Translations · Text 105 · 1101001

Animadversiones, Part II, articles 36–39: the true measure of force

Reference
GP IV 370–373
Date
1692
Original
Latin
Earlier English
this is a new translation (report tab 2)
Physics and dynamicsMetaphysics
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Editor’s note

The heart of Leibniz's dynamics against Descartes: not quantity of motion (mass times speed) but force (mass times the height to which a body can rise, that is, mass times the square of speed) is conserved, proved by the example of bodies of mass 4 and 1 and the impossibility of perpetual motion. New translation from Gerhardt; the OCR's garbled numerals ("A" or "4" for 1) are restored from the arithmetic of the example.

Original
English
1
[1] Ad artic. 36. Eandem motus quantitatem conservari in rebus, celebratissima est sententia Cartesianorum; demonstrationem tamen nullam dedere, nam quae hic ratio sumitur a constantia Dei, quam debilis sit, nemo non videt, quoniam etsi constantia Dei summa sit, nec quicquam ab eo nisi secundum praescriptae dudum seriei leges mutetur, id tamen quaeritur, quidnam conservare in serie decreverit; utrumne quantitatem motus, an aliud quiddam ab ea diversum, qualis est quantitas virium quam a me demonstratum est eandem potius conservari, et a Motus quantitate esse diversam, et saepissime contingere, ut quantitas motus mutetur, quantitate tamen virium semper permanente. Quibus argumentis hoc evicerim, et ab objectionibus vindicaverim, alibi legi pluribus potest. Quia tamen magni momenti res est, meditationis meae fontem summatim aperiam in exemplo. Sint duo corpora, A mole ut 4, celeritate ut 1, et B mole ut 1, celeritate ut 0, seu quiescens. Ponamus vel fingamus effici ut mox tota vis ipsius A transferatur in B, id est ut A redigatur ad quietem, B vero pro ipso solum moveatur: Quaeritur quantum celeritatis nancisci debeat B? Secundum Cartesianos respondebitur: debere B habere celeritatem ut 4; ita enim quantitas motus pristina et praesens aequabuntur, quia moles 4 in celeritatem 1 tantum producit, quantum moles 1 in celeritatem 4; celeritate scilicet in tantum aucta in quantum diminutum fuit corpus. Mea sententia respondendum est, B. 1 debere accipere celeritatem 2, ut tantum potentiae habeat quantum A. 4, celeritatem habens ut 1, cujus ratio qua licet paucis explicanda est, ne nulla ratione dictum videatur. Nimirum hoc modo tantum potentiae nunc habebit B, quantum antea habebat A, seu potentia praesens et pristina erunt aequales, quod ostendi operae pretium est.
[1] On article 36. That the same quantity of motion is conserved in things is the most celebrated doctrine of the Cartesians; yet they have given no demonstration of it. For everyone sees how weak is the reason taken here from God's constancy: although God's constancy is supreme, and nothing is changed by him except according to the laws of a series prescribed long ago, the question is precisely what he decreed to conserve in the series, whether quantity of motion or something different from it, such as the quantity of forces, which I have demonstrated is what is conserved instead, that it differs from the quantity of motion, and that it very often happens that the quantity of motion changes while the quantity of forces always remains. By what arguments I proved this and defended it against objections can be read at greater length elsewhere. Yet since the matter is of great importance, I shall briefly reveal the source of my thinking by an example. Let there be two bodies, A with mass 4 and speed 1, and B with mass 1 and speed 0, that is, at rest. Let us suppose or imagine that the whole force of A is presently transferred to B, that is, that A is brought to rest and B alone moves in its place. The question is how much speed B must acquire. According to the Cartesians the answer will be that B must have speed 4; for so the former and the present quantities of motion will be equal, since mass 4 times speed 1 gives as much as mass 1 times speed 4, the speed being increased in the same proportion as the body was diminished. In my view the answer must be that B, of mass 1, should receive speed 2, so as to have as much power as A, of mass 4, having speed 1. The reason must be explained, briefly as may be, lest it seem said without reason. Namely, in this way B will now have as much power as A had before, that is, the present and the former power will be equal; which it is worth the trouble to show.
