus naturam ignoret. Certe pari jure niterentur etiam Hobbes et alii, qui omnes res volunt esse corporeas, quia nihil nisi corpus distincte et imaginabiliter explicari posse sibi persuadent.
Further, if difficulty of explanation is enough to reject things, there will follow what he complains is unjustly imputed to him (chapter 4, § 2): that he would rather hold that all things are moved only by divine power than admit something under the name of nature whose nature he does not know. Hobbes and others, certainly, would rely on the same right, who want all things to be corporeal because they persuade themselves that nothing but body can be explained distinctly and imaginably.
23
Sed illi ipsi ex eo ipso recte refutantur, quod vis agendi rebus inest, quae ex imaginabilibus non derivatur: eamque in Dei mandatum, olim semel datum, res nullo modo afficiens nec effectum post se relinquens simpliciter rejicere, tantum abest, ut foret reddere rem explicatiorem, ut potius deposita philosophi persona esset gladio gordium nodum secare. Ceterum distinctior et rectior Vis activae explicatio, quam hactenus habita est, ex Dynamicis nostris, legumque naturae et motus vera aestimatione in illis tradita et rebus consentanea derivatur.
But they are rightly refuted by the very fact that there is in things a force of acting which is not derived from imaginable things. And simply to throw this force back onto a command of God, given once long ago, which in no way affects things and leaves no effect behind it, would be so far from making the matter clearer that it would rather be to lay aside the character of a philosopher and cut the Gordian knot with a sword. For the rest, a more distinct and correct explanation of active Force than has been had until now is derived from our Dynamics, and from the true measure of the laws of nature and of motion given there, which agrees with the facts.
24
(8) Quodsi quis defensor philosophiae novae, inertiam rerum et torporem introducentis, eo usque progrediatur, ut omnem jussis Dei effectum durabilem efficaciamque in futurum adimens, etiam novas semper molitiones ab ipso exigere nihil pensi habeat (quod Dn. Sturmius a se alienum esse prudenter profitetur), is quam digna Deo sentiat, ipse viderit; excusari autem non poterit, nisi rationem afferat, cur res quidem ipsae aliquamdiu durare possint, attributa autem rerum, quae in ipsis naturae nomine intelligimus, durabilia esse non possint:
(8) But if some defender of the new philosophy, which introduces inertness and torpor into things, should go so far as to take from God's commands every lasting effect and efficacy for the future, and think nothing of requiring ever new contrivances from him (which Mr Sturm wisely declares foreign to his own view), let him see for himself how worthy of God his opinion is. He cannot be excused, however, unless he gives a reason why things themselves can last for some time, while the attributes of things, which we understand in them by the name of nature, cannot be lasting.
25
cum tamen consentaneum sit, quemadmodum verbum fiat aliquid post se reliquit, nempe rem ipsam persistentem; ita verbum benedictionis non minus mirificum aliquam post se in rebus reliquisse producendi actus suos operandique foecunditatem nisumve, ex quo operatio, si nihil obstet, consequatur.
Yet it is reasonable that, just as the word "Let there be" left something behind it, namely the persisting thing itself, so the no less wonderful word of blessing should have left behind it in things some fruitfulness or striving to produce their acts and to operate, from which, if nothing hinders, operation follows.
26
Quibus addi potest, quod alibi a me explicatum est, etsi nondum fortasse satis perspectum omnibus, ipsam rerum substantiam in agendi patiendique vi consistere: unde consequens est, ne res quidem durabiles produci posse, si nulla ipsis vis aliquamdiu permanens divina virtute imprimi potest. Ita sequeretur nullam substantiam creatam, nullam animam eandem numero manere, nihilque adeo a Deo conservari, ac proinde res omnes esse tantum evanidas quasdam sive fluxas unius divinae substantiae permanentis modificationes et phasmata, ut sic dicam;
To this may be added what I have explained elsewhere, though perhaps not yet sufficiently grasped by all: that the very substance of things consists in the force of acting and being acted on. From this it follows that not even lasting things can be produced if no force lasting for some time can be impressed on them by divine power. It would follow that no created substance, no soul, remains numerically the same, and so that nothing is conserved by God, and hence that all things are only certain vanishing or fleeting modifications and, so to speak, apparitions of one permanent divine substance;
27
et quod eodem redit, ipsam naturam vel substantiam rerum omnium Deum esse, qualem pessimae notae doctrinam nuper scriptor quidem subtilis, at profanus, orbi invexit vel renovavit. Sane si res corporales nil nisi materiale continerent, verissime dicerentur in fluxu consistere, neque habere substantiale quicquam, quemadmodum et Platonici olim recte agnovere.
and, what comes to the same thing, that God is the very nature or substance of all things: a doctrine of the worst kind, which a writer, subtle indeed but profane, recently brought into the world or revived. Certainly, if corporeal things contained nothing but the material, they would most truly be said to consist in flux and to have nothing substantial, as the Platonists too rightly recognized long ago.
28
(9) Altera quaestio est, utrum creaturae proprie et vere agere sint dicendae? Ea, si semel intelligamus, naturam insitam non differre a vi agendi et patiendi, recidit in priorem. Nam actio sine vi agendi esse non potest, et vicissim inanis potentia est, quae nunquam potest exerceri. Quia tamen nihilominus actio et potentia res sunt diversae, illa successiva, haec permanens, videamus et de actione;
(9) The second question is whether creatures are to be said to act properly and truly. Once we understand that inherent nature does not differ from the force of acting and being acted on, this falls back into the first. For there can be no action without a force of acting, and conversely a power that can never be exercised is empty. But since action and power are nonetheless different things, the one successive, the other permanent, let us look at action too.
