Translations · Text 64 · 1000000

De rerum originatione radicali, 23 November 1697

Reference
GP VII 302–308
Date
1697
Original
Latin
Earlier English
Loemker; Ariew and Garber; Parkinson and Morris; this is a new translation
Principal workMetaphysicsTheology
View

Editor’s note

"On the ultimate origination of things." An untitled manuscript dated by Leibniz, first printed by Erdmann in 1840. The translation follows Gerhardt.

Original
English
1
Praeter Mundum seu Aggregatum rerum finitarum datur Unum aliquod Dominans, non tantum ut in me anima, vel potius ut in meo corpore ipsum ego, sed etiam ratione multo altiore. Unum enim dominans Universi non tantum regit Mundum sed et fabricat seu facit, et mundo est superius et ut ita dicam extramundanum, estque adeo ultima ratio rerum. Nam non tantum in nullo singulorum, sed nec in toto aggregato serieque rerum inveniri potest sufficiens ratio existendi.
Beyond the World, or Aggregate of finite things, there is some One that is Dominant, not only as the soul is in me, or rather as the I itself is in my body, but in a far higher way. For the One dominant over the Universe not only rules the World but also builds or makes it; it is above the world and, so to speak, extramundane, and is thus the ultimate reason of things. For the sufficient reason of existing can be found neither in any single thing nor in the whole aggregate and series of things.
2
Fingamus Elementorum Geometricorum librum fuisse aeternum, semper alium ex alio descriptum, patet, etsi ratio reddi possit praesentis libri ex praeterito unde est descriptus, non tamen ex quotcunque libris retro assumtis unquam veniri ad rationem plenam, cum semper mirari liceat, cur ab omni tempore libri tales extiterint, cur libri scilicet et cur sic scripti. Quod de libris, idem de Mundi diversis statibus verum est, sequens enim quodammodo ex praecedente (etsi certis mutandi legibus) est descriptus. Itaque utcunque regressus fueris in status anteriores, nunquam in statibus rationem plenam repereris, cur scilicet aliquis sit potius Mundus, et cur talis.
Let us suppose that a book of the Elements of Geometry had been eternal, one copy always made from another. It is plain that, although a reason can be given for the present book from the previous one from which it was copied, still, however many books we take going backwards, we will never reach a complete reason, since we may always wonder why such books have existed from all time, that is, why books at all, and why written in this way. What holds of the books holds also of the different states of the World, for the following state is in a way copied from the preceding one (though according to certain laws of change). And so, however far back you go into earlier states, you will never find in the states a complete reason why there should be any World at all rather than none, and why it should be such as it is.
3
Licet ergo Mundum aeternum fingeres, cum tamen nihil ponas nisi statuum successionem, nec in quolibet eorum rationem sufficientem reperias, imo nec quotcunque assumtis vel minimum proficias ad reddendam rationem, patet alibi rationem quaerendam esse. In aeternis enim, etsi nulla causa esset, tamen ratio intelligi debet, quae in persistentibus est ipsa necessitas seu essentia, in serie vero mutabilium, si haec aeterna a priore fingeretur, foret ipsa praevalentia inclinationum ut mox intelligetur, ubi rationes scilicet non necessitant (absoluta seu metaphysica necessitate ut contrarium implicet), sed inclinant. Ex quibus patet, nec supposita mundi aeternitate ultimam rationem rerum extramundanam seu Deum effugi posse.
So even if you supposed the World eternal, since you posit nothing but a succession of states, and find a sufficient reason in none of them, and indeed make not the least progress toward giving a reason however many of them you take, it is plain that the reason must be sought elsewhere. For in eternal things, even if there were no cause, a reason must still be understood. In things that persist, this reason is necessity itself, or essence; in a series of changing things, if it were supposed eternal from the start, the reason would be the prevailing of inclinations, as will soon be understood, where reasons do not necessitate (by absolute or metaphysical necessity, such that the contrary implies a contradiction) but incline. From this it is plain that, even supposing the world eternal, one cannot escape an ultimate extramundane reason of things, that is, God.
