Translations · Text 94 · 1011110

Addition à l'explication du système nouveau, Part 2 and end: confused thoughts, the resemblance of sensations, the mark of a true idea

Reference
GP IV 574–577
Date
1702
Original
French
Earlier English
this is a new translation
MetaphysicsMind and body
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Editor’s note

Leibniz answers Lamy's claims that the mind is united to the body "passively but not actively", that confused sensations differ essentially from distinct thoughts, and that God attaches ideas to brain traces arbitrarily. Against the Cartesian consensus he defends a resemblance (expression) between sensations and their bodily causes, and ends with his criterion of a true idea. New translation from Gerhardt; Lamy's words are in italics.

Original
English
1
[1] Nostre auteur soûtient que l'esprit est uni passivement au corps, mais non pas activement, parceque selon luy il n'y a point de partie du corps qui n'agisse sur l'esprit, au lieu qu'il y a des parties du corps, sur lesquelles l'esprit n'agit point. Mais il paroist plustost que cela doit tousjours estre reciproque, et qu'il n'y a jamais action entre les creatures sans reaction. Il soûtient aussi, que le corps est uni activement à l'esprit en tout, mais non pas passivement, parceque l'esprit estant indivisible, le corps ne peut le toucher que tout entier, au lieu que selon luy l'esprit a des pensées purement intelligibles qui ne touchent point le corps. Mais il paroist encor que le corps se ressent aussi de nos pensées abstraites, et l'experience fait voir que les meditations sont capables de luy faire du tort: car les pensées les plus abstraites employent tousjours quelques signes qui touchent l'imagination, outre l'attention qui bande les fibres du cerveau. Il paroist aussi qu'il est plus exact de dire que les esprits sont là où ils operent immediatement, que de dire, comme on fait icy, qu'ils sont nulle part. J'ay expliqué ailleurs, comment je l'entends, quand je dis que les Esprits operent sur les corps.
[1] Our author maintains that the mind is united to the body passively, but not actively, because according to him there is no part of the body that does not act on the mind, whereas there are parts of the body on which the mind does not act. But it seems rather that this must always be reciprocal, and that there is never action among creatures without reaction. He also maintains that the body is united to the mind actively in everything, but not passively, because the mind, being indivisible, can be touched by the body only as a whole, whereas according to him the mind has purely intelligible thoughts that do not touch the body. But it seems again that the body also feels the effects of our abstract thoughts, and experience shows that meditation can do it harm: for the most abstract thoughts always employ some signs that touch the imagination, besides the attention that strains the fibres of the brain. It also seems more exact to say that minds are where they operate immediately than to say, as is done here, that they are nowhere. I have explained elsewhere how I understand it when I say that Minds operate on bodies.
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[2] On conçoit ordinairement les pensées confuses comme d'un genre entierement different des pensées distinctes, et nostre auteur juge que l'esprit est plus uni au corps par les pensées confuses que par les distinctes. Cela n'est pas sans fondement, car les pensées confuses marquent nostre imperfection, passions et dependance de l'assemblage des choses exterieures ou de la matiere, au lieu que la perfection, force, empire, liberté et action de l'ame consistent principalement dans nos pensées distinctes. Cependant il ne laisse pas d'estre vray que dans le fonds les pensées confuses ne sont autre chose qu'une multitude de pensées qui sont en elles mêmes comme les distinctes, mais qui sont si petites que chacune à part n'excite pas nostre attention et ne se fait point distinguer. On peut même dire qu'il y en a tout à la fois un nombre veritablement infini enveloppé dans nos sentimens. C'est en cela que consiste veritablement la grande difference qu'il y a entre les pensées confuses et les distinctes, qui est justement la même qu'il y a entre les machines de la nature et de l'art, expliquée lorsqu'on a publié le systeme nouveau dans le Journal des Sçavans. Ainsi on ne peut dire que les pensées confuses different essentiellement entre elles que de la même maniere qu'on peut dire que les corps ou mouvemens different entre eux. Il est vray que nostre auteur paroist d'une autre opinion, croyant que le sentiment de la douleur differe essentiellement de celui de la chaleur, bien que la difference des mouvemens du feu qui causent la douleur, et la chaleur ne different que de plus et du moins. Cependant on peut dire que le sentiment agreable d'une chaleur moderée, et le sentiment douloureux d'une chaleur excessive sont egalement representatifs des mouvemens de la matiere et ne different que comme eux, la reflexion de l'ame mise à part. Ainsi il ne faut point concevoir les sensations confuses comme quelque chose de primitif et d'inexplicable, autrement on les mettroit à peu prés sur le pied des anciennes qualités de quelques philosophes de l'ecole, aux quelles on ne feroit que substituer ces sensations, en voulant soutenir cette difference essentielle, ce qui ne seroit que transporter la difficulté.
