Translations · Text 97 · 1100001

Reply to Lamy's objections, Part 3: the human automaton and the fifth objection

Reference
GP IV 583–586
Date
1702
Original
French
Earlier English
this is a new translation (report tab 2)
MetaphysicsMind and body
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Editor’s note

Leibniz answers the second half of Lamy's fourth objection (that speaking and writing cannot come from mechanical laws) and the fifth (if each substance follows its own laws, why do bodies destroy themselves and souls suffer pain?). New translation from Gerhardt; Lamy's words are in italics.

Original
English
1
[1] Pour ce qui est de cette difficulté qui fait la 2e partie de la 4me objection, que les actions du corps humain, qui marquent de l'intelligence, comme parler, écrire etc. ne sçauroient estre produites par les loix de mechanique, elle merite le plus d'estre eclaircie, et je l'ay fait amplement dans la derniere réponse à M. Bayle. Plusieurs anciens et modernes qui ont combattu contre les preuves Cartesiennes et autres semblables de la spiritualité de l'ame, entre autres Gassendi dans ses objections, et dans leur defense, ont crû que tout ce qui se passe dans la nature jusqu'aux actions qui paroissent dans l'homme, pouvoit estre expliqué par les modifications de la matiere, ou mecaniquement: et même le sentiment des Cartesiens qui font d'une beste un automate, a fait juger que les hommes pouvoient estre des automates aussi. En effect le corps pourroit l'estre, et l'est veritablement, mais l'action interne seule de l'ame en doit estre exceptée. Pour ne rien dire à present du principe même des loix mecaniques qu'on ne sauroit deriver des modifications de l'étendue. Ainsi l'objection ne vient que du peu de connoissance qu'on a du mechanisme admirable que Dieu exerce. J'avois pris mes precautions d'abord, et j'avois demandé en proposant mon systeme, s'il n'estoit pas possible que Dieu pût faire un automate qui fist les fonctions de l'homme. Et la possibilité de cela supposée, j'en inferay que mon systeme estant possible, devoit estre preferé aux autres, puisque nous exemtant d'une espece de conduite miraculeuse et relevant le plus la sagesse de Dieu, il levoit toute la difficulté sur l'union de l'ame et du corps. Aussi l'auteur des objections, ayant dit pag. 235 au commencement de la 4me objection, que quand on conviendroit de la possibilité de mon systeme, on trouveroit que Dieu ne l'a point suivi en effect, ne pouvoit point de cette même objection revenir à en nier la possibilité, en disant que tant d'actions si regulieres en un sens et si bizarres en un autre ne peuvent point venir des loix generales des mecaniques. Cependant il ne dit point, pourquoy cela ne se peut. Ces loix generales quelques simples qu'elles soyent en elles mêmes, donnent une infinité de variations dans leur application, et les Cartesiens le doivent reconnoistre, puisque les bestes leur sont des machines. Les hommes mêmes sont capables de faire des machines dont les effects semblent demander une intelligence. Dieu qui est infiniment plus intelligent et plus puissant que nous, pour inventer les moyens et pour les executer, pourquoy ne pourroit il pas aller infiniment plus loin, ou plustost pourquoy ne l'auroit il point fait en effect? Ainsi la difficulté ne vient que des bornes qu'on donne tacitement et sans y penser à la sagesse et à la puissance divine.
[1] As for the difficulty that makes up the second part of the fourth objection, that the actions of the human body which show intelligence, such as speaking, writing and so on, cannot be produced by the laws of mechanics, it most deserves clarification, and I have given it amply in my last reply to Mr Bayle. Several ancients and moderns who fought against the Cartesian and similar proofs of the spirituality of the soul (among others Gassendi in his objections and in their defence) believed that everything that happens in nature, down to the actions that appear in man, could be explained by the modifications of matter, that is, mechanically; and even the Cartesian view that makes a beast an automaton has led people to judge that men could be automata too. And indeed the body could be one, and truly is; only the internal action of the soul must be excepted, to say nothing for the present of the very principle of the mechanical laws, which cannot be derived from the modifications of extension. So the objection comes only from our slight knowledge of the admirable mechanism that God practises. I took my precautions from the beginning, and when proposing my system I asked whether it was not possible for God to make an automaton that would perform the functions of a man. And the possibility of this being supposed, I inferred that my system, being possible, ought to be preferred to the others, since by exempting us from a kind of miraculous conduct and raising God's wisdom highest, it removed every difficulty about the union of soul and body. So the author of the objections, having said on p. 235, at the beginning of the fourth objection, that even if one agreed to the possibility of my system, one would find that God has not in fact followed it, could not from that same objection come back to denying its possibility, by saying that so many actions, so regular in one sense and so bizarre in another, cannot come from the general laws of mechanics. Yet he does not say why this cannot be. These general laws, however simple in themselves, give an infinity of variations in their application, and the Cartesians must admit it, since beasts are machines for them. Men themselves are capable of making machines whose effects seem to require intelligence. Why could God, infinitely more intelligent and powerful than we in inventing means and carrying them out, not go infinitely further, or rather, why should he not in fact have done so? So the difficulty arises only from the limits that people tacitly, without thinking, set to divine wisdom and power.
