Editor’s note
The proofs of God's existence (ontological, from the idea of God, from our duration), knowledge of the infinite, final causes, and the Cartesian theory of error and freedom. New translation from Gerhardt.
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[1] Ad artic. 14. Argumentum pro existentia Dei ab ipsa ejus notione sumtum, primus quantum constat, invenit proposuitque Anselmus Cantuariensis Archiepiscopus libro contra insipientem qui extat. Et passim examinatur a Scholasticae Theologiae scriptoribus, ipsoque Aquinate, unde videtur hausisse Cartesius, ejus studii non expers. Continet aliquid pulchri haec ratiocinatio, sed est tamen imperfecta. Res huc redit. Quicquid ex notione rei demonstrari potest, id rei attribui potest. Jam ex notione Entis perfectissimi seu maximi demonstrari potest existentia. Ergo Enti perfectissimo (Deo) attribui Existentia potest, seu Deus existit. Probatur assumtio: Ens perfectissimum seu maximum continet omnes perfectiones, ergo et existentiam, quae utique est ex numero perfectionum, cum plus majusve sit existere quam non existere. Hactenus argumentum. Sed omissa perfectione aut magnitudine potuisset formari argumentatio adhuc propior strictiorque hoc modo: Ens necessarium existit (seu Ens de cujus Essentia est Existentia, sive Ens a se existit), ut ex terminis patet. Jam Deus est Ens tale (ex Dei definitione), Ergo Deus existit. Haec argumenta procedunt, si modo concedatur Ens perfectissimum seu Ens necessarium esse possibile, nec implicare contradictionem, vel quod idem est, possibilem esse essentiam ex qua sequatur existentia. Sed quamdiu possibilitas ista non est demonstrata, utique nec Dei existentiam tali argumento perfecte demonstratam esse putandum est. Et in genere sciendum est (quemadmodum olim admonui) ex definitione aliqua nihil posse tuto inferri de definito, quam diu non constat definitionem exprimere aliquid possibile. Nam si contradictionem occultam forte implicet, fieri poterit ut aliquid absurdum inde deducatur. Interim ex hac argumentatione praeclarum hoc discimus divinae naturae privilegium, ut si modo sit possibilis, eo ipso existat, quod in caeteris rebus ad existentiam probandam non sufficit. Tantum ergo pro Geometrica divinae existentiae demonstratione superest, ut possibilitas Dei accurata ad Geometricum rigorem severitate demonstretur. Interea vel hinc magnam fidem accipit existentia rei quae tantum indiget possibilitate; caeterum esse aliquam rem necessariam, aliunde constat vel ex eo quod existunt res contingentes.
[1] On article 14. The argument for God's existence drawn from the very notion of God was, so far as is known, first discovered and put forward by Anselm, Archbishop of Canterbury, in his surviving book against the Fool. It is examined here and there by the writers of scholastic theology, and by Aquinas himself, from whom Descartes, who was not without that learning, seems to have drawn it. This reasoning has something fine in it, but it is imperfect. The matter comes to this. Whatever can be demonstrated from the notion of a thing can be attributed to the thing. Now from the notion of the most perfect or greatest Being existence can be demonstrated. Therefore Existence can be attributed to the most perfect Being (God), that is, God exists. The minor premiss is proved: the most perfect or greatest Being contains all perfections, therefore also existence, which is certainly among the perfections, since it is more, or greater, to exist than not to exist. So far the argument. But leaving aside perfection or greatness, the argument could have been framed still more closely and strictly as follows: a necessary Being exists (that is, a Being whose Essence is Existence, or a Being that exists of itself), as is evident from the terms. Now God is such a Being (by the definition of God). Therefore God exists. These arguments hold, provided it is granted that a most perfect Being, or a necessary Being, is possible and implies no contradiction, or, what is the same, that an essence from which existence follows is possible. But so long as that possibility has not been demonstrated, God's existence must certainly not be thought perfectly demonstrated by such an argument. And in general one must know (as I once pointed out) that nothing can safely be inferred from a definition about the thing defined so long as it is not established that the definition expresses something possible; for if it happens to imply a hidden contradiction, something absurd may be deduced from it. Meanwhile we learn from this argument this remarkable privilege of the divine nature: that if only it is possible, by that very fact it exists, which in other things is not enough to prove existence. So for a Geometrical demonstration of the divine existence it remains only that God's possibility be demonstrated with exactness and geometrical rigour. In the meantime, even from this, great credibility accrues to the existence of a thing that needs only possibility; and besides, that there is some necessary thing is established otherwise, even from the fact that contingent things exist.
