Translations · Text 98 · 1100010

Reply to Lamy's objections, Part 4 and end: created force, the nature of miracles, Spinoza

Reference
GP IV 586–590
Date
1702
Original
French
Earlier English
this is a new translation (report tab 2)
MetaphysicsMind and body
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Editor’s note

The sixth and decisive objection: a force or energy in creatures distinct from God's power contradicts the creature's dependence and God's sovereignty. Leibniz replies with his definition of miracle (the planet moving of itself in an ellipse would be a perpetual miracle), the derivative character of extension, and the warning that denying all created action leads to Spinoza. New translation from Gerhardt; Lamy's words are in italics.

Original
English
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[1] J'ay de la peine à comprendre en effect, comment on a pû s'aviser de ces difficultés, et de quel costé que je regarde mon systeme, je ne trouve rien qui me donne occasion de les remarquer. Il faut qu'on l'ait regardé à travers d'un verre taillé d'une estrange maniere, pour le faire paroistre aussi disloqué qu'on dit. Car on ne voit là rien de sage (dit-on), rien de reglé, rien de digne de Dieu. Par la même raison on ne trouvera rien de sage, rien de reglé, rien de digne de Dieu dans toute la nature, car pourquoy Dieu seroit il obligé de faire d'avantage selon moy que selon les autres? Quoyqu'il soit d'ailleurs tres vray que sa sagesse et puissance infinies ne paroissent jamais mieux que dans mon hypothese et presque jamais moins que dans celle des occasionnelles, où l'on fait Dieu ressembler à un homme qui vit du jour au lendemain, ou à un ouvrier qui est tousjours occupé à raccommoder son ouvrage. Et cependant un sectateur d'une doctrine qui pour parler aprés nostre auteur luy même semble rabbaisser la divinité, peut aller jusqu'à dire que le systeme de l'harmonie préetablie qui l'avoit ébloui par je ne sçay quel air de simplicité et d'uniformité luy paroist presentement si disloqué, si ruineux et portant à faux par tant d'endroits, qu'il le croit insoutenable. Et moy j'ay plus de peine à trouver de la difficulté dans ses objections que je n'en trouve à y repondre.
[1] I find it hard to understand, in fact, how anyone could have thought of these difficulties; from whatever side I look at my system, I find nothing that gives occasion to notice them. It must have been looked at through a glass cut in some strange fashion to make it appear as dislocated as is said. For nothing wise is seen there (it is said), nothing ordered, nothing worthy of God. By the same reasoning one will find nothing wise, nothing ordered, nothing worthy of God in the whole of nature; for why should God be obliged to do more according to me than according to the others? Although it is otherwise very true that his infinite wisdom and power never appear better than in my hypothesis, and almost never less than in that of occasional causes, which makes God resemble a man who lives from hand to mouth, or a workman always busy mending his work. And yet a follower of a doctrine which, to speak after our author himself, seems to lower the divinity, can go so far as to say that the system of the pre-established harmony, which had dazzled him by some air of simplicity and uniformity, now seems to him so dislocated, so ruinous and resting on false supports in so many places, that he believes it untenable. For my part I have more trouble finding a difficulty in his objections than in answering them.
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[2] La sixieme objection est, que l'endroit par lequel ce systeme paroist porter le plus à faux et qui est pourtant le plus capital, est la supposition d'une nature agissante, puissance, force ou energie distinguée de la puissance de Dieu, en vertu de laquelle les Estres produisent par ordre tous les changemens qui leur arrivent, en sorte que tout leur naisse de leur propre fonds par une parfaite spontaneité. Car cette supposition (dit-on) est directement contraire à la dependance et foiblesse essentielle à la creature et à la puissance souveraine essentielle au Createur. Mais on ne marque point, pourquoy et en quoy ma supposition y est contraire. La creature, pour estre foible et dependante, doit elle estre sans pouvoir aucun? Et le Createur, pour estre souverainement puissant, doit il estre seul puissant et agissant? Parceque Dieu est infiniment parfait, n'y aura-t-il aucune perfection dans les creatures? On prouveroit de la même maniere que parcequ'il est l'Estre souverain, il est le seul Estre ou du moins la seule substance.
