Editor’s note
Lamy's fourth objection: even if the harmony were possible, God did not follow it, for on it the drunkard's or madman's ravings would come from the soul's own nature and God would be their author. Leibniz answers by parity with the other systems, refuses to be drawn into the problem of evil in general, and distinguishes what is essential to a substance from what is natural to it. New translation from Gerhardt; Lamy's words are in italics. Part 1 is text 95 in the first tab.
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[1] 4°. On objecte que quand mon systeme seroit possible, ce n'est pas celuy que Dieu a suivi; il faudra donc dire que mon systeme ne satisfait pas aux phenomenes, ce que je ne voy pas comment on peut soutenir si on accorde que Dieu peut créer une nature capable de produire par ordre ces phenomenes. Venons pourtant au detail de l'objection. Elle pretend que suivant mon systeme ce seroit sans sujet et non pas à cause du renversement des traces dans le cerveau (par exemple) que l'esprit extravague. Mais je reponds que je puis fort bien dire, que l'ame extravague à cause du corps, aussi bien que dans les autres systemes, parceque sa nature est d'exprimer son corps, et de s'accorder avec luy, tout comme si le corps influoit sur l'ame. J'admire comment on se peut aviser de charger mon systeme de tous les inconveniens qui nous paroissent dans la nature des choses, comme si ce n'estoit pas tout un à l'egard des autres systemes, et comme si la difficulté ne sembloit pas encor plus grande dans celuy des causes occasionnelles, où tout accord du corps et de l'ame ne vient qu'immediatement de Dieu.
[1] 4. It is objected that, even if my system were possible, it is not the one God has followed. One would then have to say that my system does not account for the phenomena, which I do not see how one can maintain if one grants that God can create a nature capable of producing these phenomena in order. Let us come, however, to the detail of the objection. It claims that on my system the mind would rave for no reason, and not because of the disturbance of the traces in the brain (for example). But I reply that I can very well say that the soul raves because of the body, as in the other systems, because its nature is to express its body and to agree with it, just as if the body influenced the soul. I am surprised that anyone should think of loading my system with all the drawbacks that appear to us in the nature of things, as if it were not all one with regard to the other systems, and as if the difficulty did not seem even greater in that of occasional causes, where all agreement of body and soul comes only immediately from God.
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[2] On me demande, s'il est vraisemblable que ces extravagances, qui se font remarquer dans l'esprit d'un homme yvre, ne soyent que les suites naturelles de la constitution de l'ame, et qu'elle ne fasse en cela que se conformer aux loix de la nature que Dieu luy a données. Mais comme nostre nature est corrompue par des actions libres nées du propre fonds de la nature humaine, et qui ont melé leur effect avec celuy de la constitution originaire qui vient de Dieu, et que nostre nature est faite d'abord en sorte que nos modifications dependent beaucoup des modifications du corps exprimées en nous; ny nos pechés ny nos extravagances involontaires comme celles qui peuvent venir d'une phrenesie ne sauroient plus estre imputées à Dieu dans mon systeme que dans les autres. Car ne demandera-t-on pas de même comment ces desordres ne peuvent estre que des suites des impressions de Dieu dans le systeme des causes occasionnelles? Ou bien selon le systeme commun, comment Dieu a créé les corps en sorte qu'il leur arrive ces desordres capables de deranger l'ame; ou pourquoy il a comme condamné l'ame à loger dans un tel corps? C'est justement demander la cause du mal.
[2] I am asked whether it is likely that the ravings observed in the mind of a drunken man are only the natural consequences of the soul's constitution, and that in this it is only conforming to the laws of nature God has given it. But since our nature is corrupted by free actions born of the very ground of human nature, which have mixed their effect with that of the original constitution that comes from God; and since our nature is made from the start in such a way that our modifications depend greatly on the modifications of the body expressed in us; neither our sins nor our involuntary ravings, such as those that may come from a frenzy, can be imputed to God any more in my system than in the others. For will it not likewise be asked how these disorders can be nothing but consequences of God's impressions in the system of occasional causes? Or, in the common system, how God created bodies such that these disorders happen to them, capable of deranging the soul; or why he as it were condemned the soul to lodge in such a body? That is precisely to ask for the cause of evil.