[2] Confused thoughts are ordinarily conceived as of a kind entirely different from distinct thoughts, and our author judges that the mind is more united to the body by confused thoughts than by distinct ones. This is not without foundation, for confused thoughts mark our imperfection, our passions and our dependence on the assemblage of external things, or on matter, whereas the perfection, force, dominion, freedom and action of the soul consist chiefly in our distinct thoughts. Yet it remains true that at bottom confused thoughts are nothing but a multitude of thoughts which in themselves are like distinct ones, but are so small that each by itself does not excite our attention and does not make itself distinguished. One may even say that there is at once a truly infinite number of them enveloped in our sensations. It is in this that the great difference between confused and distinct thoughts truly consists, and it is exactly the same as that between the machines of nature and those of art, explained when the new system was published in the Journal des sçavans. So one can say that confused thoughts differ essentially from one another only in the same way as one can say that bodies or motions differ from one another. It is true that our author seems to be of another opinion, believing that the sensation of pain differs essentially from that of heat, although the motions of the fire that cause the pain and the heat differ only by more and less. Yet one may say that the pleasant sensation of a moderate heat and the painful sensation of an excessive heat are equally representative of the motions of matter and differ only as those motions do, setting aside the soul's reflection. So confused sensations must not be conceived as something primitive and inexplicable; otherwise we should put them roughly on the footing of the old qualities of some scholastic philosophers, merely substituting these sensations for them in maintaining this essential difference, which would only move the difficulty elsewhere.
Original
English
3
[3] Et quoyqu'il soit vray que leur entiere explication passe nos forces, à cause de la trop grande multitude des varietés enveloppées, on ne laisse pas d'y penetrer de plus en plus par des experiences qui y font decouvrir des fondemens des pensées distinctes, dont la lumiere et les couleurs nous fournissent des exemples. Ces sentimens confus ne sont pas arbitraires non plus, et on ne demeure point d'accord de l'opinion receue aujourdhuy par plusieurs, et suivie par nostre auteur, qu'il n'y a point de ressemblance ou rapport entre nos sensations et les traces corporelles. Il paroist plustost que nos sentimens les representent et les expriment parfaitement. Quelqu'un dira peutestre que le sentiment de la chaleur ne ressemble pas au mouvement: oui, sans doute, il ne ressemble pas à un mouvement sensible, tel que celui d'une roue de carosse, mais il ressemble à l'assemblage des petits mouvemens du feu et des organes qui en font la cause, ou plustost il n'est que leur representation. C'est comme la blancheur ne ressemble pas à un miroir spherique convexe, cependant elle n'est autre chose que l'assemblage de quantité de petits miroirs convexes tels qu'on voit dans l'écume, en la regardant de prés. Et si nous pouvions tousjours decouvrir avec la même facilité les causes de nos sensations, nous trouverions que c'est tousjours quelque chose d'approchant. Ainsi toutes les declamations et pointes employées contre l'école et contre la philosophie ordinaire qui enseigne la ressemblance de nos sensations avec les traces des objets, sont inutiles et ne viennent que des considerations trop superficielles.
