1(1) Superioribus seculis magna erat experimentorum publice extantium raritas. Nam autores veterum tantum narrationes prodigiis quam historiis similiores transscribebant, delectandi potius animo quam proficiendi.
(1) In earlier centuries experiments available to the public were very rare. For authors merely copied out the tales of the ancients, more like prodigies than histories, with a mind to delight rather than to make progress.
2(2) Proximo autem atque nostro vasta Historiae naturalis sylva succrevit. Studio nimirum Chymicorum, Anatomicorum, aliorumque curiosorum hominum, qui non libros tantum, sed et rusticos, opifices, peregrinatores in consilium adhibuere; nec propriis sumtibus laboribusque pepercere. Accessit Typographicae commoditas, qua factum est ut singulorum opes publicae fierent.
(2) But in the last century and our own a vast forest of natural history has grown up. This is owing to the zeal of chemists, anatomists and other curious men, who took counsel not only of books but of peasants, craftsmen and travellers, and spared neither their own expense nor labour. To this was added the convenience of printing, by which the wealth of individuals became public.
3(3) Nihilominus parum admodum profecimus in augendis vitae commodis. Nam pulcherrima quaeque inventa circa rerum naturalium vires Casui potius debentur quam ingenio et rerum contemplationi, et Medicina practica reddita est copiosior magis quam certior: et opifices qui circa physica versantur pauca admodum philosophis debent.
(3) Nevertheless we have advanced very little in increasing the conveniences of life. For all the finest discoveries about the powers of natural things are owed to chance rather than to wit and the contemplation of things; practical medicine has been made more copious rather than more certain; and the craftsmen who work with natural things owe very little to the philosophers.
4(4) Neque hactenus praedicere possumus, oblato quodam experimento novo, quid sit futurum. Scio quosdam Chymicos jactare se statim judicare posse de oblato processu, sive formula operandi, sed quantum illi fallantur in his quae quorumve similia nondum tentavere, et quam inexpectata saepe prodeant ex variis rerum combinationibus atque mixturis quotidie experimur.
(4) Nor can we so far predict, when some new experiment is proposed, what will happen. I know that certain chemists boast they can judge at once of a process or recipe put before them; but how far they are deceived in things which, or the like of which, they have not yet tried, and how unexpected the results often are from the various combinations and mixtures of things, we experience daily.
5(5) Hinc intelligi potest nos causarum admodum ignaros esse. Nimirum ut prognostica Medicum nobilitant, ita in universum praedictiones sunt scientiae causarum signa. Non enim tantum ex effectu erui potest causa, sed et vicissim ex causa potest effectus praevideri. Et facilius est ex causa effectum quam ex effectu causam cognoscere, quorum illud genesis est, hoc analysis; prorsus quemadmodum facilius est cryptice scribere, quam cryptice scripta resolvere.
(5) From this it can be understood that we are very ignorant of causes. For as prognoses ennoble the physician, so in general predictions are the signs of a knowledge of causes. Not only can the cause be drawn out from the effect, but conversely the effect can be foreseen from the cause. And it is easier to know the effect from the cause than the cause from the effect; the former is genesis, the latter analysis; exactly as it is easier to write in cipher than to solve what is written in cipher.
6(6) Itaque sequitur nos tanto experimentorum apparatu non esse recte usos. Nam si artem analyticam veram teneremus, ex quolibet experimento potuissemus ducere conclusiones quasdam, quae semper nos propius duxissent ad causam. Et juncto sufficienti experimentorum numero inter se, potuissemus eruere ipsas causas. Nam ex pluribus illis conclusionibus rursus duxissemus alias semper causae propiores; nec res in infinitum ire potest, et si modo ex datis experimentis causa sufficienter determinata est, poterit inde erui ratiocinando. Si non sit determinata, haec ipsa analysis nobis ostendet, quaenam experimenta adhuc facienda supersint ad causam veram a pluribus aliis quae etiam primo aspectu possibiles videntur, discernendam.
(6) It follows that we have not rightly used so great a store of experiments. For if we possessed the true analytic art, we could have drawn from any experiment certain conclusions that would always have led us nearer to the cause [the print reads "autem analyticam"; "artem" is my reading]. And with a sufficient number of experiments joined together we could have drawn out the causes themselves. For from those several conclusions we should again have drawn others ever nearer to the cause. The matter cannot go on to infinity, and if only the cause is sufficiently determined by the given experiments, it can be drawn out from them by reasoning. If it is not determined, this very analysis will show us which experiments still remain to be made in order to tell the true cause from the several others that at first sight also seem possible.
