Editor’s note
A short paper "sent to Paris" in answer to the extract of Dom François Lamy's De la connoissance de soi-même in the Journal des sçavans of 8 and 15 September 1698. Lamy had made the soul–body relation "supernatural" and arbitrary; Leibniz answers that it is a natural consequence of creation, rehabilitates the scholastic "incompleteness" of soul and matter, and denies that God gives us sensations immediately. New translation from Gerhardt; Lamy's words as quoted by Leibniz are in italics.
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[1] Il y a dans les Journaux des Sçavans du 8 et 15 Septembre n. 35 et 36 de l'an 1698 l'extrait d'un livre intitulé Connoissance de soy même, publié à Paris chez Pralard, où il est fort parlé de l'union de l'ame et du corps. On dit là dessus plusieurs choses tres bonnes, on examine cette matiere avec soin, et on entre dans le detail plus que de coustume. Pour expliquer l'origine de cette union, on dit que ces deux substances ne peuvent estre unies que par un rapport pour ainsi dire surnaturel, entre leur diverses manieres d'estre, qui ne peut venir que de l'institution purement arbitraire de l'auteur de la nature. Mais si l'habile auteur de ce livre avoit consideré un nouveau systeme publié depuis peu, il auroit pû estre exemt des embarras qu'il trouve icy. Ce rapport n'est rien moins que surnaturel, car il est une suite naturelle de ce que Dieu a créé, et n'est nullement arbitraire, qu'en tant qu'on peut dire que la creation de cet univers dependoit du bon plaisir du createur.
[1] In the Journal des sçavans of 8 and 15 September 1698, nos. 35 and 36, there is an extract of a book entitled Connoissance de soi-même [Knowledge of oneself], published in Paris by Pralard, in which much is said about the union of soul and body. Several very good things are said on it; the matter is examined with care, and in more detail than usual. To explain the origin of this union, it is said that these two substances can be united only by a relation, so to speak supernatural, between their different ways of being, which can come only from the purely arbitrary institution of the author of nature. But if the able author of this book had considered a new system published not long ago, he could have been spared the difficulties he finds here. This relation is anything but supernatural, for it is a natural consequence of what God has created, and it is in no way arbitrary, except in so far as one may say that the creation of this universe depended on the good pleasure of the creator.
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[2] L'opinion de l'Ecole, que l'ame et la matiere ont quelque chose d'incomplet, n'est pas si absurde qu'on pense. Car la matiere sans les ames et formes ou entelechies n'est que passive, et les ames sans matiere ne seroient qu'actives: la Substance corporelle complete, veritablement une, que l'Ecole appelle unum per se (opposé à l'Estre par aggregation) devant resulter du principe de l'unité qui est actif, et de la masse qui fait la multitude et qui seroit passive seulement, si elle ne contenoit que la matiere premiere. Au lieu que la matiere seconde ou masse qui fait nostre corps, a partout des parties qui sont des substances completes elles mêmes, lorsque ce sont d'autres animaux ou substances organiques animées ou actuées à part. Mais l'amas de ces substances corporelles organisées qui constitue nostre corps, n'est uni avec nostre Ame que par ce rapport qui suit de l'ordre des phenomenes naturels à chaque substance à part. Et tout cela fait voir, comment on peut dire d'un costé que l'ame et le corps sont independans l'un de l'autre, et de l'autre costé que l'un est incomplet sans l'autre, puisque naturellement l'un n'est jamais sans l'autre.
[2] The opinion of the School, that soul and matter each have something incomplete, is not as absurd as people think. For matter without souls and forms or entelechies is only passive, and souls without matter would be only active: the complete corporeal Substance, truly one, which the School calls unum per se (as opposed to Being by aggregation), must result from the principle of unity, which is active, and from the mass, which makes the multitude and would be merely passive if it contained only prime matter. Whereas the secondary matter or mass that makes up our body has everywhere parts that are themselves complete substances, being other animals, or organic substances animated or actuated on their own. But the heap of these organized corporeal substances that constitutes our body is united with our Soul only by that relation which follows from the order of natural phenomena in each substance on its own. And all this shows how one can say, on the one hand, that soul and body are independent of each other, and on the other hand that the one is incomplete without the other, since naturally the one is never without the other.
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[3] Ainsi il ne paroist point qu'on puisse dire generalement avec l'auteur du traité de la Connoissance de soy même, que le corps (organique) exerçoit la plus part de ses fonctions avant que l'ame luy fut unie, ny que l'ame n'exercera jamais mieux les siennes que lorsqu'elle sera separée d'avec le corps. Au contraire quand il s'agit des plantes, bestes et toute sorte de vivans en general, on a sujet de croire qu'aussitost que le corps est veritablement organique pour soy, l'ame luy est unie, et que la mort ne peut depouiller l'ame naturellement que du plus grossier de son corps organique. On ne parle à l'egard de ce point que des Ames et Entelechies substantielles que Dieu laisse au cours de la nature, comme sont celles des bestes, n'entreprenant point de prononcer sur l'origine ni sur la separation de nos ames, ou sur l'oeconomie des esprits, ni sur le regne de la grace distingué de celui de la nature.