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[2] Ad artic. 18. Habere nos ideam Entis perfectissimi ejusque ideae adeo causam (id est Ens perfectissimum) existere quod secundum est Cartesii argumentum, magis dubium est quam Dei possibilitas, et negatur ab illis quoque multis, qui Deum non tantum possibilem sed et existentem summo studio profitentur. Nec valet quod Cartesium alicubi dicere memini, nos cum de aliqua re loquimur, intelligendo quod dicimus habere rei ideam. Nam saepe fit ut combinemus incompatibilia, velut cum de Motu celerrimo cogitamus quem impossibilem esse constat, adeoque idea carere, et tamen concessum nobis est de eo cum intellectu loqui. Scilicet alibi a me explicatum est, saepe nos confuse tantum cogitare id de quo loquimur neque ideae in mente nostra existentis conscios esse, nisi rem intelligamus et quantum satis est resolvamus.
[2] On article 18. That we have the idea of a most perfect Being, and that therefore the cause of this idea (that is, the most perfect Being) exists, which is Descartes's second argument, is more doubtful than God's possibility, and is denied even by many who most zealously profess that God is not only possible but existent. Nor is it valid, what I remember Descartes saying somewhere, that when we speak of a thing understanding what we say, we have the idea of the thing. For we often combine incompatibles, as when we think of the fastest Motion, which is known to be impossible and so to lack an idea; and yet we are allowed to speak of it with understanding. As I have explained elsewhere, we often think only confusedly of what we speak about, and are not conscious of an idea existing in our mind unless we understand the thing and analyse it sufficiently.
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[3] Ad artic. 20. Tertium argumentum praeter alia eodem vitio laborat, dum scilicet assumit, esse in nobis summae Dei perfectionis ideam, atque inde concludit esse Deum, quia nos eam ideam habentes existimus.
[3] On article 20. The third argument suffers, among other things, from the same fault: it assumes that the idea of God's supreme perfection is in us, and concludes that God exists because we, who have this idea, exist.
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[4] Ad artic. 21. Ex eo quod jam sumus, sequitur, nos mox adhuc futuros esse, nisi existat ratio mutationis. Itaque nisi aliunde constaret nos ne existere quidem posse, nisi Dei beneficio, nihil efficeretur pro Dei existentia ex nostra duratione; quasi scilicet una pars durationis hujus ab alia esset penitus independens, quod concedendum non est.
[4] On article 21. From the fact that we now exist it follows that we shall still exist shortly afterwards, unless there is a reason for change. So unless it were established otherwise that we could not even exist without God's beneficence, nothing would be achieved for God's existence from our duration, as if one part of this duration were wholly independent of another, which is not to be granted.
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[5] Ad artic. 26. Etiamsi nos finiti simus, multa tamen de infinito possumus scire, ut de lineis Asymptotis, seu quae in infinitum productae semper sibi propiores fiunt, nunquam concurrunt, de spatiis longitudine infinitis finito quoad aream non majoribus, de summis serierum infinitarum. Alioqui nec de Deo quicquam certo cognosceremus. Aliud est autem scire aliquid de re, aliud rem comprehendere, hoc est quicquid in ea latet in potestate habere.
[5] On article 26. Although we are finite, we can know many things about the infinite: about Asymptotic lines, which, produced to infinity, always come closer and never meet; about spaces infinite in length but no greater in area than a finite one; about the sums of infinite series. Otherwise we should know nothing certain about God either. But it is one thing to know something about a thing, another to comprehend the thing, that is, to have in one's power whatever lies hidden in it.