7(7) Si vero sic pergimus ut nunc solet, etiam regiis sumtibus et summa diligentia tarde proficiemus. Nam saepe quae ex simplici quodam et obvio experimento duci poterant, ea nos maximo apparatu demonstrare conamur, in quo quidem hominum vanitati et pompae nonnunquam satisfit potius quam utilitati publicae. Perit interea tempus, sumtusque et industria non male quidem, non tamen satis bene collocantur.
(7) But if we go on as is now usual, we shall advance slowly even with royal funds and the greatest diligence. For often what could have been drawn from some simple and obvious experiment we try to demonstrate with the greatest apparatus, in which men's vanity and pomp are sometimes satisfied rather than the public good. Meanwhile time is lost, and expense and industry are laid out, not badly indeed, yet not well enough.
8(8) Ita vix ac ne vix quidem serae posteritati proderimus; laboribus vero nostris non fruemur ipsi. Equidem laudanda est cura posteritatis, sed tamen et culpanda est negligentia nostri. Et quemadmodum miser est pater qui jejunat inter opes, ut liberi divitiis abundent, ita inepti sumus si malumus ipsi aeris injuriis expositi fundamenta potius jacere molis immensae, sed cui tectum post aliquot demum secula imponetur, quam aedificium mediocre at firmum struere in quo nos aeque ac posteri nostri commode habitemus.
(8) In this way we shall scarcely, if at all, benefit even a late posterity, and we shall not enjoy our own labours ourselves. Care for posterity is indeed to be praised, yet neglect of ourselves is to be blamed. And as the father is wretched who fasts amid riches so that his children may abound in wealth, so we are foolish if we prefer, exposed to the weather ourselves, to lay the foundations of an immense pile on which a roof will be set only after some centuries, rather than to build a modest but solid house in which we and our descendants alike may live in comfort.
9Quanquam metuendum sit etiam, ut studium nostrum ne posteris quidem prosit. Nam in tanta multitudine et confusione rerum librorumque semper crescente in immensum, desperabitur denique de delectu, et nisi cavebimus, ipso studiorum taedio, ut sunt res humanae periodis obnoxiae fortasse aliquando, aegre superata barbaries redibit.
And yet it is to be feared that our zeal may not profit even posterity. For in so great a multitude and confusion of things and books, always growing beyond measure, men will at last despair of choosing; and unless we take care, from sheer weariness of studies, human affairs being subject to cycles, the barbarism we overcame with such difficulty may perhaps one day return.
10(9) Ut Remedium malo adhibeamus, primum dare operam oportet, ut notitias nostras potiores, quae jam publice prostant, et quas habemus in potestate; habeamus etiam in numerato. Nam nunc quidem similes videmur mercatori sine rationum libro; aut Bibliothecae sine indice. In omnibus enim rebus Tabulis quibusdam atque inventariis opus esse constat, cum tanta sit memoriae nostrae imaginationisque imbecillitas, ut nec retinere omnia, nec eorum quae tenet semper cum opus est reminisci possit: quis autem non videt, quam multi percurrendi sint libri, quot amicorum consulenda experientia, quot a nobis ipsis tentanda, si quis illis praeclaris virorum praestantium in Republica meritis frui velit. Itaque tempus est ut contributiones eorum in publicum aerarium redigantur, et in accepti tabulas sub certis classibus et ut ita dicam rubricis referantur.
(9) To apply a remedy to the evil, we must first see to it that our more important knowledge, which is already public and which we have in our power, we also have in ready cash. For at present we resemble a merchant without an account book, or a library without a catalogue. In all matters, it is agreed, certain tables and inventories are needed, since the weakness of our memory and imagination is such that it can neither retain everything nor always recall what it holds when it is needed. Who does not see how many books must be run through, how many friends' experience consulted, how many things tried by ourselves, if one wishes to enjoy those splendid services of eminent men to the commonwealth? It is time, then, that their contributions be gathered into a public treasury and entered in the books of receipts under fixed classes and, so to speak, rubrics.
11(10) Alterum est, ut notitiae nostrae certo quodam ordine collocentur, qui non tantum ad hoc prosit, ut ipsas cum opus est inveniamus, sed qui utilissimus sit ad alias etiam inveniendas ex ipsis. Ordo autem esse debet a simplicibus ad composita, a generalibus ad specialia. Adhibendaeque Tabulae variae ut res sub oculis esse atque inter se facile conferri possint. Tabulae exhibere debent generum species, specierum gradus, rerum combinationes, et harmonias sive analogias. Nam multum saepe interest ad novarum rerum inventionem quo ordine jam inventa collocentur. [...] Eodem modo Inventis in quolibet genere rerum recte in tabula ordinatis, patebit modus inventa continuandi, id est inveniendi nova, longe facilior quam si quis eadem singulatim et a serie sua velut avulsa, aut dispersa, invenire tentaret.