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[2] Scilicet, ut altius ordiar, verumque aestimandi modum explicem (quod est officium Matheseos cujusdam vere universalis nuspiam traditae) ante omnia potentiam duplam, triplam, quadruplam fieri manifestum est, cum id quod simplam habet, bis, ter, quater praecise repetitur. Itaque duo corpora mole et celeritate aequalia duplum potentiae habent unius ex ipsis. Non tamen inde sequitur, unum corpus dupla celeritate praeditum esse uno, simplam habente, duplo tantum potentius; licet enim repetatur adhuc semel gradus celeritatis, non tamen replicatur et subjectum: quemadmodum revera fit cum corpus duplo majus vel bina corpora aequalium celeritatum ponuntur pro uno, ubi plena unius ex ipsis fit repetitio tam magnitudine quam motu. Similiter duae librae super horizontem altitudine pedis elevatae praecise re et virtute duplum sunt unius tantundem elevatae; et duo elastra aequaliter tensa sunt duplum unius ex ipsis. Sed quando duo potentiam habentia non plane homogenea sunt, neque hoc modo inter se comparari aut ad mensuram re pariter et virtute metientem revocari possunt, tentanda est comparatio per ambages, comparando scilicet effectus eorum homogeneos vel causas. Nam unaquaeque causa aequalem potentiam habet cum effectu integro seu quem ipsa potentiam suam consumendo producit.
[2] To begin further back and explain the true way of estimating (which is the business of a truly universal Mathesis, nowhere yet taught): first of all it is evident that power becomes double, triple, quadruple when what has a single power is exactly repeated two, three, four times. So two bodies equal in mass and speed have double the power of one of them. It does not follow, however, that one body endowed with double speed is only twice as powerful as one having single speed; for although the degree of speed is repeated once more, the subject is not also replicated, as really happens when a body twice as large, or two bodies of equal speeds, are put in place of one, where there is a full repetition of one of them in both size and motion. Likewise two pounds raised a foot above the horizon are exactly, in reality and in virtue, double one pound raised as much; and two springs equally stretched are double one of them. But when two things having power are not wholly homogeneous, and cannot be compared in this way or brought to a measure that measures equally in reality and in virtue, the comparison must be attempted indirectly, namely by comparing their homogeneous effects or causes. For every cause has a power equal to its entire effect, that is, the effect it produces by using up its power.
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[3] Cum ergo duo corpora supradicta A mole 4, celeritate 1, et B mole 1, celeritate 2 per se praecise non sint comparabilia, neque unum aliquod potentia praeditum assignari possit, cujus simplici repetitione producatur utrumque, inspiciamus eorum effectus. Nempe ponantur haec duo corpora esse gravia; itaque si A directionem suam sursum convertat et ope celeritatis ut 1 assurgere possit ad unius pedis altitudinem, poterit B celeritate ut 2 assurgere ad altitudinem pedum 4, ex demonstratis a Galilaeo aliisque, isque effectus uterque erit integer et potentiam consumens, adeoque causae producenti aequalis. Sed hi duo effectus sunt virtute seu potentia aequales inter se, librarum scilicet 4, seu corporis A elevatio ad pedem unum et librae unius seu corporis B elevatio ad quatuor. Ergo et causae, nempe A. 4 celeritate 1 et B. 1 celeritate 2 virtute seu potentia erunt aequales, quod asserebatur. Si quis autem neget ejusdem potentiae esse 4 libras ad pedem 1 et unam lib. ad ped. 4 elevare seu duos hos effectus aequipollere (quanquam admittant ni fallor fere omnes), ex eodem principio convinci potest. Nam adhibita inaequalium brachiorum bilance utique per libram 1 descendentem ex pedibus 4, praecise attolli possunt librae 4 ad pedem 1, nec quicquam ultra licet praestare; ita ut hic effectus causae potentiam praecise consumat, adeoque sit ei virtute aequalis.