29
ubi fateor, me non exiguam in explicanda celeberrimi Sturmii mente difficultatem reperire. Negat enim, res creatas per se et proprie agere; mox tamen ita concedit eas agere, ut nolit quodammodo sibi tribui comparationem creaturarum cum bipenni a fabro lignario mota. Ex quibus nihil certi exsculpere possum, nec diserte satis explicatum video, quousque ipse a receptis sententiis recedat; aut quamnam distinctam animo conceperit actionis notionem, quae quam non sit obvia et facilis, ex metaphysicorum certaminibus constat.
Here I confess I find no small difficulty in making out the celebrated Sturm's meaning. He denies that created things act by themselves and properly; yet soon he grants that they act, in such a way that he does not want to have attributed to him the comparison of creatures with an axe moved by a carpenter. From this I can extract nothing certain, nor do I see it explained clearly enough how far he departs from received opinions, or what distinct notion of action he has formed in his mind; how far from obvious and easy that notion is, the battles of the metaphysicians show.
30
Quantum ego mihi notionem actionis perspexisse videor, consequi ex illa et stabiliri arbitror receptissimum philosophiae dogma, actiones esse suppositorum; idque adeo esse verum deprehendo, ut etiam sit reciprocum, ita ut non tantum omne quod agit sit substantia singularis, sed etiam ut omnis singularis substantia agat sine intermissione, corpore ipso non excepto, in quo nulla unquam quies absoluta reperitur.
As far as I seem to have grasped the notion of action, I think there follows from it, and is confirmed, the very widely received doctrine of philosophy that actions belong to supposita (individual subjects). And I find this so true that it is also reciprocal: not only is everything that acts a singular substance, but every singular substance acts without interruption, body itself not excepted, in which absolute rest is never found.
31
(10) Sed nunc attentius paulo consideremus eorum sententiam, qui rebus creatis veram et propriam actionem adimunt, quod olim etiam fecere Philosophiae Mosaicae autor Robertus Fluddus, nunc vero Cartesiani quidam, qui putant non res agere, sed Deum ad rerum praesentiam et secundum rerum aptitudinem; adeoque res occasiones esse, non causas, et recipere, non efficere aut elicere.
(10) But now let us consider a little more attentively the view of those who take true and proper action away from created things, as Robert Fludd, the author of the Mosaical Philosophy, did long ago, and as certain Cartesians do now, who think that it is not things that act but God, at the presence of things and according to their aptitude; so that things are occasions, not causes, and receive, rather than effect or bring forth.
32
Quam doctrinam Cordemoius, Forgaeus et alii Cartesiani cum proposuissent, Malebranchius inprimis, pro acumine suo, orationis quibusdam luminibus exornavit; rationes autem solidas (quantum intelligo) adduxit nemo. Certe si eousque producitur haec doctrina, ut actiones etiam immanentes substantiarum tollantur (quod tamen merito rejicit Dn. Sturmius Physicae Elect. lib. 1. cap. 4. Epilog. §. 11. p. 176. et in eo circumspectionem suam luculenter ostendit), adeo a ratione apparet aliena, ut nihil supra.
Cordemoy, La Forge and other Cartesians put forward this doctrine, and Malebranche above all, with his acuteness, adorned it with certain flourishes of style; but no one, as far as I understand, has brought solid reasons for it. Certainly, if the doctrine is pushed so far as to remove even the immanent actions of substances (which Mr Sturm rightly rejects, Physica Electiva book 1, chapter 4, Epilogue § 11, page 176, and in this clearly shows his circumspection), it appears as foreign to reason as anything could be.
33
An enim mentem cogitare ac velle, et in nobis a nobis elici multas cogitationes ac voluntates, ac spontaneum penes nos esse, quisquam in dubium revocabit? Quo facto non tantum negaretur libertas humana, et in Deum causa rejiceretur malorum, sed etiam intimae nostrae experientiae conscientiaeve testimonio reclamaretur, quo ipsimet nostra esse sentimus, quae nulla rationis specie a dissentientibus in Deum transferrentur.
For will anyone call into question that the mind thinks and wills, that many thoughts and volitions are brought forth in us by ourselves, and that there is something spontaneous in our power? To do so would not only deny human freedom and throw the cause of evils back onto God, but would also contradict the testimony of our inmost experience or consciousness, by which we feel that those things are our own which our opponents, with no show of reason, would transfer to God.
34
Quod si vero menti nostrae vim insitam tribuimus, actiones immanentes producendi vel quod idem est, agendi immanenter, jam nihil prohibet, imo consentaneum est, aliis animabus vel formis, aut si mavis, naturis substantiarum eandem vim inesse; nisi quis solas in natura rerum nobis obvia mentes nostras activas esse, aut omnem vim agendi immanenter, atque adeo vitaliter ut sic dicam, cum intellectu esse conjunctam arbitretur, quales certe asseverationes neque ratione ulla confirmantur, nec nisi invita veritate propugnantur.
But if we attribute to our mind an inherent force of producing immanent actions, or what is the same, of acting immanently, then nothing prevents, indeed it is reasonable, that the same force should be in other souls or forms, or if you prefer, in the natures of substances; unless someone thinks that, in the nature of things known to us, only our minds are active, or that all force of acting immanently, and so, as it were, vitally, is joined with intellect. Such assertions are certainly confirmed by no reason, and are defended only in the teeth of the truth.