[3] And although it is true that their complete explanation is beyond our powers because of the excessive multitude of varieties enveloped, we nevertheless penetrate further and further into them by experiments that reveal in them foundations of distinct thoughts, of which light and colours give us examples. Nor are these confused sensations arbitrary; and we do not agree with the opinion received today by many, and followed by our author, that there is no resemblance or relation between our sensations and the bodily traces. It seems rather that our sensations represent and express them perfectly. Someone will perhaps say that the sensation of heat does not resemble motion. Yes, no doubt it does not resemble a sensible motion such as that of a carriage wheel; but it resembles the assemblage of the small motions of the fire and of the organs that cause it, or rather it is nothing but their representation. It is as whiteness does not resemble a convex spherical mirror, and yet it is nothing but the assemblage of a quantity of small convex mirrors such as one sees in foam when one looks at it closely. And if we could always discover the causes of our sensations with the same ease, we should find that it is always something of the kind. So all the declamations and witticisms used against the School and against the ordinary philosophy, which teaches the resemblance of our sensations to the traces of objects, are useless and come only from too superficial considerations.
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[4] D'où il paroist aussi que Dieu ne presente pas à l'ame les idées telles qu'il luy plaist à l'occasion des traces du cerveau, comme dit l'auteur, mais telles qu'exige la ressemblance. Et il y a lieu de s'etonner, que des Philosophes excellens de ce temps peuvent concevoir que Dieu agit d'une maniere si arbitraire et si peu determinée (c'est à dire si destituée de raison), en establissant les loix de la nature soit pour les pensées soit pour les mouvemens. Ce n'est pas assez employer sa sagesse, qui est tousjours determinée à choisir le plus convenable. Ainsi si Dieu attachoit le sentiment de saveur à la trace qui resulte dans le cerveau à l'occasion de l'ebranlement de l'oreille, comme nostre auteur croit qu'il luy estoit libre de faire, ce seroit comme si un peintre representoit la cupola de S. Pierre par la figure d'une pyramide. Et alors on pourroit dire veritablement que nos sens nous tromperoient. Car dans l'objection que nostre auteur se fait sur un autre fondement, comme si quelqu'un pourroit dire, que Dieu nous jette dans l'erreur par nos sens, en nous faisant rapporter aux corps des qualités sensibles qui ne sont que des manieres de nostre esprit, il suppose ce qui n'est point. Car ces qualités sensibles sont des manieres ou modifications des corps et non pas de nostre esprit; et nos sensations sont à la verité des façons d'estre de l'ame, mais qui representent celles du corps. Il est vray que nos sentimens ne ressemblent point aux seules modifications de l'etendue ou de l'espace, et c'est ce que nostre auteur fait bien voir, mais aussi a-t-on assés monstré, qu'il y a quelque chose de plus dans le corps que de l'étendue.
[4] From which it appears also that God does not present ideas to the soul as he pleases on the occasion of the traces in the brain, as the author says, but as resemblance requires. And it is surprising that excellent Philosophers of our time can conceive God acting in so arbitrary and undetermined a manner (that is, so devoid of reason) in establishing the laws of nature, whether for thoughts or for motions. That is not to make enough use of his wisdom, which is always determined to choose what is most fitting. So if God attached the sensation of taste to the trace produced in the brain on the occasion of a shaking of the ear, as our author believes he was free to do, it would be as if a painter represented the dome of St Peter's by the figure of a pyramid; and then one could truly say that our senses would deceive us. For in the objection our author raises against himself on another ground, as if someone could say that God leads us into error through our senses by making us ascribe to bodies sensible qualities that are only modes of our mind, he supposes what is not so. These sensible qualities are modes or modifications of bodies and not of our mind; our sensations are indeed ways of being of the soul, but ways that represent those of the body. It is true that our sensations do not resemble the bare modifications of extension or space, as our author shows well; but it has been sufficiently shown that there is something more in body than extension.
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[5] Pour ce qui est des combats qu'on suppose entre le corps et l'ame, ce n'est autre chose que la diversité des penchans nés des pensées distinctes ou des pensées confuses, c'est à dire des raisons ou des instincts et passions: l'instinct estant pour ainsi dire une passion durable et née avec nous, et la passion estant comme un instinct passager et survenu; à quoy on pourroit joindre l'accoustumance qui tient le milieu entre ces deux sortes d'inclinations, estant plus durable que la passion, mais non pas née avec nous comme l'instinct.