[3] Since, then, the two bodies above, A of mass 4 and speed 1 and B of mass 1 and speed 2, are not exactly comparable in themselves, and no single thing endowed with power can be assigned by whose simple repetition each is produced, let us look at their effects. Suppose these two bodies are heavy. If A turns its direction upwards and by its speed 1 can rise to a height of one foot, B with speed 2 will be able to rise to a height of 4 feet, as demonstrated by Galileo and others; and each of these effects will be entire and will use up the power, and so will be equal to the cause producing it. But these two effects are equal to each other in virtue or power: the raising of 4 pounds, that is of body A, to one foot, and the raising of one pound, that is of body B, to four. Therefore the causes too, namely A of mass 4 with speed 1 and B of mass 1 with speed 2, will be equal in virtue or power, as was asserted. And if anyone denies that it takes the same power to raise 4 pounds one foot as one pound 4 feet, or that these two effects are equivalent (though almost everyone, if I am not mistaken, admits it), he can be convinced by the same principle. For with a balance of unequal arms, by one pound descending 4 feet exactly 4 pounds can be raised one foot, and nothing more can be achieved; so this effect exactly uses up the power of the cause and is therefore equal to it in virtue.
Original
English
4
[4] Itaque hinc tandem colligo: Si tota potentia ipsius A. 4 praediti celeritate 1 transferri debeat in B. 1, debere B accipere celeritatem 2, vel quod eodem redit, si prius B quiescente, motum fuisset A, nunc vero A quiescente in motu debeat esse B (caeteris paribus manentibus), debere celeritatem ipsius B esse duplam, cum moles ipsius A quadrupla sit. Si vero ut vulgo volunt, B subquadruplum ipsius A seu quartae ejus parti pondere aequale acciperet celeritatem quadruplam, acquireremus motum perpetuum seu effectum potentiorem causa; nam initio cum moveretur A, tantummodo poterant 4 librae attolli ad pedem 1, seu una libra ad pedes 4; postea vero, moto B, posset una libra attolli ad pedes 16, nam altitudines sunt ut quadrata celeritatum quarum vi ad eas assurgi potest, et quadrupla celeritas ad altitudinem sedecuplam attollit. Ita ope ipsius B non possemus tantum A rursus attollere ad pedem 1, unde redescendendo celeritatem pristinam reciperet, sed et plura alia efficere, quod est motum mechanicum perpetuum exhibere, cum scilicet potentia prima redit et tamen aliquid ultra praestitum est. Etsi autem suppositio illa de translatione totius potentiae ipsius A in B non posset actu ipso praestari, id tamen ad rem non facit, cum hoc loco de vera aestimatione agatur seu quantum ex tali hypothesi B accipere oporteret. Imo etsi pars virium retineatur, parte tantum translata, easdem tamen absurditates nasci necesse est, nam si quantitas motus servanda est, quantitatem virium servari semper non posse patet, cum quantitatem motus constet esse in ratione composita molis et celeritatis, quantitas autem potentiae, ut ostendimus, sit in ratione composita molis et altitudinis ad quam grave vi potentiae attolli potest, altitudines vero sint in ratione celeritatum attollentium duplicata. Interim haec regula constitui potest: eandem tam virium quam motus quantitatem servari, cum corpora tam ante quam post concursum tendunt in easdem partes, item cum corpora concurrentia aequalia sunt.
[4] So from this I finally conclude: if the whole power of A, of mass 4 with speed 1, is to be transferred to B, of mass 1, B must receive speed 2; or, what comes to the same, if A was formerly in motion while B was at rest, and now B is to be in motion while A is at rest (other things remaining equal), B's speed must be double, since A's mass is fourfold. But if, as is commonly held, B, a quarter of A, that is equal in weight to a fourth part of it, received fourfold speed, we should obtain perpetual motion, or an effect more powerful than its cause. For at the beginning, while A was moving, only 4 pounds could be raised one foot, or one pound 4 feet; but afterwards, with B moving, one pound could be raised 16 feet, since heights are as the squares of the speeds by whose force bodies can rise to them, and fourfold speed raises to a sixteenfold height. So by means of B we could not only raise A again to one foot, from which by descending again it would recover its former speed, but also accomplish much else besides; which is to exhibit mechanical perpetual motion, since the original power returns and yet something more has been done. And although that supposition of transferring the whole power of A to B could not actually be carried out, that is beside the point, since here the question is the true estimate, that is, how much B ought to receive on such a hypothesis. Indeed, even if part of the forces is retained and only part transferred, the same absurdities must arise. For if the quantity of motion is to be conserved, it is plain that the quantity of forces cannot always be conserved, since the quantity of motion is known to be in the compound ratio of mass and speed, while the quantity of power, as we have shown, is in the compound ratio of mass and of the height to which a heavy body can be raised by the force of that power, and heights are in the duplicate ratio of the speeds that raise them. Meanwhile this rule can be laid down: the same quantity both of forces and of motion is conserved when the bodies, both before and after collision, tend in the same direction, and also when the colliding bodies are equal.