35
Quid vero de transeuntibus creaturarum actionibus sit statuendum, alio loco melius exponetur, pro parte etiam jam tum a nobis alibi est explicatum: commercium scilicet substantiarum sive monadum oriri non per influxum, sed per consensum ortum a divina praeformatione, unoquoque, dum suae naturae vim insitam legesque sequitur, ad extranea accommodato, in quo etiam unio animae corporisque consistit.
What should be held about the transitive actions of creatures will be better set out elsewhere, and in part I have already explained it elsewhere: namely, that the commerce of substances, or of monads, arises not through influx but through an agreement arising from divine preformation, each being adapted to things outside it while it follows the inherent force and laws of its own nature; and in this the union of soul and body also consists.
36
(11) Quod autem corpora sint per se inertia, verum quidem est, si recte sumas; hactenus scilicet, ut quod semel quiescere aliqua ratione ponitur, se ipsum eatenus in motum concitare non possit, nec sine resistentia ab alio concitari patiatur; non magis quam suapte sponte mutare sibi potest gradum velocitatis aut directionem, quam semel habet, aut pati facile ac sine resistentia, ut ab alio mutetur.
(11) That bodies are of themselves inert is indeed true, if rightly taken: namely, to this extent, that what is once supposed to be at rest in some respect cannot set itself in motion in that respect, nor allow itself to be set in motion by another without resistance; no more than it can of its own accord change the degree of speed or the direction it once has, or easily and without resistance allow it to be changed by another.
37
Atque adeo fatendum est, extensionem, sive quod in corpore est geometricum, si nude sumatur, nihil in se habere, unde actio et motus proficiscatur: imo potius materiam resistere motui per quandam suam inertiam naturalem a Keplero pulchre sic denominatam, ita ut non sit indifferens ad motum et quietem, uti vulgo rem aestimare solent, sed ad motum pro magnitudine sua vi tanto majore activa indigeat.
And so it must be admitted that extension, or what is geometrical in body, taken by itself, has nothing in it from which action and motion could arise; rather, matter resists motion through a certain natural inertia of its own, beautifully so named by Kepler, so that it is not indifferent to motion and rest, as people commonly suppose, but needs for motion an active force the greater in proportion to its size.
38
Unde in hac ipsa vi passiva resistendi (et impenetrabilitatem et aliquid amplius involvente) ipsam materiae primae sive molis, quae in corpore ubique eadem magnitudinique ejus proportionalis est, notionem colloco, et ostendo hinc alias longe, quam si sola in corpore ipsaque materia inesset cum extensione impenetrabilitas, motuum leges consequi; et uti in materia inertiam naturalem oppositam motui, ita in ipso corpore, imo in omni substantia inesse constantiam naturalem oppositam mutationi.
Hence I place the very notion of primary matter, or mass, which is everywhere the same in body and proportional to its size, in this passive force of resisting (which involves impenetrability and something more). And I show that from this follow laws of motion far different from those that would follow if there were in body and in matter itself only impenetrability together with extension; and that, as there is in matter a natural inertia opposed to motion, so in body itself, and indeed in every substance, there is a natural constancy opposed to change.
39
Verum haec doctrina non patrocinatur, sed potius adversatur illis, qui rebus actionem adimunt: nam quam certum est, materiam per se motum non incipere, tam certum est (quod experimenta etiam ostendunt praeclara de motu impresso a motore translato) corpus per se conceptum semel impetum retinere constansque in levitate sua esse, sive in illa ipsa mutationis suae serie, quam semel est ingressum, perseverandi habere nisum.
But this doctrine does not support, but rather opposes, those who take action away from things. For as certain as it is that matter does not begin motion of itself, so certain is it (as fine experiments on motion impressed by a moving carrier also show) that a body of itself retains an impetus once conceived and is constant in its very inconstancy, that is, has a striving to persevere in the very series of its changes on which it has once entered.
40
Quae utique activitates atque entelechiae, cum materiae primae sive molis, rei essentialiter passivae, modificationes esse non possint, uti praeclare (quemadmodum sequente paragrapho dicemus) ab ipso judiciosissimo Sturmio agnitum est, vel hinc judicari potest, debere in corporea substantia reperiri entelechiam primam, tanquam πρῶτον δεκτικὸν activitatis, vim scilicet motricem primitivam, quae praeter extensionem (seu id quod est mere geometricum) et praeter molem (seu id quod est mere materiale) superaddita, semper quidem agit, sed tamen varie ex corporum concursibus per conatus impetusve modificatur.
Since these activities and entelechies cannot be modifications of primary matter or mass, a thing essentially passive, as the very judicious Sturm himself has excellently recognized (as we shall say in the next paragraph), it can be judged from this alone that there must be found in corporeal substance a first entelechy, as the πρῶτον δεκτικόν (first receptacle) of activity: namely a primitive motive force, which, added over and above extension (what is merely geometrical) and mass (what is merely material), always acts, yet is modified in various ways by the collisions of bodies, through strivings or impetuses.
41
Atque hoc ipsum substantiale principium est, quod in viventibus anima, in aliis forma substantialis appellatur, et quatenus cum materia substantiam vere unam, seu unum per se constituit, id facit quod ego Monadem appello, cum sublatis his veris et realibus unitatibus, non nisi entia per aggregationem, imo quod hinc sequitur, nulla vera entia in corporibus sint superfutura.