4
Rationes igitur Mundi latent in aliquo extramundano, differente a catena statuum seu serie rerum, quarum aggregatum mundum constituit. Atque ita veniendum est a physica necessitate seu Hypothetica, quae res Mundi posteriores a prioribus determinat, ad aliquid quod sit necessitatis absolutae, seu Metaphysicae, cujus ratio reddi non possit. Mundus enim praesens physice seu hypothetice, non vero absolute seu Metaphysice est necessarius. Nempe posito quod semel talis sit, consequens est, talia porro nasci.
The reasons of the World, then, lie hidden in something extramundane, different from the chain of states or series of things whose aggregate constitutes the world. And so we must pass from physical or Hypothetical necessity, which determines the later things of the World from the earlier, to something of absolute or Metaphysical necessity, for which no reason can be given. For the present World is necessary physically or hypothetically, but not absolutely or Metaphysically: that is, granted that it is once such, it follows that such things will come about thereafter.
5
Quoniam igitur ultima radix debet esse in aliquo, quod sit Metaphysicae necessitatis, et ratio existentis non est nisi ab existente, hinc oportet aliquod existere Ens unum Metaphysicae necessitatis, seu de cujus essentia sit existentia, atque adeo aliquid existere diversum ab Entium pluralitate seu Mundo, quem Metaphysicae necessitatis non esse concessimus ostendimusque.
Since, then, the ultimate root must lie in something of Metaphysical necessity, and the reason of an existing thing comes only from an existing thing, there must exist some one Being of Metaphysical necessity, that is, one to whose essence existence belongs; and so there must exist something different from the plurality of Beings, or the World, which we have granted and shown is not of Metaphysical necessity.
6
Ut autem paulo distinctius explicemus, quomodo ex veritatibus aeternis sive essentialibus vel metaphysicis oriantur veritates temporales, contingentes sive physicae, primum agnoscere debemus eo ipso, quod aliquid potius existit quam nihil, aliquam in rebus possibilibus seu in ipsa possibilitate vel essentia esse exigentiam existentiae, vel (ut sic dicam) praetensionem ad existendum et, ut verbo complectar, essentiam per se tendere ad existentiam.
But to explain a little more distinctly how temporal, contingent or physical truths arise from eternal, essential or metaphysical truths, we must first recognize, from the very fact that something exists rather than nothing, that there is in possible things, or in possibility or essence itself, a certain demand for existence, or (so to speak) a claim to exist; in a word, that essence of itself tends toward existence.
7
Unde porro sequitur, omnia possibilia, seu essentiam vel realitatem possibilem exprimentia, pari jure ad existentiam tendere pro quantitate essentiae seu realitatis, vel pro gradu perfectionis quem involvunt; est enim perfectio nihil aliud quam essentiae quantitas.
From this it follows further that all possibles, that is, all that express essence or possible reality, tend with equal right toward existence in proportion to their quantity of essence or reality, or to the degree of perfection they involve; for perfection is nothing other than quantity of essence.
8
Hinc vero manifestissime intelligitur ex infinitis possibilium combinationibus seriebusque possibilibus existere eam, per quam plurimum essentiae seu possibilitatis perducitur ad existendum. Semper scilicet est in rebus principium determinationis quod a Maximo Minimove petendum est, ut nempe maximus praestetur effectus, minimo ut sic dicam sumtu. Et hoc loco tempus, locus, aut ut verbo dicam, receptivitas vel capacitas mundi haberi potest pro sumtu sive terreno, in quo quam commodissime est aedificandum, formarum autem varietates respondent commoditati aedificii multitudinique et elegantiae camerarum.
From this it is understood most clearly that, out of the infinite combinations of possibles and possible series, that one exists through which the most essence or possibility is brought to existence. There is always in things a principle of determination, to be sought from a Maximum or a Minimum: namely, that the greatest effect be obtained at the least, so to speak, expense. And here time, place, or in a word the receptivity or capacity of the world, can be taken as the expense, or the plot of ground on which one must build as advantageously as possible; while the varieties of forms correspond to the convenience of the building and the number and elegance of its rooms.