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[5] Ad artic. 37, 38. Verissima et indubitata naturae lex est, quod eadem res, quantum in se est, semper in eodem statu perseverat, quam et Galilaeus et Gassendus, et plerique alii dudum tenuere. Ut mirum sit fuisse, quibus in mentem venit projecti continuationem motus aeri debere, non cogitantibus pari jure hoc modo novam rationem motus continuandi quaerendam fore pro aere ipso; neque enim ille lapidem projectum impellere posset ut illi volunt, nisi vim recepti motus continuandi in se haberet, eaque in re ab obstante lapide impediretur.
[5] On articles 37, 38. It is a most true and indubitable law of nature that the same thing, as far as in it lies, always persists in the same state; Galileo, Gassendi and many others held it long ago. So it is surprising that there have been people who thought of attributing the continuation of a projectile's motion to the air, not considering that by the same right a new reason for continuing motion would have to be sought for the air itself; for the air could not push the thrown stone, as they would have it, unless it had in itself the force of continuing the motion received, and was hindered in this by the stone standing in its way.
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[6] Ad artic. 39. Pulcherrimam naturae legem, qua fit ut circulum vel lineam quamcunque curvam describentia recedere conentur a linea per rectam tangentem, non tantum observavit Keplerus (post alios fortasse), sed etiam ea jam tum usus est, quod palmarium judico ad illustrandam causam gravitatis, ut apparet ex Epitoma Astronomiae Copernicanae. A Cartesio recte posita est haec lex, et egregie explicata, sed non tamen demonstrata, quod ab ipso expectandum videbatur.
[6] On article 39. The very fine law of nature by which things describing a circle or any curved line strive to recede from it along the straight tangent was not only observed by Kepler (perhaps after others), but he already used it, which I judge the crowning point, to illustrate the cause of gravity, as appears from his Epitome Astronomiae Copernicanae. Descartes stated this law correctly and explained it excellently, but did not demonstrate it, which one might have expected of him.

Notes to text 105

  1. The vis viva controversy. This is Leibniz's argument of the Brevis demonstratio erroris memorabilis Cartesii (Acta eruditorum, March 1686), restated with an explicit perpetual-motion reductio: force is measured by its entire effect (raising a weight), so it varies as mass times the square of speed (mv²), not as mass times speed (mv). If quantity of motion were what is conserved, one could gain work from nothing. The "rule" at the end (both quantities conserved when bodies move the same way before and after collision, or are equal) marks the cases where Descartes's law happens to give the right answer.
  2. "A truly universal Mathesis". The estimation of power by repetition of a unit, and indirectly by equal effects, belongs to Leibniz's projected universal science of quantity and quality; compare the Specimen dynamicum (texts 68, 75).
  3. Galileo's law. Heights reached are as the squares of the speeds acquired in falling (or needed to rise): Galileo, Discorsi (1638), Third Day.
  4. Inertia. Leibniz endorses the law of persistence but, as elsewhere, refuses to treat it as self-evident: it must be grounded in force. The Aristotelian theory that the air keeps a projectile moving is dismissed with a regress argument.
  5. The centrifugal tendency and Kepler. Leibniz credits Kepler's Epitome Astronomiae Copernicanae (1618–1621) with the tendency of a revolving body to recede along the tangent and with using it to explain gravity; Kepler's role here is Leibniz's claim and is to be checked against the Epitome. The vortex theory of gravity in the Tentamen de motuum coelestium causis (1689) builds on this law.
  6. Numerals. The OCR renders the digit 1 as "A" or "4" throughout this article; the values (A: mass 4, speed 1; B: mass 1, speed 2 on Leibniz's view, 4 on the Cartesian) are fixed by the arithmetic of the example and agree with the Brevis demonstratio.
  7. Text 106 continues with articles 40–44 and Descartes's rules of collision (GP IV 373).
This text in the whole · 1692, a year from which 198 pieces are catalogued166316901716