[2] The sixth objection is that the point at which this system seems to rest most on false supports, and which is nevertheless the most essential, is the supposition of an acting nature, a power, force or energy distinct from God's power, by virtue of which Beings produce in order all the changes that happen to them, so that everything arises in them from their own ground with perfect spontaneity. For this supposition (it is said) is directly contrary to the dependence and weakness essential to the creature and to the sovereign power essential to the Creator. But it is not shown why or in what way my supposition is contrary to them. Must the creature, in order to be weak and dependent, be without any power at all? And must the Creator, to be sovereignly powerful, be the only one with power and action? Because God is infinitely perfect, will there be no perfection in creatures? One would prove in the same way that because he is the sovereign Being he is the only Being, or at least the only substance.
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[3] On adjoute, que c'est une fausse idée que de s'imaginer qu'il soit indigne de Dieu de s'assujettir à agir à tous momens dans les creatures et à produire par luy même tous les changemens qui leur arrivent. Je conviens que Dieu agit à tous momens sur les creatures en les conservant: mais s'il agit seul, quelle perfection leur a-t-il donnée? Je voudrois bien qu'on la specifiât, car on n'en trouvera aucune qui ne marque de l'action. Et s'il ne leur avoit donné aucune perfection, son ouvrage seroit indigne de luy. De plus l'auteur de l'objection avoit reconnu d'abord, comme M. Bayle aussi, que la voye de l'harmonie préetablie marque une sagesse infiniment plus grande. Et cela ne suffit il pas pour faire juger que toute autre hypothese est au dessous de Dieu?
[3] It is added that it is a false idea to imagine that it is unworthy of God to subject himself to act at every moment in creatures and to produce by himself all the changes that happen to them. I agree that God acts at every moment on creatures by conserving them; but if he acts alone, what perfection has he given them? I should like it specified, for none will be found that does not signify action. And if he had given them no perfection, his work would be unworthy of him. Moreover, the author of the objection had at first acknowledged, as Mr Bayle did too, that the way of the pre-established harmony shows an infinitely greater wisdom. Is that not enough to make us judge that every other hypothesis falls short of God?
Original
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[4] On dit encor, que ce n'est point luy demander des perpetuels miracles que de luy faire ainsi produire toutes les impressions qui arrivent à l'esprit et au corps, puisqu'il ne le fait qu'en consequence de certaines loix generales et ordinaires, et que les miracles sont des exceptions de ces loix. A cela j'ay deja repondu autresfois, qu'en raisonnant ainsi, on n'a pas une juste idée de ce que c'est que miracle. Car suivant cette idée, les loix de nature seroient arbitraires, et celles que Dieu auroit voulu etablir seroient la nature des choses, comme leur exceptions seroient les miracles: par consequent le naturel et le miraculeux ne differeroient pas en eux mêmes, mais par la seule denomination exterieure (denominatione extrinseca) prise des antecedens et consequens. Car ce qui seroit precedé et suivi par ses pareils, seroit naturel, et ce qui ne seroit point tel, seroit miracle. Mais il faut savoir que toute sorte de regle ou loy n'est point propre à faire une loy de nature, et qu'il y a une difference essentielle entre le naturel et le miraculeux, en sorte que si Dieu agissoit continuellement d'une certaine façon, il feroit des miracles perpetuels. Par exemple, si Dieu avoit établi qu'une planete devoit tousjours aller de soy dans une ligne courbe comme est l'Ellipse, par exemple, sans adjouter rien d'explicable, qui causât ou entretinst ce mouvement Elliptique; je dis que Dieu auroit establi un miracle perpetuel et qu'on ne pourroit point dire que la Planete iroit ainsi en vertu de sa nature ou suivant les loix naturelles, puisqu'il n'est point possible d'expliquer cela, ny de rendre raison d'un tel phenomene, ce qui se devroit pourtant, parceque ce mouvement est composé, donc la raison doit venir de mouvemens plus simples. Et si Dieu vouloit neantmoins qu'il y eût tousjours un tel mouvement elliptique de la planete, sans qu'aucune autre cause corporelle y contribuât, il faudroit que Dieu y mist tousjours la main, ou en donnât la charge à quelque intelligence; à moins (dis je) que d'autres corps concourent à l'entretenir, et qu'on en trouve la raison dans quelques mouvemens plus simples d'autres corps qui causent ce mouvement composé; mais alors ce sera dans ces raisons plus simples que consistera la nature de la chose, par exemple dans le mouvement droit de la planete, composé avec l'impression du mouvement de l'ambiant capable de faire peser la planete vers le soleil. Ainsi si Dieu veut qu'un corps de soy tende en ligne droite, ce sera une loy de nature, mais s'il veut que de soy il aille en ligne circulaire ou Elliptique, ce sera un miracle continuel. De la même maniere, c'est veritablement un miracle perpetuel, si Dieu doit tousjours servir de truchement au corps auprés de l'ame, et d'executeur des volontés de l'ame auprés du corps, puisqu'on n'explique pas par quelque chose de plus simple, comment cela s'execute, et qu'on ne rend aucune raison de cet accord de ces substances prise de la nature des choses mêmes, comme j'ay eu soin de faire dans mon hypothese.