[3] So it does not seem that one can say generally, with the author of the treatise Connoissance de soi-même, that the (organic) body exercised most of its functions before the soul was united to it, or that the soul will never exercise its own better than when it is separated from the body. On the contrary, where plants, beasts and every kind of living thing in general are concerned, there is reason to believe that as soon as the body is truly organic in itself, the soul is united to it, and that death can naturally strip the soul only of the grossest part of its organic body. On this point we speak only of the substantial Souls and Entelechies that God leaves to the course of nature, such as those of beasts, without undertaking to pronounce on the origin or the separation of our souls, or on the economy of spirits, or on the kingdom of grace as distinguished from that of nature.
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[4] L'auteur persuadé du rapport surnaturel entre l'ame et le corps, dit que si l'ame faisoit reflexion que les sentimens agreables qu'elle reçoit à l'occasion de son corps ne luy peuvent venir immediatement que de Dieu, et qu'il n'a pas besoin du corps pour les luy donner, elle ne devroit avoir d'inclination qu'à s'unir à Dieu. On demeure d'accord que ces sensations ne peuvent venir que de Dieu originairement, mais non pas immediatement, si ce n'est de [?] cette maniere generale, selon laquelle toutes les realités emanent continuellement de Dieu. Car les sentimens presens sont une suite des sentimens precedens et tous ensemble suivent de la nature même [?] de l'ame, qui n'est essentiellement que cette tendance reglée, de laquelle doit naistre spontanement une telle serie de phenomenes, qui representeront les fonctions de son corps, tout comme si ce corps les luy pouvoit donner par l'influence des especes que l'ecole se figuroit. Mais il ne paroist pas que pour nous porter à aimer Dieu, on ait besoin de croire qu'il nous donne à tout moment des sentimens agreables par une maniere immediate surnaturelle, ou miraculeuse. Au contraire cette opinion diminueroit celle qu'on doit avoir de la grandeur et de la sagesse de Dieu, et de la perfection de ses ouvrages. Il est vray que Dieu n'a pas besoin du corps, absolument parlant, pour donner à l'ame les sentimens qu'elle a, mais il en a besoin pour agir dans l'ordre de la nature qu'il a etabli, ayant donné à l'ame dés le commencement et une fois pour toutes cette force ou tendance qui la fait exprimer son corps.
[4] The author, persuaded of the supernatural relation between soul and body, says that if the soul reflected that the pleasant feelings it receives on the occasion of its body can come to it immediately only from God, and that he has no need of the body to give them to it, it ought to have no inclination except to unite itself with God. We agree that these sensations can come only from God originally, but not immediately, except [?] in that general manner by which all realities continually emanate from God. For present feelings are a consequence of preceding feelings, and all together follow from the very nature [?] of the soul, which is essentially nothing but that ordered tendency from which must spontaneously arise such a series of phenomena as will represent the functions of its body, just as if that body could give them to it through the influence of the species the School imagined. But it does not seem that, to bring us to love God, we need to believe that he gives us pleasant feelings at every moment in an immediate, supernatural or miraculous way. On the contrary, this opinion would diminish the one we ought to have of the greatness and wisdom of God and of the perfection of his works. It is true that God has no need of the body, absolutely speaking, to give the soul the feelings it has; but he needs it in order to act within the order of nature he has established, having given the soul from the beginning, once for all, that force or tendency which makes it express its body.
Notes to text 93
- Lamy and his book. Dom François Lamy (1636 to 1711), Benedictine of Saint-Maur and a follower of Malebranche, published De la connoissance de soi-même in several treatises (Paris, Pralard, from 1694; enlarged edition 1699). The extract Leibniz answers appeared in the Journal des sçavans of 8 and 15 September 1698. Leibniz's remark in text 91 that he had not yet seen Lamy's objections refers to the 1699 edition cited by Bayle, which is consistent with this paper answering only the 1698 extract. The paper's date and whether it was printed in Leibniz's lifetime are to be checked.
- "Anything but supernatural." Against Lamy's occasionalist "purely arbitrary institution", Leibniz makes the correspondence a natural consequence of the natures God created; the only arbitrariness is the free choice to create this universe at all.
- Incomplete substances and the unum per se. Row [2] is an important text for Leibniz's view of corporeal substance around 1698 to 1700: the complete corporeal substance, truly one, results from an active principle of unity (the entelechy) and a passive mass (primary matter), while secondary matter is an aggregate whose parts are themselves living substances. Compare the letters to De Volder and Des Bosses, both in the queue.
- Animals never wholly separated. Leibniz's doctrine that the soul is joined to its body as soon as the body is organic and that death strips away only the "grossest" part (preformation and transformation, not transmigration) appears also in the Système nouveau and Monadology §§72–77. He leaves the origin and separation of rational souls, and the kingdom of grace, to theology.
- Readings marked [?]. The OCR has "sin e cette maniere", read "si ce n'est de cette manière", and "natur cme", read "nature même"; "'@Atinuellement" is read "continuellement". The sense is clear in each case.
- Love of God without miracles. Lamy's pious argument (if all pleasure comes immediately from God, the soul should seek only God) is turned by Leibniz into a question of God's wisdom: a God who acts through an established order is greater than one who intervenes at every moment, a theme of the Théodicée and the Clarke correspondence.
- Part 2 (text 94) continues from "Nostre auteur soûtient que l'esprit est uni passivement au corps" (GP IV 574).