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[3] Ainsi quand l'auteur de l'objection adjoute: O que cela feroit honneur à la sagesse divine! ne voit-il pas qu'il plaide pour les Manicheens qui vouloient deux principes? Quand il m'accordera, que mon systeme est le seul veritable, je m'engage de le satisfaire sur ce point là, et de repondre aux Manicheens; mais quand il s'agit de comparer mon systeme avec les autres, pourquoy m'embarrasseray-je et mon lecteur des difficultés communes à tous les systemes, lorsqu'on ne monstre point, que le mien les rehausse. C'est même tout le contraire, et je pourrois monstrer tres aisement comment il satisfait à ces difficultés mieux encor que les autres; mais ce n'est pas icy le lieu d'entrer dans une telle discussion. C'est ce que M. Bayle a bien consideré, car il declare de ne me vouloir point objecter ce qui regarde toutes les hypotheses.
[3] So when the author of the objection adds, Oh, what honour that would do to divine wisdom!, does he not see that he is pleading for the Manicheans, who wanted two principles? When he grants me that my system is the only true one, I undertake to satisfy him on that point and to answer the Manicheans; but when it is a matter of comparing my system with the others, why should I burden myself and my reader with difficulties common to all systems, when it is not shown that mine aggravates them? It is quite the contrary, and I could show very easily how it meets these difficulties even better than the others; but this is not the place to enter into such a discussion. Mr Bayle saw this well, for he declares that he does not wish to object to me what concerns all hypotheses.
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[4] C'est pourquoy, quand l'auteur poursuit avec des exclamations: Digne spectacle de l'Estre infiniment parfait, qu'une ame qui sort de ses mains avec une nature qui la met dans une vraye necessité d'extravaguer les soixante ou quatre vingt années ou peutestre toute l'eternité! Il faut qu'il m'ait bien peu connu par mes ouvrages, s'il m'a crû assez malavisé pour admettre cette pretendue necessité dans les actions de l'ame: moy à qui feu M. Arnaud imputa au commencement quelque chose de semblable, mais dont il se retracta genereusement par aprés quand il eut mieux connu le fonds de mes sentimens. N'est il pas vray qu'encor dans les autres systemes tant la nature de l'ame que celle du corps sortent des mains de Dieu? et que les pechés et les extravagances y naissent neantmoins, soit qu'on dise que le corps influe sur l'ame ou non, puisque selon moy l'ame est faite pour agir comme si le corps influoit, parcequ'elle l'exprime, et selon l'auteur, parceque Dieu y produit ce qu'il veut qui s'y fasse à l'occasion du corps.
[4] So when the author goes on with exclamations, A worthy spectacle for the infinitely perfect Being: a soul that leaves his hands with a nature that puts it under a true necessity of raving for sixty or eighty years, or perhaps for all eternity!, he must have known me very little from my works if he thought me ill-advised enough to admit this alleged necessity in the actions of the soul: I, to whom the late Mr Arnauld at first imputed something similar, though he generously retracted it afterwards when he had come to know the ground of my views better. Is it not true that in the other systems too the nature of the soul, as well as that of the body, comes from the hands of God? And that sins and ravings nevertheless arise there, whether one says the body influences the soul or not: according to me because the soul is made to act as if the body influenced it, since it expresses it; and according to the author because God produces in the soul what he wills to happen there on the occasion of the body.