9
Et sese res habet ut in ludis quibusdam, cum loca omnia in Tabula sunt replenda secundum certas leges, ubi nisi artificio quodam utare, postremo spatiis exclusus iniquis, plura cogeris loca relinquere vacua, quam poteras vel volebas. Certa autem ratio est per quam repletio maxima facillime obtinetur.
And the matter stands as in certain games, where all the places on a Board are to be filled according to fixed rules: unless you use some skill, you end up shut out by awkward spaces and are forced to leave more places empty than you could or wished. But there is a definite method by which the fullest filling is most easily obtained.
10
Uti ergo si ponamus decretum esse ut fiat triangulum, nulla licet alia accidente determinandi ratione, consequens est, aequilaterum prodire; et posito tendendum esse a puncto ad punctum, licet nihil ultra iter determinet, via eligetur maxime facilis seu brevissima; ita posito semel ens praevalere non-enti, seu rationem esse cur aliquid potius extiterit quam nihil, sive a possibilitate transeundum esse ad actum, hinc, etsi nihil ultra determinetur, consequens est, existere quantum plurimum potest pro temporis locique (seu ordinis possibilis existendi) capacitate, prorsus quemadmodum ita componuntur tessellae ut in proposita area quam plurimae capiantur.
So, just as, if we suppose it decreed that a triangle be made, with no further reason to determine it, it follows that an equilateral one is produced; and supposing one must go from point to point, with nothing further determining the route, the easiest or shortest way will be chosen; so, once it is supposed that being prevails over non-being, or that there is a reason why something rather than nothing has existed, or that there must be a passage from possibility to act, it follows, even if nothing further is determined, that as much exists as possibly can for the capacity of time and place (or of the possible order of existing), exactly as tiles are fitted together so that as many as possible go into a given area.
11
Ex his jam mirifice intelligitur, quomodo in ipsa originatione rerum Mathesis quaedam Divina seu Mechanismus Metaphysicus exerceatur, et maximi determinatio habeat locum. Uti ex omnibus angulis determinatus est rectus in Geometria, et uti liquores in heterogeneis positi sese in capacissimam figuram nempe sphaericam componunt, sed potissimum uti in ipsa Mechanica communi pluribus corporibus gravibus inter se luctantibus talis demum oritur motus, per quem fit maximus descensus in summa.
From this it is now wonderfully understood how, in the very origination of things, a certain Divine Mathematics or Metaphysical Mechanism is at work, and how the determination of a maximum takes place. Just as, of all angles, the determinate one in Geometry is the right angle; and as liquids placed among heterogeneous ones arrange themselves in the most capacious figure, the spherical; but above all as, in common Mechanics itself, when several heavy bodies strive against one another, the motion that finally results is the one by which the greatest descent in total is achieved.
12
Sicut enim omnia possibilia pari jure ad existendum tendunt pro ratione realitatis, ita omnia pondera pari jure ad descendendum tendunt pro ratione gravitatis, et ut hic prodit motus, quo continetur quam maximus gravium descensus, ita illic prodit mundus, per quem maxima fit possibilium productio.
For as all possibles tend with equal right to exist in proportion to their reality, so all weights tend with equal right to descend in proportion to their heaviness; and as here that motion results which contains the greatest possible descent of heavy bodies, so there that world results through which the greatest production of possibles takes place.
13
Atque ita jam habemus physicam Necessitatem ex Metaphysica: etsi enim Mundus non sit metaphysice necessarius, ita ut contrarium implicet contradictionem seu absurditatem logicam, est tamen necessarius physice vel determinatus ita ut contrarium implicet imperfectionem seu absurditatem moralem. Et ut possibilitas est principium Essentiae, ita perfectio seu Essentiae gradus (per quem plurima sunt compossibilia) principium existentiae.
And so we now have physical Necessity from Metaphysical. For although the World is not metaphysically necessary, in the sense that its contrary would imply a contradiction or logical absurdity, it is nonetheless physically necessary, or determined, in the sense that its contrary would imply imperfection or moral absurdity. And as possibility is the principle of Essence, so perfection, or the degree of Essence (through which the most things are compossible), is the principle of existence.