[4] It is further said that it is not asking him for perpetual miracles to have him produce in this way all the impressions that occur in mind and body, since he does so only in consequence of certain general and ordinary laws, and miracles are exceptions to those laws. To this I have already answered in the past that, reasoning thus, one does not have a correct idea of what a miracle is. For on this idea the laws of nature would be arbitrary: those God had chosen to establish would be the nature of things, and their exceptions would be miracles. Consequently the natural and the miraculous would not differ in themselves but only by an extrinsic denomination (denominatione extrinseca) taken from what comes before and after: what was preceded and followed by its like would be natural, and what was not would be a miracle. But one must know that not every kind of rule or law is fit to make a law of nature, and that there is an essential difference between the natural and the miraculous, so that if God acted continually in a certain way he would be performing perpetual miracles. For example, if God had established that a planet should always move of itself along a curved line such as the Ellipse, without adding anything explicable that would cause or maintain this Elliptical motion, I say that God would have established a perpetual miracle, and one could not say that the Planet moved thus by virtue of its nature or according to natural laws; for it is not possible to explain this or give a reason for such a phenomenon, which nevertheless ought to be possible, because this motion is composite, and so its reason must come from simpler motions. And if God nevertheless willed that the planet should always have such an elliptical motion without any other bodily cause contributing to it, God would always have to lend his hand, or give the task to some intelligence; unless (I say) other bodies concur in maintaining it, and its reason is found in some simpler motions of other bodies that cause this composite motion. But then the nature of the thing will consist in those simpler reasons: for example, in the planet's rectilinear motion, compounded with the impression of the motion of the surrounding medium capable of making the planet gravitate towards the sun. So if God wills that a body of itself tends in a straight line, that will be a law of nature; but if he wills that of itself it should go in a circular or Elliptical line, that will be a continual miracle. In the same way it is truly a perpetual miracle if God must always serve as the body's interpreter to the soul, and the executor of the soul's volitions to the body, since one does not explain by anything simpler how this is carried out, and gives no reason for this agreement of these substances drawn from the nature of the things themselves, as I have taken care to do in my hypothesis.
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[5] Enfin l'auteur du livre de la Connoissance de soy même conclut cette matiere en disant, que Dieu se desaisiroit (selon moy) de sa puissance, pour la communiquer aux Creatures, et se depouilleroit d'une perfection essentielle et incommunicable, et qu'ainsi mon systeme est appuyé sur des idées contradictoires et chimeriques. Mais ce n'est que petition de principe, quand il suppose qu'il appartient à Dieu seul de pouvoir agir. Il est certain, dit-il, que Dieu fait tout ce qui se passe de reel à tous momens dans les creatures, et qu'il n'y a que luy qui puisse agir en elles, et produire leur changemens comme cause veritable. J'accorde en quelque façon le premier point, que Dieu produit continuellement tout ce qui est reel dans les creatures. Mais je tiens qu'en le faisant il produit aussi continuellement ou conserve en nous cette energie ou activité qui selon moy fait la nature de la substance, et la source de ses modifications. Et ainsi je n'accorde point que Dieu seul agit dans les substances, ou cause seul leur changemens, et je croy que ce seroit faire les creatures tout à fait vaines et inutiles.
[5] Finally the author of the Connoissance de soi-même concludes this matter by saying that God would (on my view) divest himself of his power to communicate it to Creatures, and would strip himself of an essential and incommunicable perfection, and that my system therefore rests on contradictory and chimerical ideas. But this is only a petition of principle, when he supposes that the power to act belongs to God alone. It is certain, he says, that God does everything real that happens at every moment in creatures, and that he alone can act in them and produce their changes as true cause. I grant the first point in a way: God continually produces everything that is real in creatures. But I hold that in doing so he also continually produces, or conserves in us, that energy or activity which on my view makes the nature of substance and the source of its modifications. And so I do not grant that God alone acts in substances, or alone causes their changes; and I believe that would make creatures entirely vain and useless.