Original
English
2
[2] La cinquieme Objection est: que si chaque substance a receu de Dieu une nature, en vertu de la quelle ses modifications se developpent successivement et conformement à certaines loix, independamment de l'influence de toute autre creature, on demandera, si ces loix sont sages, si les substances les suivent, et qui est ce qui les fait executer. Je reponds qu'elles sont sages sans doute, que les substances les suivent, et que leur propre nature les fait executer. A cela on objecte que les estres tendent mecaniquement au moins à leur conservation, cependant on voit des corps qui se jettent dans les flammes, qui se precipitent, qui se coupent par morceaux. Mais je trouve qu'on me fait des objections toutes telles qu'un sauvage du fonds de l'Amerique feroit à tous les philosophes, ou telles que les hommes auroient faites à celuy qui a philosophé le premier, comme si j'estois reponsable de tout. Et il semble que l'habile auteur du livre de la Connoissance de soy même se depouille de toute sa science par une espece de fiction ingenieuse, comme pour m'obliger à recommencer la philosophie ab ovo. Car ne peut on pas faire cette objection à toutes les hypotheses? Et ces aheurtemens des corps qui se perdent par quelque rencontre, ne sont ce pas des suites des loix de la nature que Dieu a mises dans les corps, soit qu'on admette mon systeme ou quelque autre? Chaque chose se conserve dans son estat, s'il n'y a point de raison qui la fait changer, et on n'a jamais pris autrement la loy de la conservation. Mais il faut encor distinguer entre la substance et l'assemblage des substances qui fait la masse. Chaque substance se conserve, mais les masses en vertu des loix de leur propre nature tendent à se detruire, car elles se dissiperoient par leur mouvement interne, en tendant à s'eloigner du centre, si elles n'estoient point maintenues dans leur consistance par la pression des ambians.
[2] The fifth Objection is: if each substance has received from God a nature by virtue of which its modifications develop successively and according to certain laws, independently of the influence of any other creature, it will be asked whether these laws are wise, whether the substances follow them, and who it is that has them carried out. I answer that they are no doubt wise, that the substances follow them, and that their own nature has them carried out. To this it is objected that beings tend mechanically at least to their own preservation; yet we see bodies that throw themselves into flames, that hurl themselves down, that cut themselves to pieces. But I find that I am being made objections exactly like those a savage from the depths of America would make to all the philosophers, or such as men would have made to the first person who philosophized, as if I were answerable for everything. And it seems that the able author of the Connoissance de soi-même strips himself of all his learning by a kind of ingenious fiction, as if to oblige me to begin philosophy again from the egg. For can this objection not be made to every hypothesis? And these collisions of bodies that destroy themselves in some encounter, are they not consequences of the laws of nature God has put into bodies, whether one admits my system or some other? Each thing preserves itself in its state if there is no reason that makes it change; the law of conservation has never been taken otherwise. But we must further distinguish between a substance and the assemblage of substances that makes up a mass. Each substance preserves itself, but masses by the laws of their own nature tend to destroy themselves; for they would dissipate through their internal motion, tending to fly from the centre, if they were not held together by the pressure of the surrounding bodies.
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[3] La même objection est appliquée aussi à l'esprit. On voit (dit-on) des esprits qui vivent perpetuellement dans les douleurs, plaisante loy que celle par laquelle dans le temps, qu'une ame est appliquée à contempler la divinité, elle se trouve surprise d'une vive douleur qui luy fait abandonner son sujet. Mais c'est plustost une plaisante demande, de vouloir que mon hypothese rende les choses meilleures qu'elles ne doivent et ne peuvent estre; et que la loy que Dieu a mise dans la nature suivant mon sentiment, fasse plus que Dieu ne fait luy même dans l'opinion de l'auteur. Car puisque Dieu agissant luy même sur l'ame par des impressions continuelles, selon la doctrine des causes occasionnelles, n'evite point ou donne plustost ces douleurs, pourquoy ne luy sera-t-il point permis de donner au commencement à l'esprit une nature qui produise ces mêmes sentimens par aprés dans leur temps? A-t-on jamais vû une partialité pareille, et n'ay je pas sujet d'estre surpris qu'on me fait de telles objections?
[3] The same objection is applied to the mind as well. We see (it is said) minds that live perpetually in pain. A fine law indeed, by which, at the very time a soul is applied to contemplating the divinity, it finds itself seized by a sharp pain that makes it abandon its subject. But it is rather a fine demand, to want my hypothesis to make things better than they ought to be and can be, and to want the law God has put into nature, on my view, to do more than God himself does in the author's opinion. For since God, acting himself on the soul by continual impressions according to the doctrine of occasional causes, does not prevent these pains, or rather gives them, why should he not be allowed to give the mind at the beginning a nature that will produce these same feelings later in their time? Was such partiality ever seen, and have I not reason to be surprised that such objections are made to me?