14
Unde simul patet quomodo libertas sit in Autore Mundi, licet omnia faciat determinate quia agit ex principio sapientiae seu perfectionis. Scilicet indifferentia ab ignorantia oritur et quanto quisque magis est sapiens, tanto magis ad perfectissimum est determinatus.
From this it is also plain how there is freedom in the Author of the World, although he does everything determinately, because he acts from the principle of wisdom or perfection. For indifference arises from ignorance, and the wiser anyone is, the more he is determined to the most perfect.
Original (continued)
English
15
At (inquies) comparatio haec Mechanismi cujusdam determinantis Metaphysici cum physico gravium corporum, etsi elegans videatur, in eo tamen deficit quod gravia nitentia vere existunt, at possibilitates seu essentiae ante vel praeter existentiam sunt imaginariae seu fictitiae, nulla ergo in ipsis quaeri potest ratio existendi. Respondeo, neque essentias istas, neque aeternas de ipsis veritates quas vocant, esse fictitias, sed existere in quadam ut sic dicam regione idearum, nempe in ipso Deo, essentiae omnis existentiaeque caeterorum fonte.
But (you will say) this comparison of a determining Metaphysical Mechanism with the physical one of heavy bodies, elegant as it may seem, fails in this: the heavy bodies that strive really exist, whereas possibilities or essences, before or apart from existence, are imaginary or fictitious, so no reason for existing can be sought in them. I answer that neither those essences nor the so-called eternal truths about them are fictitious, but that they exist in a certain region, so to speak, of ideas, namely in God himself, the source of all essence and of the existence of all else.
16
Quod ne gratis dixisse videamur, ipsa indicat existentia seriei rerum actualis. Cum enim in ea ratio non inveniatur ut supra ostendimus, sed in metaphysicis necessitatibus seu aeternis veritatibus sit quaerenda, existentia autem non possint esse nisi ab existentibus, ut jam supra monuimus; oportet aeternas veritates existentiam habere in quodam subjecto absolute vel Metaphysice necessario, id est in Deo, per quem haec, quae alioqui imaginaria forent (ut barbare sed significanter dicamus) realisentur.
Lest I seem to have said this without grounds, the very existence of the actual series of things shows it. For since the reason is not found in that series, as shown above, but must be sought in metaphysical necessities or eternal truths, and since existing things can come only from existing things, as already noted, the eternal truths must have their existence in some subject that is absolutely or Metaphysically necessary, that is, in God, through whom these things, which would otherwise be imaginary, are (to use a barbarous but expressive word) realized.
17
Et vero reapse in Mundo deprehendimus omnia fieri secundum leges aeternarum veritatum non tantum Geometricas sed et Metaphysicas, id est non tantum secundum necessitates materiales, sed et secundum rationes formales; idque verum est non tantum generaliter in ea quam nunc explicavimus ratione Mundi existentis potius quam non existentis, et sic potius quam aliter existentis (quae utique ex possibilium tendentia ad existendum petenda est),
And in fact we find in the World that everything happens according to the laws of eternal truths, not only Geometrical but also Metaphysical laws, that is, not only according to material necessities but also according to formal reasons. And this is true not only in general, in the reason we have just explained why the World exists rather than not, and exists thus rather than otherwise (which must be sought in the tendency of possibles to exist),
18
sed etiam ad specialia descendendo videmus mirabili ratione in tota natura habere locum leges metaphysicas causae, potentiae, actionis, easque ipsis legibus pure geometricis materiae praevalere, quemadmodum reddendis legum motus rationibus magna admiratione mea deprehendi usque adeo, ut legem compositionis Geometricae conatuum, olim a juvene, cum materialis magis essem, defensam, denique deserere sim coactus, ut alibi a me fusius est explicatum.
but also, descending to particulars, we see that the metaphysical laws of cause, power and action hold in a wonderful way throughout nature and prevail over the purely geometrical laws of matter themselves. I found this, to my great wonder, in giving reasons for the laws of motion, so much so that I was finally forced to abandon the law of the geometrical composition of strivings, which I had defended as a young man when I was more of a materialist, as I have explained more fully elsewhere.