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[5] L'auteur de l'objection pretend encor que l'extravagance de cette ame dont il parle devroit selon moy durer toute l'eternité: puisque (dit il) ce qui naist de la nature ou de l'essence d'une chose doit durer autant que cette chose. Mais il me pardonnera, si je dis que c'est un peu equivoquer. On distingue par tout entre ce qui est essentiel et ce qui est naturel, jusque dans les livres des Jurisconsultes qui font difference entre ce qui est essentiel et ce qui est naturel à un contract. Les proprietez sont essentielles et eternelles, mais les modifications peuvent estre naturelles quoyqu'elles soyent changeantes. Il y a même des degrés entre les modifications naturelles. Le plus naturel est ce qui est entierement conforme à la perfection originaire de la nature. Mais quand elle est corrompue, les fautes luy peuvent devenir naturelles. Il ne faut point confondre aussi ce que nous appellons naturel dans un sens ordinaire avec ce qui peut estre appellé naturel dans un sens plus metaphysique. Par exemple dans le sens ordinaire, il nous est naturel de mourir, mais il ne nous est point naturel de mourir d'un coup de canon; on appelle cela accidentel et violent et on a raison; aussi ne pretends-je point changer ce langage. Ainsi quand je dis que tout ce qui arrive à une substance peut estre jugé dans un certain sens luy estre naturel, ou estre une suite de sa nature individuelle, j'entends la nature complete qui comprend tout ce qui appartient à cet individu. Je l'entends donc dans un certain sens transcendant, suivant lequel la nature complete de chaque individu enveloppe tout ce qui luy arrive et tous les autres individus à cause de leur rapport entre eux, ce qui est vray, cet enveloppement estant conforme à la rigueur des expressions metaphysiques, quoyqu'il ne soit point consideré dans l'usage populaire. Mais je ne leve point les distinctions ordinaires pour cela, et je ne prends les mots dans ce sens extraordinaire que parceque je ne trouve point de termes plus propres pour m'exprimer. Et si on ne veut point prendre garde à cela, on me fera mille objections badines et de neant, qui ne sieront bien qu'à quelque homme du peuple peu informé de l'interieur des choses et qui traitera par exemple les sentimens de Copernic et de des Cartes d'extravagans. Aussi suis-je persuadé que l'auteur de la Connoissance de soy même est trop judicieux pour insister, aprés avoir bien compris mon sentiment.
[5] The author of the objection further claims that the raving of the soul he speaks of would, on my view, have to last for all eternity, since (he says) what arises from the nature or essence of a thing must last as long as the thing. But he will pardon me if I say that this is something of an equivocation. People everywhere distinguish between what is essential and what is natural, even in the books of the Jurists, who distinguish what is essential to a contract from what is natural to it. Properties are essential and eternal, but modifications can be natural although they are changeable. There are even degrees among natural modifications. The most natural is what conforms entirely to the original perfection of the nature; but when the nature is corrupted, faults can become natural to it. Nor must we confuse what we call natural in an ordinary sense with what may be called natural in a more metaphysical sense. For example, in the ordinary sense it is natural for us to die, but it is not natural for us to die by a cannon shot: that is called accidental and violent, and rightly so; nor do I claim to change this language. So when I say that everything that happens to a substance may be judged in a certain sense to be natural to it, or to be a consequence of its individual nature, I mean the complete nature that includes everything belonging to this individual. I understand it, then, in a certain transcendent sense, according to which the complete nature of each individual envelops everything that happens to it, and all the other individuals because of their relation to one another. This is true, this enveloping being in accordance with the rigour of metaphysical expressions, although it is not considered in popular usage. But I do not remove the ordinary distinctions on that account, and I take the words in this extraordinary sense only because I find no more fitting terms to express myself. If one will not pay attention to this, one will make me a thousand trifling and empty objections, which would suit only some man of the people with little knowledge of the inside of things, who would treat the views of Copernicus and Descartes, for example, as ravings. So I am persuaded that the author of the Connoissance de soi-même is too judicious to insist, once he has properly understood my view.