(10) The second thing is that our knowledge be set in a definite order, one that serves not only for finding it when needed but is most useful for finding other knowledge from it. The order should run from the simple to the composite, from the general to the special. Various tables should be used so that things may lie before the eyes and be easily compared with one another. The tables should show the species of genera, the degrees of species, the combinations of things, and the harmonies or analogies. For it often matters greatly for discovering new things in what order the things already found are arranged. [Leibniz here shows with a table of square and odd numbers how a series, once set out, reveals an easy rule for continuing it.] In the same way, when the discoveries in any kind of thing are rightly ordered in a table, the way of continuing them, that is of finding new ones, will lie open, far more easily than if one tried to find the same things singly, torn as it were from their series or scattered.
12(11) Tertium est ut initio habeatur delectus, et de plerisque rebus colligantur, sed primaria tantum. Cum enim nihil sit tempore pretiosius, et multo melius sit absolvere aliquid mediocre, quam nequicquam incipere aliquid magnum: ideo satius erit initio nos moderari curiositatem nostram, et potius primaria de plerisque rebus colligere, ut integrum aliquod corpus constituatur, quam minutissima quaeque congerere, sed de paucis tantum rebus. Omnia enim naturae opera mirifice conspirant, ac se mutuo interpretantur, faciliusque est observationes in unaquaque materia omissas, quam in toto corpore integras materias supplere. Denique qui causas rerum quaerit, ad pauca respicere non debet.
(11) The third thing is that at the outset a selection be made, and that things be collected about most subjects, but only the chief ones. Since nothing is more precious than time, and it is much better to finish something moderate than to begin something great in vain, it will be better at first to restrain our curiosity and gather the chief points about most things, so that a complete body may be formed, than to heap up every smallest detail about a few things only. For all the works of nature conspire wonderfully and interpret one another, and it is easier to supply observations omitted in a given subject than whole subjects missing from the entire body. Finally, he who seeks the causes of things must not look to a few things only.
13(12) Primaria sunt maxime utilia tum ad praxin seu usum vitae, tum ad theoriam. Ad theoriam praxi profuturam id est causarum inventionem praestat cognoscere primum fundamentalia (id est ex quibus caetera pleraque per consequentias duci possunt) generaliora, simpliciora. Praxeos causa annotandae observationes potissimae quarum usus apparet in vita, seu quibus utuntur homines in sua quisque arte, quaeque omnibus obvia non sunt, et naturalibus maxime arcanis constant. Theoriae autem causa omittenda sunt quaecunque facili consequentia, aut certo calculo ex fundamentalibus ducuntur, ne multitudine oneremur. Itaque annotanda potissimum non quae sunt rationis, sed quae sunt facti, sive quae experientia proprie constant; spectantque ad Historiam naturalem, haec enim non possunt ingenio suppleri sed quodammodo fortunae primi observantis aut traditioni artificum debentur, adeoque maxime merentur in aerarium referri.
(12) The chief things are those most useful both for practice, or the use of life, and for theory. For a theory that will profit practice, that is for the discovery of causes, it is best to know first the fundamentals (those from which most other things can be drawn by consequence), the more general and the simpler. For the sake of practice the principal observations are to be noted whose use is seen in life, or which men employ each in his own art, and which are not obvious to all and consist above all of the secrets of nature. For the sake of theory whatever follows from the fundamentals by easy consequence or sure calculation should be left out, so that we are not burdened by the multitude. What is chiefly to be noted, then, is not what belongs to reason but what belongs to fact, what rests properly on experience and concerns natural history; for these things cannot be supplied by wit but are owed in a way to the fortune of the first observer or to the tradition of the craftsmen, and so most deserve to be entered in the treasury.
14Quibus jungendae observationes, quas per inductionem variis inter se junctis experimentis ipsi formavimus. Generaliora autem praefero, malim enim exempli causa observationes de plantis in universum, quam singularium quarundam plantarum historias, nisi cum valde efficaces sunt, aut totam botanices oeconomiam illustrant. Nam per singularia ire infinitum est. Adde quod semper generalia faciliorem praebent aditum ad causae inventionem. Itaque malo etiam observationes plerumque veras, quam instantias raras et singulares (nisi cum aliquid valde notabile ex his duci potest), nam instantiae singulares serviunt potius ad destruendas falsas hypotheses, quam condendas veras. Simpliciora quoque utiliora sunt ad causarum inventionem, quia in valde complicatis ignoratur cuinam ex iis quae rei compositionem ingrediuntur ascribendus sit effectus. Itaque res traducenda a speciebus organicis ad corpora magis similaria, et a subjectis ad qualitates, et a qualitatibus occultis (inter quas calorem et frigus numero) ad manifestas, quales sunt motus, consistentia.