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[6] Ad artic. 28. Quod ad Fines attinet, quos DEUS sibi proposuit, plane sentio, et cognosci eos posse [?] et summa utilitate investigari; et contemtum hujus inquisitionis periculo aut suspicione non carere. Et in universum, quotiescunque rem aliquam egregias utilitates habere videmus, possumus tuto pronuntiare, hunc inter alios finem Deo eam rem producenti propositum fuisse, ut illas utilitates praeberet, cum usum hunc rei et sciverit et procurarit. Alibi notavi et exemplis ostendi, arcanas quasdam magni momenti veritates Physicas consideratione causae finalis erui posse, quas non aeque facile licuit cognoscere per causam efficientem.
[6] On article 28. As for the Ends that GOD has set himself, I hold firmly both that they can be known and that they are investigated with the greatest profit, and that contempt for this inquiry is not free of danger or of suspicion. And in general, whenever we see that something has outstanding uses, we can safely declare that, among others, this end was set before God when he produced the thing: that it should provide those uses, since he both knew and procured this use of the thing. I have noted elsewhere, and shown by examples, that certain hidden physical truths of great importance can be drawn out by considering the final cause which could not as easily be known through the efficient cause.
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[7] Ad artic. 30. Etiam admissa substantia perfecta, quae imperfectionum causa utique non est, non ideo illae verae vel fictitiae dubitandi rationes tolluntur, quas induxit Cartesius, quemadmodum jam animadversum est artic. 13.
[7] On article 30. Even when a perfect substance is admitted, which is certainly not the cause of imperfections, the reasons for doubting, true or feigned, that Descartes introduced are not thereby removed, as was already observed on article 13.
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[8] Ad artic. 31 et 35. Errores pendere magis a voluntate quam ab intellectu, non admitto. Credere vera vel falsa, quorum illud cognoscere, hoc errare est, nihil aliud quam conscientia aut memoria est quaedam perceptionum aut rationum, itaque non pendet a voluntate, nisi quatenus obliqua arte tandem efficitur etiam aliquando nobis ignaris, ut quae volumus nobis videre videamur. Add. artic. 6. Judicamus igitur non quia volumus, sed quia apparet. Et quod dicitur, voluntatem esse latiorem intellectu, argutum est magis quam verum, verbo dicam: ad populum phalerae. Nihil volumus quin intellectui obversetur. Errorum omnium origo eadem est, suo quodam modo, quae errorum calculi ratio apud Arithmeticos observatur. Nam saepe fit defectu attentionis aut memoriae ut agamus indebitum aut omittamus debitum, aut putemus nos egisse quod non egimus, aut quod egimus non egisse. Ita fit ut notae debitae in calculo (cui ratiocinatio respondet in animo) non ponantur, indebitae ponantur, transsiliatur aliquid inter colligendum, methodus turbetur. Mens scilicet nostra lassata aut distracta non satis attendit ad praesentes operationes suas, aut errore memoriae assumit tanquam olim probatum, quod tantum inculcatum saepius aut consideratum fixe, aut optatum studiose, altius in nobis haesit. Remedium quoque errorum nostrorum idem est, quod errorum calculi, ut materiae formaeque attendamus, ut procedamus lente, ut repetamus operationem variemusque, ut examina instituamus sive comprobationes, ut longiores ratiocinationes in partes secemus, quo respirare mens possit, partemque quamlibet peculiaribus comprobationibus confirmemus.
[8] On articles 31 and 35. I do not admit that errors depend more on the will than on the intellect. To believe what is true or false (the first is knowing, the second erring) is nothing but a certain consciousness or memory of perceptions or reasons; so it does not depend on the will, except in so far as by an indirect art it is at last brought about, sometimes even without our knowing it, that we seem to ourselves to see what we want. Compare article 6. We judge, then, not because we will, but because it appears. And the saying that the will is wider than the intellect is more clever than true; in a word, trappings for the crowd. We will nothing that is not presented to the intellect. The origin of all errors is, in its own way, the same as the cause of errors of calculation observed among Arithmeticians. For it often happens through lack of attention or memory that we do what we should not, or omit what we should, or think we have done what we have not done, or not done what we have. So it comes about that the signs that ought to be in the calculation (to which reasoning corresponds in the mind) are not set down, and others that ought not are, something is skipped in collecting, the method is disturbed. Our mind, being tired or distracted, does not attend enough to its present operations, or by an error of memory assumes as once proved what has only stuck in us more deeply through being often inculcated, or fixedly considered, or eagerly wished. The remedy for our errors is also the same as for errors of calculation: to attend to matter and form, to proceed slowly, to repeat and vary the operation, to set up tests or checks, to cut longer reasonings into parts so that the mind can draw breath, and to confirm each part with its own checks.