19
Ita ergo habemus ultimam rationem realitatis tam essentiarum quam existentiarum in uno, quod utique Mundo ipso majus, superius anteriusque esse necesse est, cum per ipsum non tantum existentia, quae Mundus complectitur, sed et possibilia habeant realitatem. Id autem non nisi in uno fonte quaeri potest ob horum omnium connexionem inter se. Patet autem ab hoc fonte res existentes continue promanare ac produci productasque esse, cum non appareat cur unus status Mundi magis quam alius, hesternus magis quam hodiernus ab ipso fluat.
Thus we have the ultimate reason of the reality both of essences and of existences in one being, which must certainly be greater, higher and prior to the World itself, since through it not only the existing things the World contains but also the possibles have their reality. And it can be sought only in one source, because of the connection of all these with one another. It is plain, too, that existing things continually flow forth from this source and are produced, and have been produced, since it does not appear why one state of the World rather than another, yesterday's rather than today's, should flow from it.
20
Patet etiam quomodo Deus non tantum physice, sed et libere agat, sitque in ipso rerum non tantum efficiens sed et finis, nec tantum ab ipso magnitudinis vel potentiae in machina universi jam constituta, sed et bonitatis vel sapientiae in constituenda, ratio habeatur.
It is plain also how God acts not only physically but freely, and how in him lies not only the efficient cause of things but also their end, and how from him we have the reason not only of the greatness or power in the machine of the universe once established, but also of the goodness or wisdom in establishing it.
21
Et ne quis putet perfectionem moralem seu bonitatem cum metaphysica perfectione seu magnitudine hic confundi, et hac concessa illam neget, sciendum est, sequi ex dictis non tantum quod Mundus sit perfectissimus physice, vel si mavis metaphysice, seu quod ea series rerum prodierit, in qua quam plurimum realitatis actu praestatur, sed etiam quod sit perfectissimus moraliter, quia revera moralis perfectio ipsis mentibus physica est. Unde Mundus non tantum est Machina maxime admirabilis, sed etiam quatenus constat ex Mentibus, est optima Respublica, per quam Mentibus confertur quam plurimum felicitatis seu laetitiae, in qua physica earum perfectio consistit.
And lest anyone think that moral perfection or goodness is here confused with metaphysical perfection or greatness, and grant the latter while denying the former, it should be known that it follows from what has been said not only that the World is the most perfect physically, or if you prefer metaphysically, that is, that the series of things that has come forth is the one in which the most reality is actually achieved, but also that it is the most perfect morally, because moral perfection is in truth physical perfection for minds themselves. Hence the World is not only the most admirable Machine, but also, insofar as it consists of Minds, the best Republic, through which the most felicity or joy is conferred on Minds, and in this their physical perfection consists.
22
At, inquies, nos contraria in Mundo experiri, optimis enim persaepe esse pessime, innocentes non bestias tantum, sed et homines affligi occidique etiam cum cruciatu, denique mundum, praesertim si generis humani gubernatio spectetur, videri potius Chaos quoddam confusum quam rem a suprema quadam sapientia ordinatam. Ita prima fronte videri fateor, sed re penitius inspecta contrarium esse statuendum; a priori patet ex illis ipsis quae sunt allata, quod scilicet omnium rerum atque adeo et Mentium summa quae fieri potest perfectio obtineatur.
But, you will say, we experience the opposite in the World: very often the best fare worst; the innocent, not only beasts but also men, are afflicted and killed, even with torture; and in short the world, especially if one looks at the government of the human race, seems rather a confused Chaos than a thing ordered by some supreme wisdom. I admit it seems so at first sight, but when the matter is examined more deeply the contrary must be held. It is plain a priori, from the very things already put forward, that the highest perfection possible of all things, and so also of Minds, is obtained.