To these should be joined the observations we have ourselves formed by induction from various experiments combined. I prefer the more general: I would rather have, for example, observations on plants in general than the histories of certain particular plants, unless they are very powerful or illuminate the whole economy of botany. For to go through particulars is endless. Besides, general things always give easier access to the discovery of the cause. So too I prefer observations that are true for the most part to rare and singular instances (unless something very notable can be drawn from them), for singular instances serve rather to destroy false hypotheses than to found true ones. Simpler things are also more useful for discovering causes, because in very complicated things one does not know to which of the ingredients of the compound the effect is to be ascribed. The inquiry must therefore be led from organic species to more homogeneous bodies, from subjects to qualities, and from occult qualities (among which I count heat and cold) to manifest ones, such as motion and consistency.
15(13) Quartum est ut subductis accepti rationibus, appareat, quid a nobis praestari jam possit, et adhuc praestandum supersit. Separetur certum ab incerto, probabile ab improbabili: fiat catalogus desideratorum, proponantur interrogatoria, denique praescribantur experimenta decretoria.
(13) The fourth thing is that, the account of receipts being cast up, it should appear what we can already do and what still remains to be done. Let the certain be separated from the uncertain, the probable from the improbable; let a catalogue of desiderata be made, let questionnaires be proposed, and finally let decisive experiments be prescribed.
16Subduci autem rationes sic intelligo: quemadmodum is qui cryptice scripta explicare conatur, interdum deprehendit partem legum quibus clavis autor usus est, modificationes autem nonnullas quibus res involvitur adhuc ignorat easque ex ea quam prae manibus habet epistola derivare non possit nec si angelico quidem ingenio esset, quia non est in illa sufficiens numerus exemplorum; itaque vel unicam adhuc epistolam expectat, inque ea casum aliquem venatur quo deprehenso praevidet rem liquidam fore. Eodem modo nos insidiari debemus naturae, eamque deprehensam equuleo fatigare, id est excogitare experimenta decretoria, quae aliquam quaestionem resolvere possunt; ita ut enumeratis variis modis possibilibus, atque exclusis in vera causa quiescamus.
By casting up the account I mean this. He who tries to explain writings in cipher sometimes detects part of the rules the author of the key has used, but is still ignorant of some of the modifications in which the matter is wrapped, and could not derive them from the letter he has in hand even if he had the wit of an angel, because it does not contain a sufficient number of examples. So he waits for even one more letter, and hunts in it for some case which, once caught, he foresees will make the matter clear. In the same way we must lie in wait for nature and, having caught her, weary her on the rack: that is, devise decisive experiments that can resolve some question, so that, the various possible ways being enumerated and excluded, we may rest in the true cause.
17Quoties autem in nostra potestate non est sumere experimentum quo indigemus, sed expectandus est fortunae favor; poterimus admonere ejus rei tum nostrum seculum tum posteritatem, quod Astronomi quoque facere solent. Interea autem satis habebimus separare incertum ab incerto, ac definire quid jam demonstratum, quid adhuc problematicum, quid interim probabilius tutiusque atque in praxi sequendum. Possumus aliquando et gradum definire probabilitatis, cum utrinque magna est species indiciorum et quaestio magni momenti est. Ipsa enim probabilitas aestimari certis rationibus potest.
Whenever it is not in our power to make the experiment we need, and the favour of fortune must be awaited, we can give notice of it both to our own age and to posterity, as astronomers also do. Meanwhile we shall be content to separate the certain from the uncertain [the print has "incertum ab incerto"] and to define what is already demonstrated, what is still problematic, and what is for the present more probable and safer and to be followed in practice. Sometimes we can also define the degree of probability, when the show of evidence is great on both sides and the question is of great moment. For probability itself can be estimated by sure reasons.
18Hac ratione autem denique ab Hypothesibus arbitrariis liberabimur, quae ad res eleganti et jucundo sermone explicandas valent, ad praedicendum aliquid ineptae, ad producendum inefficaces plerumque deprehenduntur. Danda itaque opera est, ut Naturam ex natura explicemus; experimenta nimirum specialia et occulta, ex causis generalibus et manifestis, quarum veritas indubitata est. Quid enim opus est recurrere ad fictitia corpuscula, cum causa reddi potest per aerem, lumen, et corpora quorum existentia certa est.
By this means we shall at last be freed from arbitrary hypotheses, which serve for explaining things in elegant and pleasing discourse but are mostly found unfit for predicting anything and powerless to produce anything. We must therefore take pains to explain nature from nature: that is, special and hidden experiments from general and manifest causes whose truth is beyond doubt. For what need is there to resort to fictitious corpuscles, when the cause can be given through air, light and bodies whose existence is certain?