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[9] Et quoniam in agendo aliquando festinandum est, magna res est, praesentiam animi sibi comparasse assuescendo, velut illi qui in tumultu atque etiam sine scriptura aut calculis, non ideo minus ingentes numeros computare possunt, ut scilicet non distrahatur facile mens, vel sensibus externis vel imaginibus affectibusque propriis, sed super id quod agit emineat, retineatque potestatem animadvertendi, seu ut vulgo dicimus reflectendi in sese, ut subinde dicere sibi ipsi possit: vide quid agas, dic cur hic, ruit hora; vice extranei monitoris. Germani egregie vocant, sich begreiffen; Galli non minus pulchre s'aviser, quasi monere se ipsum, suggerere sibi; ut nomenclatores Romanis candidatis nomina ac merita civium prensari dignorum, ut insusurrator comoedo initialia verba superstitis pensi, ut ephebus quidam Philippo regi Macedonum illud: memento te mortalem. Ipsum vero animadvertere, s'aviser, non est in nostra potestate nec in arbitrio voluntatis, imo prius intellectui occurrere oportet, pendetque a praesenti perfectionis nostrae gradu. Voluntatis est in antecessum omni studio niti, ut mens bene praeparetur, quod utiliter fit tum intuitu alienorum experimentorum damnorumque aut periculorum, tum et usu propriorum, sed (qua licet) periculo vacantium, aut levis saltem vel ludicri damni, tum vero assuefactione animi ad seriem quandam methodumque cogitandi, ut postea velut sponte occurrat quod oportet. Sunt tamen quae sine culpa elabuntur aut non subveniunt, ubi non judicii defectu, sed memoriae aut ingenii laboramus, nec tam erramus quam ignoramus, quod non est hujus loci, neque enim efficere possumus ut aut nosse liceat aut meminisse quae vellemus. Sufficit ea animadversionis species, qua pugnamus in defectum attentionis, et quoties memoria nobis praeteritas probationes refert, quae fortasse nullae fuerunt, suspectam habeamus confusam recordationem; et vel repetamus inquisitionem, si licet, magnaque res est, vel non nisi testatae satis praeteritae diligentiae confidamus.
[9] And since in action one must sometimes make haste, it is a great thing to have acquired presence of mind by practice, like those who can compute huge numbers amid uproar and even without writing or counters; that is, so that the mind is not easily distracted, either by the external senses or by its own images and feelings, but rises above what it is doing and keeps the power of noticing, or, as we commonly say, of reflecting upon itself, so that it can say to itself from time to time, as if it were an outside monitor: Look what you are doing; say why you are here; the hour is rushing by. The Germans call this excellently sich begreifen, the French no less beautifully s'aviser, as if to admonish oneself, to prompt oneself: like the nomenclators who prompted Roman candidates with the names and merits of citizens worth canvassing, like the prompter who whispers to the actor the first words of the rest of his part, like the youth who said to King Philip of Macedon, Remember that you are mortal. But noticing itself, s'aviser, is not in our power or in the will's choice; it must first occur to the intellect, and it depends on our present degree of perfection. It is for the will to strive in advance with every effort that the mind be well prepared. This is usefully done by observing the experiments, losses or dangers of others; by our own, but (as far as possible) free of danger, or at least of slight or playful loss; and above all by accustoming the mind to a certain order and method of thinking, so that afterwards what is needed occurs as if of itself. There are, however, things that slip away or do not come to us without any fault, where we suffer not from a defect of judgment but of memory or wit, and do not so much err as not know; that is not the subject here, for we cannot bring it about that we know or remember what we would wish. It is enough to have that kind of noticing by which we fight against lack of attention; and whenever memory reports past proofs to us that perhaps never existed, to hold the confused recollection suspect, and either repeat the inquiry if we can (which is a great thing) or trust only past diligence that is sufficiently attested.