23
Et vero incivile est, nisi tota Lege inspecta judicare, ut ajunt Jurisconsulti. Nos porrigendae in immensum aeternitatis exiguam partem novimus, quantulum enim est memoria aliquot millenorum annorum, quam nobis historia tradit. Et tamen ex tam parva experientia temere judicamus de immenso et aeterno, quasi homines in carcere aut si mavis in subterraneis salinis Sarmatarum nati et educati non aliam in mundo putarent esse lucem, quam illam lampadum malignam aegre gressibus dirigendis sufficientem.
And indeed it is improper to judge without having examined the whole Law, as the Jurists say. We know a tiny part of an eternity stretching out without measure; for how little is the memory of some thousands of years that history hands down to us! And yet from so small an experience we judge rashly of the immense and eternal, like men born and raised in a prison, or if you like in the underground salt mines of the Sarmatians, who would think there is no other light in the world than that feeble light of lamps, barely enough to guide their steps.
24
Picturam pulcherrimam intueamur, hanc totam tegamus demta exigua particula, quid aliud in hac apparebit, etiamsi penitissime intueare, imo quanto magis intuebere de propinquo, quam confusa quaedam congeries colorum sine delectu, sine arte, et tamen ubi remoto tegumento, totam Tabulam eo quo convenit situ intuebere, intelliges, quod temere illitum linteo videbatur, summo artificio ab operis autore factum fuisse.
Let us look at a most beautiful painting and cover all of it except a tiny part. What will appear in that part, however closely you look, and indeed the more so the nearer you look, but a confused heap of colours, without choice and without art? Yet when the covering is removed and you view the whole Picture from the proper position, you will understand that what seemed smeared on the canvas at random was made with the highest skill by the author of the work.
25
Quod oculi in pictura, idem aures in Musica deprehendunt. Egregii scilicet componendi artifices dissonantias saepissime consonantiis miscent ut excitetur auditor et quasi pungatur, et veluti anxius de eventu, mox omnibus in ordinem restitutis, tanto magis laetetur, prorsus ut gaudeamus periculis exiguis vel malorum experimentis ipso vel potentiae vel felicitatis nostrae sensu vel ostentamento;
What the eyes find in painting, the ears find in Music. Excellent masters of composition very often mix dissonances with consonances, so that the listener is stirred and as it were pricked, and, anxious as it were about the outcome, rejoices all the more when soon everything is restored to order; just as we enjoy small dangers or trials of misfortune from the very sense or display of our power or our good fortune;
26
vel ut in funambulorum spectaculo vel saltatione inter gladios (sauts perilleux) ipsis terriculamentis delectamur, et ipsimet pueros ridendo quasi jam prope projecturi semidimittimus, qua etiam ratione simia Christiernum, Daniae regem, adhuc infantem, fasciisque involutum tulit ad fastigium tecti, omnibusque anxiis ridenti similis salvum retulit in cunas.
or as at the show of rope-dancers, or in dancing among swords (sauts périlleux), we take pleasure in the very frights; and we ourselves, laughing, half let go of children as if about to throw them. In the same way an ape carried Christian, king of Denmark, while still an infant in swaddling clothes, to the top of the roof, and while everyone was in anguish, brought him back safe to his cradle, as if laughing.
27
Eodem ex principio insipidum est perpetuo dulcibus vesci; acria, acida, imo amara sunt admiscenda, quibus gustus excitetur. Qui non gustavit amara, dulcia non meruit, imo nec aestimabit. Haec ipsa est laetitiae lex, ut aequabili tenore voluptas non procedat, fastidium enim haec parit et stupentes facit, non gaudentes.
On the same principle it is insipid always to eat sweet things; sharp, sour, even bitter things must be mixed in to stir the taste. He who has not tasted bitter things has not earned sweet ones, and will not even value them. This is the very law of joy, that pleasure should not run at an even pitch, for that breeds disgust and makes us dull, not glad.
28
Hoc autem quod de parte diximus quae turbata esse possit salva harmonia in toto, non ita accipienda est, ac si nulla partium ratio habeatur, aut quasi sufficeret, totum Mundum suis numeris esse absolutum, etsi fieri possit ut genus humanum miserum sit, nullaque in universo justitiae cura sit aut nostri ratio habeatur, quemadmodum quidam non satis recte de rerum summa judicantes opinantur.