Original
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[6] L'auteur se souvient d'avoir vû un écrit de la façon d'un de ses amis, où ces verités sont prouvées (dit-il) et clairement demonstrées par la methode des Geometres, et il le veut relire au premier jour, pour se fortifier de plus en plus contre le faux brillant de mon systeme. J'ay tousjours crû que la seule raison ou apparence de demonstration, qui a fait naistre et peut excuser les causes occasionnelles des Cartesiens, est l'impossibilité des influences, laquelle a fait courir les auteurs à ce qui leur pouvoit venir plus aisement dans l'esprit, car l'harmonie préetablie est quelque chose de plus profond, et ne devoit estre que le fruit d'une plus grande maturité de la philosophie qui est un benefice du temps, c'est à dire, dû plustost à Dieu qu'aux hommes: je serois fort curieux cependant de voir cet Ecrit, et j'ay donné assez de preuves de ma docilité pour faire juger, que si ces demonstrations sont bonnes, je m'y rendrois. J'avoue qu'ayant lû souvent ce qui a esté écrit en faveur des causes occasionnelles, je n'ay jamais rien vû (à la refutation des influences prés) qui ressemblât à une demonstration. On y a eu en vue de relever nostre dependance et la puissance de Dieu: ce qui seroit louable si ce n'estoit pas au prejudice de sa sagesse, et s'il n'alloit pas à aneantir nostre substance. Car toutes mes raisons et, j'ose dire, demonstrations me font croire, qu'en depouillant la substance de l'energie et action, on ne luy laisse rien du tout. La fausse notion de l'etendue que se forment les Cartesiens, comme si c'estoit un attribut primitif et capable de constituer une substance, leur fait beaucoup de tort, en les faisant croire, qu'on peut concevoir une substance sans action, au lieu que la notion de l'etendue est derivative, à peu prés comme celle du nombre et du temps, incapables de constituer la substance, car l'extension ou étendue est relative et suppose quelque nature qui est etendue ou repetée, tout comme le nombre suppose quelque chose dont on fait le denombrement (rem numeratam). Or l'on trouvera que cette nature qui se repete continuellement dans l'etendu, et que l'etendue suppose, doit envelopper le Dynamique ou la force; ou bien il n'y a là rien qu'on luy puisse assigner.
[6] The author remembers having seen a writing by one of his friends in which these truths are proved (he says) and clearly demonstrated by the method of the Geometers, and he means to reread it at the first opportunity, to fortify himself more and more against the false brilliance of my system. I have always believed that the only reason, or appearance of demonstration, that gave birth to the occasional causes of the Cartesians and can excuse them is the impossibility of influences, which made these authors run to what could most easily come into their minds; for the pre-established harmony is something deeper, and could only be the fruit of a greater maturity of philosophy, which is a benefit of time, that is to say owed to God rather than to men. I should nevertheless be very curious to see this Writing, and I have given enough proofs of my docility for it to be judged that, if these demonstrations are good, I would yield to them. I confess that, having often read what has been written in favour of occasional causes, I have never seen anything (apart from the refutation of influences) that resembled a demonstration. The aim was to exalt our dependence and the power of God, which would be praiseworthy if it were not to the prejudice of his wisdom, and if it did not go so far as to annihilate our substance. For all my reasons and, I dare say, demonstrations make me believe that in stripping substance of energy and action one leaves it nothing at all. The false notion of extension the Cartesians form, as if it were a primitive attribute capable of constituting a substance, does them much harm, making them believe that one can conceive a substance without action; whereas the notion of extension is derivative, roughly like those of number and time, which are incapable of constituting substance. For extension is relative and presupposes some nature that is extended or repeated, just as number presupposes something that is counted (the thing numbered). Now it will be found that this nature which is continually repeated in what is extended, and which extension presupposes, must envelop the Dynamic, or force; otherwise there is nothing there that could be assigned to it.