And this very substantial principle is what is called the soul in living things, and the substantial form in others; and insofar as, together with matter, it constitutes a substance truly one, or one by itself, it makes what I call a Monad. For if these true and real unities were taken away, there would remain in bodies only beings by aggregation, indeed, as follows from this, no true beings at all.
42
Etsi enim dentur atomi substantiae, nostrae scilicet Monades partibus carentes, nullae tamen dantur atomi molis, seu minimae extensionis, vel ultima elementa, cum ex punctis continuum non componatur, prorsus uti nullum datur ens mole maximum, vel extensione infinitum, etsi semper alia aliis majora dentur; sed datur tantum ens maximum intensione perfectionis, seu infinitum virtute.
For though there are atoms of substance, namely our Monads, which lack parts, there are no atoms of mass, or of least extension, or ultimate elements, since the continuum is not composed of points; just as there is no being greatest in mass or infinite in extension, though there are always some greater than others; but there is only a being greatest in intensity of perfection, or infinite in power.
Original (concluded)
English
43
(12) Video tamen celeberrimum Sturmium in hac ipsa Dissertatione Apologetica cap. 4. §. 7 et seqq. insitam corporibus vim motricem argumentis quibusdam impugnare aggressum. Ex abundanti, inquit, hic ostendam, ne capacem quidem esse substantiam corpoream potentiae alicujus ACTIVE motricis. Quanquam ego non capiam, quae possit esse potentia non active motrix. Gemino autem se usurum ait argumento, uno a natura materiae et corporis, altero ex natura motus.
(12) I see, however, that the celebrated Sturm, in this very Apologetic Dissertation (chapter 4, § 7 and following), has undertaken to attack with certain arguments the motive force inherent in bodies. "I will show here, over and above," he says, "that corporeal substance is not even capable of any ACTIVELY motive power." Though I do not understand what a motive power could be that was not active. He says he will use a twofold argument, one from the nature of matter and body, the other from the nature of motion.
44
Prius huc redit: materiam sua natura et essentialiter passivam esse substantiam; itaque ipsi dari vim activam non magis esse possibile, quam si Deus lapidem, dum lapis manet, velit esse vitalem et rationalem, id est non lapidem: deinde quae in corpore ponantur, ea esse tantum materiae modificationes; modificationem autem (quod pulchre dictum agnosco) rei essentialiter passivae non posse rem reddere activam.
The first comes to this: matter is by its nature and essentially a passive substance; so it is no more possible for an active force to be given to it than for God to will a stone, while it remains a stone, to be living and rational, that is, not a stone. Further, whatever is posited in body is only a modification of matter; and a modification of a thing essentially passive (which I grant is well said) cannot make the thing active.
45
Sed responderi commode potest ex recepta non minus quam vera Philosophia: materiam intelligi vel secundam vel primam; secundam esse quidem substantiam completam, sed non mere passivam; primam esse mere passivam, sed non esse completam substantiam; accedereque adeo debere animam, vel formam animae analogam, sive ἐντελέχειαν τὴν πρώτην, id est nisum quendam seu vim agendi primitivam, quae ipsa est lex insita, decreto divino impressa.
But one can readily answer from a Philosophy that is received no less than true: matter is understood either as secondary or as primary. Secondary matter is indeed a complete substance, but not merely passive; primary matter is merely passive, but is not a complete substance. And so there must be added a soul, or a form analogous to a soul, or ἐντελέχεια ἡ πρώτη (first entelechy), that is, a certain striving or primitive force of acting, which is itself the inherent law impressed by divine decree.
46
A qua sententia non puto abhorrere Virum celebrem et ingeniosum, qui nuper defendit, corpus constare ex materia et spiritu; modo sumatur spiritus non pro re intelligente (ut alias solet) sed pro anima vel forma animae analoga, nec pro simplici modificatione, sed pro constitutivo substantiali perseverante, quod Monadis nomine appellare soleo, in quo est velut perceptio et appetitus.
I do not think a celebrated and ingenious man who recently maintained that body consists of matter and spirit is far from this view, provided spirit is taken not for an intelligent thing (as it usually is) but for a soul or a form analogous to a soul, and not for a simple modification but for a persisting substantial constituent, which I am accustomed to call by the name of Monad, in which there is something like perception and appetite.
47
Haec ergo recepta doctrina, et scholarum dogmati benigne explicato consentanea, refutanda est prius, ut argumentum Viri clarissimi vim habere possit; quemadmodum et hinc patet, non posse concedi, quod assumsit, quicquid est in substantia corporea, esse materiae modificationem. Notum est enim, animas inesse viventium corporibus secundum receptam philosophiam, quae utique modificationes non sunt.
This received doctrine, then, which agrees with the teaching of the schools when kindly interpreted, must first be refuted before the distinguished man's argument can have any force. So it is also plain that one cannot grant what he assumed, that whatever is in corporeal substance is a modification of matter. For it is well known that, according to the received philosophy, souls are in the bodies of living things, and they are certainly not modifications.
48
Licet enim Vir egregius contrarium statuere, omnemque veri nominis sensum animalibus brutis animamque proprie dictam adimere videatur; sententiam tamen hanc pro fundamento demonstrationis assumere non potest, antequam ipsa demonstretur. Et contra potius arbitror, neque ordini, neque pulchritudini rationive rerum esse consentaneum, ut vitale aliquid seu immanenter agens sit in exigua tantum parte materiae, cum ad majorem perfectionem pertineat, ut sit in omni; neque quicquam obstet, quo minus ubique sint animae aut analoga saltem animabus, etsi dominantes animae, atque adeo intelligentes, quales sunt humanae, ubique esse non possint.