What we have said, however, of a part that can be disturbed while the harmony of the whole is preserved, must not be taken as if no account were taken of the parts, or as if it were enough for the whole World to be complete in all its numbers, even though the human race might be wretched, and there were no care for justice in the universe and no account taken of us, as some think who judge not quite rightly of the sum of things.
29
Nam sciendum est, uti in optime constituta republica curatur, ut singulis quoad ejus fieri potest bonum sit, ita nec universum satis perfectum fore nisi quantum, licet salva harmonia universali, singulis consulatur. Cujus rei nulla constitui potuit mensura melior, quam lex ipsa justitiae dictans ut quisque de perfectione universi partem caperet et felicitate propria pro mensura virtutis propriae et ejus qua erga commune bonum affecta est voluntatis, quo id ipsum absolvitur, quod caritatem amoremque Dei vocamus, in quo uno vis et potestas etiam christianae religionis ex judicio sapientum etiam Theologorum consistit.
For it should be known that, just as in a well-constituted republic care is taken that it go well with each individual as far as possible, so the universe would not be perfect enough unless individuals were cared for as far as the universal harmony allows. No better measure for this could be set up than the very law of justice, which dictates that each should share in the perfection of the universe, and in a happiness of his own, in proportion to his own virtue and to the will with which he is disposed toward the common good. In this is completed what we call charity and the love of God, in which alone, in the judgment of wise Theologians too, the force and power of the Christian religion itself consists.
30
Neque mirum videri debet, tantum mentibus deferri in universo, cum proxime referant imaginem supremi Autoris et ad eum non tam quam machinae ad artificem (veluti caetera) sed etiam quam cives ad principem relationem habeant, et aeque duraturae sint ac ipsum universum, et totum quodammodo exprimant atque concentrent in se ipsis, ut ita dici possit, mentes esse partes totales.
Nor should it seem strange that so much is granted to minds in the universe, since they most nearly bear the image of the supreme Author, and stand in relation to him not so much as machines to their maker (as the rest do) but also as citizens to their prince; and they will last as long as the universe itself, and in a way express and concentrate the whole in themselves, so that one could say that minds are total parts.
31
Quod autem afflictiones bonorum praesertim virorum attinet, pro certo tenendum est, cedere eas in majus eorum bonum, idque non tantum Theologice, sed etiam physice verum est, uti granum in terram projectum patitur antequam fructus ferat. Et omnino dici potest, afflictiones pro tempore malas, effectu bonas esse, cum sint viae compendiariae ad majorem perfectionem.
As for the afflictions especially of good men, it must be held for certain that they turn to their greater good; and this is true not only theologically but physically, as a grain cast into the earth suffers before it bears fruit. And in general one may say that afflictions, evil for the time being, are good in their effect, since they are short cuts to greater perfection.
32
Ut in physicis qui liquores lente fermentant, etiam tardius meliorantur, sed illi in quibus fortior perturbatio est, partibus majore vi extrorsum versis promtius emendantur. Atque hoc est de quo diceres retrocedi ut majore nisu saltum facias in anteriora (qu'on recule pour mieux sauter). Ista ergo non grata tantum et consolatoria, sed et verissima esse, est statuendum. Atque in universum sentio nihil esse et felicitate verius, et felicius dulciusque veritate.
So in physical things, liquors that ferment slowly are also slower to improve, while those in which there is a stronger disturbance, their parts being driven outward with greater force, are more quickly purified. This is what you might call stepping back so as to leap forward with a greater effort (one steps back the better to jump). These things, then, must be held to be not only pleasing and consoling but also most true. And in general I hold that nothing is truer than felicity, and nothing happier and sweeter than truth.
33
In cumulum etiam pulchritudinis perfectionisque universalis operum divinorum, progressus quidam perpetuus liberrimusque totius Universi est agnoscendus, ita ut ad majorem semper cultum procedat. Quemadmodum nunc magna pars terrae nostrae culturam recepit et recipiet magis magisque. Et licet verum sit, interdum quaedam rursus silvescere aut rursus destrui deprimique, hoc tamen ita accipiendum est, ut paulo ante afflictionem interpretati sumus, nempe hanc ipsam destructionem depressionemque prodesse ad consequendum aliquid majus, ita ut ipso quodammodo damno lucremur.