[5] As for the struggles supposed between body and soul, they are nothing but the diversity of inclinations born of distinct thoughts or of confused thoughts, that is, of reasons, or of instincts and passions: instinct being, so to speak, a lasting passion born with us, and passion being like a passing, supervening instinct. To these one might add habit, which holds the middle between these two kinds of inclination, being more lasting than passion but not born with us like instinct.
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[6] Avant que de finir, j'adjouteray sur ce que l'auteur croit que nous n'avons que l'idée de Dieu, et non pas celles des creatures, que j'ay monstré ailleurs comment on dispute inutilement sur cela, tant qu'on n'a point de marque d'une vraye idée. Voicy celle que j'ay donnée autresfois: Les idées sont confusement en nous, mais nous les voyons distinctement, quand nous pouvons demonstrer a priori la possibilité de l'objet. Celuy qui peut faire cela, a droit de s'attribuer la veue des idées; autrement il se vante inutilement d'un si grand avantage. C'est le moyen de finir les controverses sur ce sujet par une epreuve de practique.
[6] Before ending I will add, on the author's belief that we have only the idea of God and not those of creatures, that I have shown elsewhere how uselessly people dispute about this as long as they have no mark of a true idea. Here is the one I once gave: Ideas are in us confusedly, but we see them distinctly when we can demonstrate a priori the possibility of the object. Whoever can do this has the right to claim the vision of ideas; otherwise he boasts in vain of so great an advantage. This is the way to end controversies on this subject by a practical test.

Notes to text 94

  1. Action and reaction among creatures. Leibniz rejects Lamy's asymmetries (mind united to body "passively, not actively", and the reverse) with a general rule that there is never action among creatures without reaction, read in his system as mutual correspondence of expression. The remark that meditation can harm the body, since abstract thought uses signs and "strains the fibres of the brain", is a characteristic piece of Leibnizian psychophysiology.
  2. Where minds are. Against the Cartesian claim that minds are "nowhere", Leibniz places them where they operate immediately, the position he will later defend to Des Bosses and Clarke (the soul is in the body by its operation, not by extension).
  3. Machines of nature and of art. The difference between confused and distinct thoughts matches that between natural machines, which are machines in their least parts to infinity, and artificial ones, which are not; this goes back to the Système nouveau §10 (text 63) and returns in Monadology §64.
  4. Sensations resemble their causes. This is one of Leibniz's sharpest statements against the Cartesian and Lockean doctrine that secondary qualities bear no resemblance to their causes. The foam of small convex mirrors producing whiteness is a favourite example (it recurs in the Nouveaux essais II.8 and II.9). "Resemblance" here means expression, an ordered correspondence, not pictorial likeness.
  5. The dome and the pyramid. If God could attach the taste of something to a shaking of the ear, our senses would indeed deceive us; so the occasionalist's "arbitrary institution" makes God either unwise or a deceiver. Leibniz's image of a painter rendering St Peter's dome as a pyramid makes the point.
  6. Instinct, passion, habit. A compact and quotable taxonomy: instinct is a lasting, innate passion; passion a passing, supervening instinct; habit (accoutumance) lies between them.
  7. The mark of a true idea. Against Malebranche's and Lamy's thesis that we see only the idea of God (and all else in God), Leibniz restates his criterion from the Meditationes de cognitione, veritate et ideis (1684): we have a true idea when we can demonstrate the possibility of the object a priori. The "practical test" (épreuve de pratique) ends disputes over the vision of ideas.
  8. Translated from GP IV 574–577; the Addition is complete as texts 93–94. Gerhardt next prints Leibniz's reply to Lamy's objections in the 1699 edition ("J'ay receu enfin l'extrait du livre de la Connoissance de soy même qui regarde mon systeme...", GP IV 577 onward), which is next in the queue.
This text in the whole · 1702, a year from which 727 pieces are catalogued166316901716