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[10] Ad artic. 37. Summa hominis perfectio non magis est quod libere, quam quod cum ratione agit; aut potius idem est utrumque, cum tanto quisque sit liberior, quanto minus affectuum impetu rationis usus turbatur.
[10] On article 37. Man's highest perfection lies no more in acting freely than in acting with reason; or rather the two are the same, since each person is the freer the less the use of reason is disturbed by the impulse of the passions.
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[11] Ad artic. 39. Quaerere, utrum in nostra voluntate sit libertas, idem est ac quaerere utrum in nostra voluntate sit voluntas. Liberum et voluntarium idem significant. Est enim liberum idem quod spontaneum cum ratione, et velle est ob rationem intellectu perceptam ad agendum ferri: quanto autem purior ratio est minusque impetus bruti et confusae perceptionis admistum habet, eo liberior actio est. A judiciis abstinere non est voluntatis nostrae, sed intellectus animadversionem quandam sibi suggerentis, ut jam dictum est ad artic. 35.
[11] On article 39. To ask whether there is freedom in our will is the same as to ask whether there is will in our will. Free and voluntary mean the same. For the free is the same as the spontaneous with reason, and to will is to be carried to act by a reason perceived by the intellect; and the purer the reason, and the less it has mixed with brute impulse and confused perception, the freer the action. To abstain from judgments is not a matter of our will but of the intellect prompting itself to a certain noticing, as was said already on article 35.
Notes to text 102
- Anselm and Aquinas. Leibniz names Anselm's Proslogion argument (and the reply Pro insipiente, "on behalf of the Fool", to which Anselm answered; the "book against the Fool" is Leibniz's loose description) and notes that Aquinas examined it (and rejected it, Summa theologiae I q.2 a.1). His draft adds that Descartes absorbed this learning "after he had studied letters with the Jesuits at La Flèche".
- The possibility proviso. Article 14 is the classic statement of Leibniz's completion of the ontological argument: it proves only that if God is possible, God exists; what remains is to demonstrate God's possibility. The same point is in the Meditationes (text 66), the Discours de métaphysique §23 and the Monadology §45. Leibniz's draft gave a mock proof that an "absolutely necessary Beast" exists, to show that definitions must first be shown possible; he struck it from the fair copy.
- Ideas and speaking with understanding. Against Descartes's claim that understanding what we say gives us the idea of the thing, Leibniz cites the "fastest motion", an impossible notion we can speak of; the draft adds that the idea of God is truly in us, since God is possible and actual and we know both, and that "all ideas are in a way innate in us".
- Knowing versus comprehending the infinite. The draft adds the important claim that an infinite line or number is not a whole, so has no middle part and is neither even nor odd, a thesis Leibniz keeps to the end (compare Nouveaux essais II.17).
- Final causes. Against Descartes's ban on final causes in physics, Leibniz holds they can be known and are useful in discovery; the draft refers to his "Unicum opticae, catoptricae et dioptricae principium" (Acta eruditorum, 1682), where the law of refraction is derived from a principle of the easiest path.
- Error as miscalculation. Articles 31 and 35 reject Descartes's theory that error comes from a will wider than the intellect. For Leibniz all error is like an error in reckoning, due to lapses of attention and memory, and its remedies are those of careful calculation. "Ad populum phalerae" (trappings for the crowd) is from Persius, Satires III.30.
- S'aviser and self-monitoring. The passage on presence of mind, sich begreifen and s'aviser, the Roman nomenclator, the theatre prompter and the slave who reminded Philip of Macedon of his mortality, is one of Leibniz's most vivid accounts of reflective self-control; a similar passage, with the same motto "dic cur hic", appears in the Nouveaux essais II.21 (to be checked against the text).
- Freedom and reason. Articles 37 and 39 identify freedom with spontaneity joined to reason: "free and voluntary mean the same", and an action is freer the purer the reason behind it.
- Reading marked [?]. In article 28 the OCR's cognosci eos Dei et summa is read cognosci eos posse et summa.
- Part 3 (text 103) continues with articles 40 onward: freedom and divine preordination (GP IV 363).