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[6] Et quand il continue par ces mots: ne seroit ce pas faire Dieu visiblement auteur de ces desordres, et un tel systeme luy feroit-il bien de l'honneur? ce n'est qu'une suite d'un mesentendu que je viens de lever. Selon l'ecole, les pechés et les extravagances, soit volontaires, soit involontaires, viennent de l'ame et des influences du corps; et la nature de l'ame et du corps est sortie des mains de Dieu. Dans le systeme des causes occasionnelles les extravagances qui sont dans l'ame ne peuvent avoir leur origine que de l'ame et des impressions de Dieu sur l'ame à l'occasion des corps, à la place des influences du corps. Et selon moy elles viennent de l'ame seule, tant à raison de sa volonté qu'en suite de ses perceptions involontaires qui luy naissent de ce que sa nature est d'exprimer le corps, ce que je mets à la place des influences du corps. Pourquoy donc auroit on plus de peine dans mon hypothese que dans les autres de sauver l'honneur de Dieu et de le justifier de ces desordres? C'est la même chose soit qu'on les attribue à l'ame seule qui represente le corps, ou à l'ame avec les impressions du corps, ou à l'ame avec les impressions de Dieu, puisqu'enfin et l'ame et le corps vient de Dieu. Et s'il y avoit quelque chose de choquant à l'egard de Dieu, ce seroit plustost dans l'hypothese, qui met les impressions de Dieu à la place de celles du corps ou de celles des idées du corps, parcequ'il semble que c'est charger Dieu plus immediatement de ce qui en arrive.
[6] And when he continues with these words, would this not be visibly making God the author of these disorders, and would such a system do him much honour?, it is only a consequence of a misunderstanding I have just removed. According to the School, sins and ravings, whether voluntary or involuntary, come from the soul and from the influences of the body; and the nature of soul and body came from the hands of God. In the system of occasional causes, the ravings in the soul can have their origin only in the soul and in God's impressions on the soul on the occasion of bodies, in place of the influences of the body. And according to me they come from the soul alone, both by reason of its will and as a consequence of its involuntary perceptions, which arise in it because its nature is to express the body; this is what I put in place of the influences of the body. Why then should it be harder in my hypothesis than in the others to save God's honour and clear him of these disorders? It is the same thing whether one attributes them to the soul alone representing the body, or to the soul with the impressions of the body, or to the soul with God's impressions, since in the end both soul and body come from God. And if there were anything offensive with regard to God, it would rather be in the hypothesis that puts God's impressions in place of those of the body, or of the ideas of the body, because it seems to charge God more immediately with what follows.
Notes to text 96
- The parity argument. Throughout, Leibniz answers that madness, drunkenness and sin raise the same difficulty for influence, occasionalism and harmony, and if anything a worse one for occasionalism, which makes God the immediate cause of every disordered perception.
- Original sin and the body. Row [2] gives two causes of disorder: corruption "born of the very ground of human nature" by free acts, and the soul's original constitution as expressing a body. Leibniz declines to treat the problem of evil here, promising that his system answers the Manicheans better than the others; the full answer came in the Théodicée (1710).
- Arnauld's retraction. In 1686 Arnauld, reading the summary of the Discours de métaphysique, charged the complete-concept doctrine with a "more than fatal necessity"; after Leibniz's explanations he withdrew the charge. Leibniz recalls this episode often (compare text 92's reference to the Arnauld letters).
- Essential and natural. Row [5] is an important clarification of the "complete individual nature": in a "transcendent" metaphysical sense everything that happens to a substance follows from its nature, but this does not abolish the ordinary distinctions between natural and accidental or violent, nor between essential properties (eternal) and natural modifications (changeable). The jurists' distinction between the essentialia and naturalia of a contract (with the accidentalia) is standard in Roman-law teaching, which Leibniz knew as a trained jurist.
- Copernicus and Descartes. The "man of the people" who would call Copernicus's and Descartes's views ravings is a reminder that a philosophical sense of words must not be judged by popular usage; compare the maxim Leibniz often cites, to think with the learned and speak with the vulgar.
- Part 3 (text 97) takes up the second part of the fourth objection, that speaking and writing cannot be produced by the laws of mechanics (GP IV 583).