For although the excellent man seems to hold the contrary, and to take from brute animals all sensation properly so called and any soul in the proper sense, he cannot assume this opinion as the foundation of a demonstration before it is itself demonstrated. And I think, on the contrary, that it agrees neither with the order nor with the beauty or reason of things that something vital, or acting immanently, should be in only a tiny part of matter, since it belongs to greater perfection that it be in all of it; and nothing prevents there being souls everywhere, or at least things analogous to souls, though dominant souls, and so intelligent ones such as human souls are, cannot be everywhere.
49
(13) Posterius argumentum quod ex natura motus sumit Vir Cl. majorem, ut mihi quidem videtur, concludendi necessitatem non habet. Motum ait esse successivam tantum rei motae in diversis locis existentiam. Concedamus hoc interim, etsi non omnino satisfaciat, magisque id quod ex motu resultat, quam ipsam (ut vocant) formalem ejus rationem exprimat; non ideo tamen excluditur vis motrix.
(13) The second argument, which the distinguished man takes from the nature of motion, has, as it seems to me, no greater force to conclude. He says motion is only the successive existence of the moved thing in different places. Let us grant this for the moment, though it does not wholly satisfy, and expresses rather what results from motion than its so-called formal reason; even so, motive force is not thereby excluded.
50
Nam non tantum corpus praesenti sui motus momento inest in loco sibi commensurato, sed etiam conatum habet seu nisum mutandi locum, ita ut status sequens ex praesenti, per se, naturae vi consequatur; alioqui praesenti momento (atque adeo momento quovis) corpus A quod movetur a corpore B quiescente nihil differet, sequereturque ex clarissimi Viri sententia, si nobis ea in re adversa esset, nullum plane discrimen in corporibus fore, quandoquidem in pleno uniformis per se massae discrimen, nisi ab eo quod motum respicit, sumi non potest. Unde etiam amplius tandem efficietur, nihil prorsus variari in corporibus, omniaque semper eodem se habere modo.
For a body is not only, at the present moment of its motion, in a place commensurate with it; it also has an endeavour or striving to change place, so that the following state follows of itself from the present one by the force of nature. Otherwise, at the present moment (and so at any moment) a body A that is moving would not differ at all from a body B at rest; and it would follow from the distinguished man's opinion, if he opposed us on this, that there would be no difference whatever among bodies, since in a plenum of mass uniform in itself no difference can be taken except from what concerns motion. From which it will further follow in the end that nothing at all varies in bodies, and that everything always remains in the same state.
51
Nam si materiae portio quaevis ab alia aequali et congrua non differt (quod admittendum est a Viro Cl. viribus activis impetibusve et quibuscumque aliis, praeter existentiam in hoc loco, successive futuram aliam vel aliam, qualitatibus modificationibusque sublatis) ac praeterea si unius momenti status a statu alterius momenti non nisi transpositione aequalium et congruarum et per omnia convenientium materiae portionum differt; manifestum est ob perpetuam substitutionem indistinguibilium consequi, ut diversorum momentorum status in mundo corporeo discriminari nullo modo possint.
For if any portion of matter does not differ from another equal and congruent one (which the distinguished man must admit, having removed active forces or impetuses and all other qualities and modifications except existence in this place, to be followed successively by existence in another and another); and if, besides, the state of one moment differs from the state of another only by the transposition of portions of matter that are equal, congruent and alike in every respect; it is plain that, because of the perpetual substitution of indistinguishables, the states of different moments in the corporeal world could in no way be told apart.
52
Extrinseca enim tantum foret denominatio, qua distingueretur materiae pars una ab alia, nempe a futuro, quod scilicet imposterum sit futura alio vel alio loco; impraesentiarum vero discrimen est nullum; imo ne a futuro quidem cum fundamento sumeretur, quia nunquam etiam imposterum ad verum aliquod praesens discrimen deveniretur, cum nec locus a loco, nec materia a materia ejusdem loci (ex hypothesi perfectae illius uniformitatis in ipsa materia) distingui ulla nota queat. Frustra etiam ad figuram praeter motum recurreretur. Nam in massa perfecte similari et indiscriminata et plena, nulla oritur figura seu terminatio partium diversarum ac discriminatio, nisi ab ipso motu.
For the denomination by which one part of matter would be distinguished from another would be merely extrinsic, namely from the future, in that it will later be in this or that place; at present there is no difference at all. Indeed, it could not even be taken with any foundation from the future, since even later one would never arrive at any true present difference, for neither place from place nor matter from the matter of the same place (on the hypothesis of that perfect uniformity in matter itself) could be distinguished by any mark. It would be useless, too, to fall back on shape besides motion. For in a perfectly homogeneous, undifferentiated and full mass, no shape, or bounding and distinguishing of different parts, arises except from motion itself.
53
Quodsi ergo motus nullam distinguendi notam continet, nullam etiam figurae largietur; et cum omnia, quae prioribus substituuntur, perfecte aequipolleant, nullum vel minimum mutationis indicium a quocunque observatore, etiam omniscio, deprehendetur; ac proinde omnia perinde erunt, ac si mutatio discriminatioque nulla in corporibus contingeret: nec unquam inde reddi poterit ratio diversarum quas sentimus apparentiarum.
If, then, motion contains no distinguishing mark, it will give none to shape either; and since everything substituted for what was before is perfectly equivalent, not the least sign of change will be detected by any observer, even an omniscient one; and so everything will be just as if no change or distinction occurred in bodies, and no reason could ever be given from this for the different appearances we perceive.