To crown the universal beauty and perfection of the divine works, a certain perpetual and entirely free progress of the whole Universe must be recognized, so that it always advances to greater cultivation. Just as a great part of our earth has now received cultivation and will receive it more and more. And though it is true that some things at times run wild again, or are again destroyed and laid low, this must be understood as we interpreted affliction a little earlier: this very destruction and laying low serves to attain something greater, so that in a way we profit from the loss itself.
34
Et quod objici posset: ita oportere ut Mundus dudum factus fuerit Paradisus, responsio praesto est: etsi multae jam substantiae ad magnam perfectionem pervenerint, ob divisibilitatem tamen continui in infinitum, semper in abysso rerum superesse partes sopitas adhuc excitandas et ad majus meliusque et ut verbo dicam, ad meliorem cultum provehendas. Nec proinde unquam ad Terminum progressus perveniri.
And to the objection that, if so, the World ought long ago to have become a Paradise, the answer is ready. Although many substances have already reached great perfection, yet because of the infinite divisibility of the continuum there always remain in the abyss of things sleeping parts still to be awakened and advanced to the greater and better, in a word to a better cultivation. And so progress never comes to an End.

Notes on text 64.

  1. Title and date. Leibniz dated the manuscript 23 November 1697 and left it untitled; "De rerum originatione radicali" is Erdmann's title (1840), kept by Gerhardt (GP VII 302–308).
  2. Readings corrected from the OCR. "ad existentiam tendere" (OCR "ad essentiam"), which the sense and the parallel sentence on weights require; "ejus qua erga commune bonum affecta est voluntatis" (OCR "ejus quae affectus est ergo commune bonum voluntatis"), the standard reading; "quoad ejus fieri potest" (OCR "quapote"); "imaginem" (OCR "imagine"). These rest on the sense and the usual printed text and should be checked against the page image.
  3. The ape and King Christian. "Christiernus" is the usual Latin form for Christian II of Denmark (born 1481), of whom the anecdote of the ape on the castle roof was told in Danish chronicles. It is a legend, not a documented event, and the identification should be checked.
  4. "Sarmatian salt mines". The Polish salt mines of Wieliczka and Bochnia, famous as underground towns where workers were said to live without daylight.
  5. "Geometrical composition of strivings". Leibniz refers to his youthful Theoria motus abstracti (1671) and its abandonment once he had arrived at his dynamics of living force (Specimen dynamicum, 1695, queued as a principal work).
  6. Sources and themes in the text.
    • "Mathesis quaedam Divina seu Mechanismus Metaphysicus": the creation of the world as a divine mathematics of maxima is the metaphysical counterpart of the Pythagorean and Kabbalistic theme of God creating by number, which Leibniz also states in the binary-arithmetic material (Imago creationis) and the Wisdom 11:20 motto.
    • Possibles exist "in quadam regione idearum, nempe in ipso Deo": the Platonic region of ideas placed in the divine mind, a commonplace of Renaissance Platonism.
    • Existing things "continue promanare", continually flow forth, from the one source: emanation language again, as in the Discours (XIV, XXXII; text 62) and the Monadologie's "fulgurations" (§ 47; text 61).
    • The world as the "optima Respublica" of minds, with God as prince and minds as citizens and "partes totales", and charity and the love of God as the measure of justice: the same society-of-minds frame as texts 61–63, here tied explicitly to Christian charity.
    • The fermenting liquors that are "more quickly purified" by stronger disturbance borrow the language of chemistry and alchemy for the purification of souls through affliction.
    • The endless progress of the universe toward "meliorem cultum", with "sleeping parts" in the "abyss of things" still to be awakened, is the metaphysical ground of Leibniz's programme for the advancement of the sciences.
This text in the whole · 1697, a year from which 747 pieces are catalogued166316901716