Notes to text 97

  1. The human automaton. Leibniz refers back to the Réponse aux réflexions (especially text 89, rows [7] and [8]): the body may be, and is, an automaton, while the soul's internal action is excepted. Gassendi's Objections to Descartes's Meditations (Fifth Objections, 1641) and his Disquisitio metaphysica (1644), written in defence of those objections, are meant by "in his objections and in their defence".
  2. The automaton question. From the Système nouveau (text 63) onward Leibniz had asked whether God could make an automaton performing all human functions, and argued that if so the harmony is preferable. His logical point here: Lamy cannot first grant the possibility ("even if possible, God did not follow it") and then deny it.
  3. Mechanical laws not derived from extension. The aside that the principle of the laws of mechanics "cannot be derived from the modifications of extension" is the dynamical argument of the Specimen dynamicum (texts 68, 75): force, not extension, grounds the laws of motion.
  4. The savage of America. A conventional rhetorical figure of the period for an objector without any philosophical background; Leibniz's complaint is that Lamy objects to the harmony what could be objected to any philosophy (ab ovo, "from the egg", from the very beginning, after Horace, Ars poetica 147).
  5. Substances and masses. Each substance preserves itself, but masses, being aggregates, tend to dissolve through internal motion and centrifugal tendency unless held by the pressure of surrounding bodies: Leibniz's physics of cohesion (compare the Specimen dynamicum) applied to Lamy's examples of self-destroying bodies.
  6. Part 4 (text 98), the sixth objection, on created force, miracles and Spinoza, closes the piece (GP IV 586–590).
This text in the whole · 1702, a year from which 727 pieces are catalogued166316901716