54
Et perinde res foret, ac si fingeremus duas sphaeras concentricas perfectas et perfecte tam inter se quam in partibus suis similares, alteram alteri ita inclusam esse, ut nec minimus sit hiatus; tunc sive volvi inclusam, sive quiescere ponamus, ne angelus quidem, ne quid amplius dicam, ullum poterit notare discrimen inter diversi temporis status, aut indicium habere discernendi, utrum quiescat an volvatur inclusa sphaera, et qua motus lege. Imo ne limes quidem sphaerarum definiri poterit, ob defectum simul hiatus et discriminis; uti motus vel ob solum discriminis defectum agnosci hic nequit.
And it would be as if we imagined two perfect concentric spheres, perfectly alike both to each other and in their parts, one enclosed in the other so that there is not the least gap. Then, whether we suppose the inner one to revolve or to be at rest, not even an angel, to say no more, could notice any difference between the states at different times, or have any sign by which to tell whether the inner sphere is at rest or revolving, and by what law of motion. Indeed not even the boundary between the spheres could be defined, for lack both of a gap and of a difference; just as motion cannot be recognized here, for lack of difference alone.
55
Unde pro certo habendum (etsi hoc minus adverterint, qui satis alte in haec non penetravere), talia a rerum natura atque ordine esse aliena, nullamque uspiam dari (quod inter nova et majora axiomata mea est) perfectam similaritatem; cujus rei consequens etiam est, nec corpuscula extremae duritiei, nec fluidum summae tenuitatis, materiamve subtilem universaliter diffusam, aut ultima elementa, quae primi secundive quibusdam nomine veniunt, in natura reperiri.
Hence it must be held for certain (though those who have not penetrated deeply enough into these matters have hardly noticed it) that such things are foreign to the nature and order of things, and that nowhere is there any perfect similarity (this is among my new and greater axioms). A consequence of this is that there are found in nature neither corpuscles of extreme hardness, nor a fluid of the utmost fineness, nor a subtle matter diffused everywhere, nor ultimate elements such as some call by the name of first or second element.
56
Quorum cum nonnihil perspexisset (ut arbitror) Aristoteles, profundior mea sententia, quam multi putant, judicavit, praeter mutationem localem opus esse alteratione, nec materiam ubique sibi esse similem, ne maneat invariabilis. Dissimilitudo autem illa vel qualitatum diversitas, atque adeo ἀλλοίωσις vel alteratio, quam non satis exposuit Aristoteles, ipsis diversis nisuum gradibus directionibusque, monadumque adeo inexistentium modificationibus obtinetur.
Aristotle, who in my opinion is more profound than many think, having seen something of this (as I believe), judged that besides local change there must be alteration, and that matter is not everywhere like itself, lest it remain unchangeable. That dissimilarity, or diversity of qualities, and so ἀλλοίωσις or alteration, which Aristotle did not sufficiently explain, is obtained through the very different degrees and directions of strivings, and so through the modifications of the monads existing within.
57
Ex quibus proinde intelligi puto, necessario aliud debere poni in corporibus, quam massam uniformem, ejusque nihil utique immutaturam transportationem. Sane qui atomos et vacuum habent, nonnihil saltem diversificant materiam, dum alibi faciunt partibilem, alibi impartibilem, et uno loco plenam, alio hiantem. Sed diu est, quod rejiciendas esse atomos cum vacuo (deposito juventutis praejudicio) deprehendi.
From this, then, I think it is understood that something other than a uniform mass, and a transporting of it that would change nothing at all, must necessarily be posited in bodies. Those who hold atoms and the void at least diversify matter somewhat, making it divisible in one place and indivisible in another, full in one place and gaping in another. But it is long since I found (having laid aside the prejudice of youth) that atoms and the void must be rejected.
58
Addit Vir celeberrimus materiae existentiam per diversa momenta tribuendam esse divinae voluntati; quidni ergo (inquit) eidem tribuatur quod existit hic et nunc? Respondeo, id ipsum Deo haud dubie deberi, ut alia omnia, quatenus quandam involvunt perfectionem; sed quemadmodum prima illa et universalis causa omnia conservans non tollit, sed facit potius rei existere incipientis subsistentiam naturalem, seu in existendo perseverationem semel concessam; ita eadem non tollet, sed potius confirmabit rei in motum concitatae efficaciam naturalem, seu in agendo perseverationem semel impressam.
The celebrated man adds that the existence of matter through different moments must be attributed to the divine will; why then, he asks, should not its existing here and now be attributed to the same? I answer that this is doubtless owed to God, like everything else, insofar as it involves some perfection. But just as that first and universal cause, which conserves all things, does not take away, but rather makes, the natural subsistence of a thing that begins to exist, that is, its perseverance in existing once granted, so the same cause will not take away, but rather confirm, the natural efficacy of a thing set in motion, that is, its perseverance in acting once impressed.
59
(14) Multa quoque alia occurrunt in Apologetica illa Dissertatione, quae difficultatem habent, ut quod ait dict. cap. 4. §. 11, motu de globulo per plures intermedios in globulum translato, globulum ultimum eadem vi moveri qua motus est globulus primus: mihi vero videtur, aequivalente quidem moveri, sed non eadem, cum unusquisque (quod mirum videri possit) sua propria vi, nempe elastica (non jam de elasmatis hujus causa disputo, neque nego mechanice debere explicari motu fluidi inexistentis ac perlabentis) a proximo urgente repulsus in motum agatur.