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[7] Quant à l'esprit qui est l'autre substance, que les Cartesiens admettent, le R. P. Malebranche, M. Sturm et autres, si je ne me trompe, luy accordent l'action interne, et moy je n'en accorde point d'autres aux substances créées. Mais les masses ne sont point des substances chez moy. J'ay quantité d'autres raisons à alleguer, et plusieurs tendent à faire juger que suivant le sentiment qui depouille les creatures de toute puissance et action, Dieu seroit la seule substance et les creatures ne seroient que les accidens ou modifications de Dieu, de sorte que ceux qui sont de ce sentiment, tomberoient malgré eux dans celuy de Spinosa qui me paroist avoir poussé le plus les suites de la doctrine Cartesienne des causes occasionnelles. Je n'ay garde d'imputer ce sentiment de Spinosa (que je tiens fort mauvais et absurde) à tant de personnes de merite, qui soutiennent l'opinion Cartesienne. Cependant il me sera permis de marquer les consequences de cette opinion. Ce que j'aurois moins de droit de faire, si je ne faisois paroistre un moyen de les eviter, qui d'ailleurs a tous les avantages qu'on peut souhaiter dans une hypothese, et qui même doit passer pour quelque chose de plus qu'une hypothese.
[7] As for mind, the other substance the Cartesians admit, Father Malebranche, Mr Sturm and others, if I am not mistaken, grant it internal action; and I grant no other action to created substances. But masses are not substances for me. I have many other reasons to allege, and several tend to show that, on the view that strips creatures of all power and action, God would be the only substance and creatures would be only accidents or modifications of God; so that those who hold this view would fall, in spite of themselves, into that of Spinoza, who seems to me to have pushed furthest the consequences of the Cartesian doctrine of occasional causes. I take care not to impute this view of Spinoza's (which I hold very bad and absurd) to so many persons of merit who maintain the Cartesian opinion. Yet I may be allowed to point out the consequences of that opinion; which I should have less right to do if I did not bring to light a means of avoiding them, one that has besides all the advantages one can wish in a hypothesis and which ought even to pass for something more than a hypothesis.

Notes to text 98

  1. God the mender. The image of the occasionalist God as a workman "always busy mending his work" anticipates Leibniz's famous charge against Newton and Clarke (1715) that their God must wind up and repair the world-machine.
  2. Created force. Lamy's sixth objection is the heart of the occasionalist case: true causal power belongs to God alone. Leibniz's answers (row [2], [3], [5]) are those of De ipsa natura (1698): a perfection that implies no action is unintelligible; God's continual conservation produces in creatures "that energy or activity which makes the nature of substance"; and the argument "God is sovereign, therefore the only agent" would equally prove "God is the sovereign Being, therefore the only substance".
  3. What a miracle is. Row [4] gives one of Leibniz's clearest definitions: the natural and the miraculous differ intrinsically, not by an "extrinsic denomination" of frequency. A law of nature must be explicable by the natures of things; a planet moving of itself in an ellipse, without simpler causes, would be a perpetual miracle. The rectilinear tendency compounded with the impulse of a surrounding fluid that makes the planet "gravitate" towards the sun is Leibniz's own vortex theory in the Tentamen de motuum coelestium causis (1689). The same argument returns against Newtonian attraction in the Clarke correspondence.
  4. Extension derivative. Row [6] states compactly the anti-Cartesian thesis of the 1690s: extension is relative, like number and time; it presupposes something "extended or repeated", and that something must contain force. Compare the letters to De Volder (1699 to 1706), in the queue.
  5. The geometrical demonstration. Lamy's friend's writing "by the method of the Geometers" proving occasionalism is not identified here; candidates in Lamy's circle are to be checked rather than guessed. Leibniz's reply allows only one sound premiss in the occasionalist case, the impossibility of real influence, which he shares.
  6. Malebranche and Sturm on mental action. Leibniz notes that even Malebranche and Johann Christoph Sturm grant minds internal action; he extends this to all created substances, while denying that masses are substances.
  7. Spinoza. As in text 91, occasionalism pushed to its consequences becomes Spinozism; Leibniz is careful not to impute Spinoza's view ("very bad and absurd") to Cartesians of merit. His closing claim that the harmony should pass "for something more than a hypothesis" echoes the Système nouveau and the Foucher pieces.
  8. Readings. "Un de ces amis" is read "un de ses amis", and "à tout de personnes" is read "à tant de personnes". The reply to Lamy is complete as texts 95–98 (GP IV 577–590).
This text in the whole · 1702, a year from which 727 pieces are catalogued166316901716