(14) Many other things also occur in that Apologetic Dissertation that present difficulty, such as what he says in the same chapter 4: that when motion is transferred from one ball through several intermediate ones to another ball, the last ball is moved by the same force by which the first was moved. To me, however, it seems that it is moved by an equivalent force, but not by the same one, since each ball (which may seem surprising) is driven into motion by its own force, namely its elastic force, when repelled by the one pressing next to it. (I do not now dispute about the cause of this elasticity, nor deny that it must be explained mechanically by the motion of a fluid existing within and flowing through.)
60
Sic etiam, quod §. 12 dicit, rem quae primordium motus dare sibi non potest, non posse per se continuare motum, mirum merito videbitur. Constat enim potius, quemadmodum vi opus est ad motum dandum, ita dato semel impetu, tantum abesse, ut vi nova sit opus ad continuandum, ut potius ea opus sit ad sistendum. Nam conservatio illa a causa universali rebus necessaria, hujus loci non est, quae ut jam monuimus, si tolleret rerum efficaciam, etiam tolleret subsistentiam.
So too his saying in § 12, that a thing which cannot give itself the beginning of motion cannot continue motion by itself, will rightly seem strange. For it is rather established that, just as force is needed to give motion, so, once an impetus is given, far from new force being needed to continue it, force is rather needed to stop it. For the conservation by the universal cause that things need is not in question here; as we have already noted, if it took away the efficacy of things, it would also take away their subsistence.
61
(15) Ex quibus rursus intelligitur, doctrinam a nonnullis propugnatam causarum occasionalium (nisi ita explicetur, ut temperamenta adhiberi possint, quae Cl. Sturmius partim admisit partim admissurus videtur) periculosis consequentiis obnoxiam esse, doctissimis licet defensoribus haud dubie invitis. Tantum enim abest, ut Dei gloriam augeat, tollendo idolum naturae; ut potius rebus creatis in nudas divinae unius substantiae modificationes evanescentibus, ex Deo factura cum Spinosa videatur ipsam rerum naturam, cum id quod non agit, quod vi activa caret, quod discriminabilitate, quod denique omni subsistendi ratione ac fundamento spoliatur, substantia esse nullo modo possit.
(15) From this it is again understood that the doctrine of occasional causes defended by some (unless it is explained so that qualifications can be applied, which the distinguished Sturm has partly admitted and seems ready to admit in part) is liable to dangerous consequences, though doubtless against the will of its very learned defenders. For, far from increasing the glory of God by removing the idol of nature, it seems rather, as created things vanish into bare modifications of the one divine substance, to make God, with Spinoza, into the very nature of things; since what does not act, what lacks active force, what is stripped of distinguishability and finally of every reason and foundation of subsisting, can in no way be a substance.
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Certissime persuasum mihi est, Cl. Sturmium, Virum et pietate et doctrina insignem, ab his portentis esse alienissimum. Itaque dubium nullum est, aut ostensurum esse liquido, qua ratione maneat aliqua in rebus substantia vel etiam variatio, salva doctrina sua, aut veritati manus esse daturum.
I am most firmly persuaded that the distinguished Sturm, a man outstanding in both piety and learning, is utterly far from these monstrosities. So there is no doubt that he will either show clearly how some substance, or even variation, remains in things while his doctrine is preserved, or yield to the truth.
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(16) Certe quo magis suspicer, mentem ipsius non satis mihi esse perspectam, nec meam ipsi, multa faciunt. Alicubi fassus mihi est, posse, imo quodammodo etiam debere, quandam divinae virtutis particulam (id est, ut opinor, expressionem, imitationem, effectum proximum, nam ipsa divina vis in partes utique secari non potest) velut rebus propriam et attributam intelligi. Videantur quae mihi transmissa repetiit in Physicae Electivae loco supra citato sub initium hujus schediasmatis. Hoc si (ut ex verbis apparet) eo sensu accipitur, quo animam divinae particulam aurae dicimus, jam sublata inter nos eatenus controversia erit.
(16) Many things make me suspect all the more that I have not sufficiently grasped his meaning, nor he mine. Somewhere he has admitted to me that some small particle of the divine power (that is, I suppose, an expression, imitation, or proximate effect of it, for the divine force itself certainly cannot be cut into parts) can, and in a way even must, be understood as belonging to things and attributed to them as their own. See what he repeated of what he sent me, in the place of his Physica Electiva cited at the beginning of this piece. If this is taken (as the words suggest) in the sense in which we call the soul a particle of the divine breath, then the controversy between us will to that extent be removed.
64
Sed quo minus hanc mentem ipsius affirmare audeam, facit, quod vix uspiam alibi video tale aliquid ab ipso tradi, aut quae inde consequantur exponi; contra vero animadverto, quae passim habet, huic sententiae parum cohaerere, Dissertationem autem Apologeticam in alia omnia ire.
But what keeps me from daring to affirm that this is his meaning is that I hardly see anything of the kind taught by him anywhere else, or its consequences set out; on the contrary, I notice that what he says here and there agrees little with this view, while the Apologetic Dissertation goes in an entirely different direction.
65
Sane cum primum meae in Actis Eruditorum Lipsiensibus mense Martio 1694 de vi insita prolatae sententiae (quam porro illustrat specimen meum dynamicum in iisdem Actis April. 1695) quaedam per literas objecisset, mox accepta responsione mea, perbenigne judicavit nullum inter nos esse discrimen, nisi in loquendi modo; quod cum ego animadvertens, monuissem adhuc nonnulla, ipse jam in contrarium versus, plura inter nos discrimina posuit, quae ego agnosco, vixque his exemtis tandem novissime eo rediit ut denuo scriberet, nisi verborum differentiam inter nos esse nullam, quod mihi futurum esset gratissimum.
Indeed, when he first raised some objections by letter to the view on inherent force that I put forward in the Leipzig Acta Eruditorum for March 1694 (which my Specimen dynamicum in the same Acta for April 1695 further illustrates), on receiving my answer he very kindly judged that there was no difference between us except in the manner of speaking. When, noticing this, I had pointed out some further things, he turned the other way and set out several differences between us, which I acknowledge; and when these had hardly been removed, he lately came back at last to writing once more that there was no difference between us except in words, which would be most welcome to me.
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Volui ergo, occasione novissimae Dissertationis Apologeticae, rem ita exponere, ut denique et de sententia cujusque et de sententiae veritate constare facilius possit. Est enim alioqui magna Viri egregii et in perspiciendo solertia et perspicuitas in exponendo, ut sperem ejus studio non exiguam tantae rei lucem afferri posse,
I wished, then, on the occasion of his latest Apologetic Dissertation, to set out the matter so that it may at last be more easily established both what each of us thinks and whether what we think is true. For the excellent man otherwise has great skill in seeing into things and clarity in setting them out, so that I hope no small light can be brought to so great a matter by his efforts;
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atque adeo vel ideo non inutilem hanc operam meam fore, quod occasionem ei fortasse praebitura est, ea qua solet industria et vi judicii expendendi atque illustrandi nonnulla alicujus in negotio praesente momenti, praetermissa hactenus ab autoribus et a me, ni fallor, novis et altius repetitis et late fusis axiomatibus nonnihil suppleta, ex quibus restitutum emendatumque Systema mediae inter formalem et materiariam philosophiae (conjuncta servataque rite utraque) nasci videtur aliquando posse.
and so that this effort of mine will not be useless, if only because it may give him occasion, with his usual industry and force of judgment, to weigh and illustrate some points of importance in the present business, which authors have so far passed over, and which I have, unless I am mistaken, somewhat supplied by new axioms, drawn from deeper sources and widely applicable. From these, it seems, a restored and corrected System of a philosophy midway between the formal and the material (with both properly joined and preserved) may one day arise.

Notes on text 65.

  1. Publication and occasion. Acta Eruditorum, September 1698. Johann Christoph Sturm (1635–1703), professor at Altdorf, had published De natura sibi incassum vindicata (1692) against the scholastic "idol of nature"; Günther Christoph Schelhammer of Kiel attacked it in Natura sibi et medicis vindicata (1697), and Sturm replied with the Apologia (1698) that Leibniz answers here. Gerhardt prints it at GP IV 504–516.
  2. Greek and OCR. The OCR garbles every Greek word. Restored: χαριεστάτῳ (§ 1), ἐνέργεια (§ 2), στάσιν (§ 3), ὡς ἐν πλάτει and ἀκριβείᾳ (§ 3), ἀποτέλεσμα (§ 6), πρῶτον δεκτικόν (§ 11), ἐντελέχειαν τὴν πρώτην (§ 12), ἀλλοίωσις (§ 13). The first is a reconstruction from the OCR letters and should be checked on the page image. The reference to Sturm's Physica Electiva in § 1 is also uncertain in the OCR ("lib. A. sect. 4"); the bracketed form is a best reading. In § 14 the OCR section numbers ("8. 14" and "$. 42") are read as § 11 and § 12, on the pattern of the OCR's other misreadings of 1 as 4, and should be checked.
  3. "Constans in levitate sua" (§ 11). A deliberate paradox: a body is "constant in its fickleness", that is, it perseveres in its own series of changes.
  4. The "scriptor subtilis at profanus" (§ 8) is Spinoza, named outright in § 15.
  5. "Divinae particulam aurae" (§ 16) is Horace, Satires II.2.79.
  6. Sources and themes in the text.
    • Robert Fludd (§ 10). Leibniz names "Robertus Fluddus, Philosophiae Mosaicae autor" as an earlier denier of the proper action of creatures, the forerunner of the occasionalists. Fludd (1574–1637) was the leading English apologist for the Rosicrucian manifestos and author of the Philosophia Moysaica (Gouda 1638). It is the only mention of Fludd among the principal works translated so far, and it shows that he read Fludd's Mosaical philosophy as a metaphysics of God as the only true agent.
    • The occult principles rejected (§ 2). The "calidum omniscium" of Hippocrates, Avicenna's "Cholcodea" (the giver of forms and souls), the "plastic virtue" of Scaliger and others, and Henry More's "principium hylarchicum" (the Spirit of Nature of the Cambridge Platonists) are all set aside as "partly impossible, partly superfluous". The list is a compact map of the vitalist and Neoplatonic tradition that ran through Paracelsian and Helmontian medicine.
    • "Divinae virtutis particula" (§ 16). Leibniz will accept a "particle of the divine power" in things only as an expression or imitation of it, never as a literal part, which is the line he holds against both Spinoza and the Kabbalistic emanationists.
    • Monads (§§ 10–12). This is one of the first printed uses of "Monas" for Leibniz's substances, and it is joined to the scholastic "first entelechy" and to "something like perception and appetite".
This text in the whole · 1698, a year from which 1,004 pieces are catalogued166316901716