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Animadversiones, Part II, articles 40–45: Descartes's third law and the law of continuity

Reference
GP IV 373–376
Date
1692
Original
Latin
Earlier English
this is a new translation (report tab 2)
Physics and dynamicsMetaphysics
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Editor’s note

Leibniz attacks Descartes's third law of nature (a body striking a stronger one loses none of its motion but only changes direction), argues that every body is elastic and reverses its motion by degrees, and states his law of continuity as a "Lydian stone" for testing rules of motion. New translation from Gerhardt.

Original
English
1
[1] Ad artic. 40 usque ad 44. Duas Naturae Leges verissimas attulit Cartesius artic. 37 et 39, et sua quadam luce claras, sed tertia mihi tam videtur aliena non tantum a veritate, sed etiam a verisimilitudine, ut mirari subeat, quomodo in mentem tanti viri irrepserit. Et huic tamen ille mox suas motuum atque concursuum regulas inaedificat, aitque omnes causas mutationum particularium in corporibus in ea contineri. Ita autem concepta est: Unum corpus alteri fortiori occurrendo nihil amittit de suo motu, sed tantum mutat determinationem, accipere tamen aliquid motus a fortiori potest; occurrendo autem minus forti, tantum amittit quantum transfert. Verum enim vero ut corpus fortiori impingendo nihil amittat de suo motu, sed celeritatem vel retineat vel augeat, tantummodo locum habet in casu concursus contrarii; sed quando corpus debilius et tamen celerius impingitur fortiori tardius antecedenti, quod scilicet assequitur, tunc contrarium evenit, generaliterque verum esse reperio, observari a natura ut corporis aliud assequentis celeritas ictu imminuatur. Nam si continuet motum post ictum, utique continuare eum priore celeritate non potest, nisi eam et antecedenti tribuat, quo casu in summa augeretur aggregatum potentiae. Si quiescat post ictum, per se patet celeritatem ejus esse ictu imminutam, imo sublatam: contingit autem quies in duris (quae hic semper subintelligo), cum ratio excessus praecedentis super assequens est ad assequens duplum, ut celeritas praecedentis ad celeritatem assequentis [?]. Denique si reflectatur incurrens corpus post assecutionem, rursus patet motum reflexi esse minorem quam ante, alioqui cum a superveniente incurrentis impulsu necessario aucta sit celeritas excipientis seu praecedentis, utique volentibus nobis ipsius quoque insequentis et jam reflexi celeritatem augere, vel saltem eandem quae prius retinere, totius potentiae aggregatum rursus auctum prodiret, quod absurdum est. Si quis excusando Cartesio excipiat, hanc Tertiam ejus Legem de occursu corporum loquentem de solis concursibus contrariis intelligi debere, facile id quidem patiar; sed tunc fatendum est non esse provisum ab ipso concursui corporum ad easdem partes tendentium, cum tamen ipsemet legem hanc, quemadmodum jam notavimus, ad omnes casus particulares porrigi profiteatur.
[1] On articles 40 to 44. Descartes put forward two very true Laws of Nature in articles 37 and 39, clear by a light of their own; but the third seems to me so far not only from truth but even from probability that one wonders how it crept into the mind of so great a man. And yet he soon builds on it his rules of motion and collision, and says that all causes of particular changes in bodies are contained in it. It is framed thus: a body meeting a stronger one loses nothing of its motion but only changes its direction, though it can receive some motion from the stronger; but meeting a less strong one, it loses as much as it transfers. Now, that a body striking a stronger one should lose nothing of its motion, but either keep or increase its speed, holds only in the case of opposite collision. When a weaker but swifter body strikes a stronger one moving more slowly ahead of it, that is, when it overtakes it, the contrary happens; and I find it to be generally true, as observed by nature, that the speed of a body overtaking another is diminished by the blow. For if it continues its motion after the blow, it certainly cannot continue it with its former speed unless it also gives that speed to the body ahead, in which case the total aggregate of power would be increased. If it comes to rest after the blow, it is evident that its speed has been diminished, indeed taken away, by the blow; and rest occurs in hard bodies (which I always understand here) when the excess of the leading body over the overtaking one is to the overtaking one as twice the speed of the leading one to the speed of the overtaking one [?]. Finally, if the striking body is reflected after overtaking, it is again plain that the reflected motion is less than before; otherwise, since the speed of the receiving or leading body is necessarily increased by the impact of the body coming up behind, if we wished also to increase the speed of the following and now reflected body, or at least keep it as before, the aggregate of total power would again come out increased, which is absurd. If someone, to excuse Descartes, objects that this Third Law of his, speaking of the meeting of bodies, should be understood only of opposite collisions, I shall readily allow it; but then it must be admitted that he made no provision for the collision of bodies moving in the same direction, although he himself professes, as we have noted, that this law extends to all particular cases.
Original (GP IV 374–376)
English
2
Demonstratio quoque quam molitur artic. 44, si proba est, omnem concursum ad easdem aut contrarias partes tendentium comprehendit. Sed mihi ne speciem quidem argumenti habere videtur. Fateor recte distingui motus quantitatem et determinationem, et unam aliquando mutari altera servata; verum non raro contra evenit ut simul mutentur, et sane ambo ad se mutuo tuendum conspirant, corpusque tota sua vi totaque motus sui quantitate huc tendit, ut determinationem suam sive directionem servet, et quicquid manente directione de celeritate detrahitur, decedit etiam determinationi; tardius enim procedens in eandem plagam, minus ad eam servandam determinatum est. Praeterea si corpus A incurrat in quiescens minus B, perget in eadem directione, imminuto licet motu, seu incurrat in quiescens sibi aequale B, sistetur, ita ut ipsummet quiescat omnino, motu translato in B; denique si A incurrat in B, quiescens majus vel aequale quidem, sed contratendens, tunc A plane reflectetur. Unde intelligitur, majore oppositione opus esse ut A reflectatur in plagam directioni suae oppositam, quam ut redigatur ad quietem; quae res prorsus pugnat cum Cartesii decretis. Major enim oppositio est, cum oppositum est majus, aut cum magis contra tendit. Quod autem ait motum, tanquam rem simplicem, perseverare, donec a causa externa destruatur, agnosco non tantum de quantitate motus, sed et determinatione. Et determinatio ipsa corporis moti, seu ipse progrediendi nisus suam habet quantitatem, quae facilius minui quam ad nihilum id est quietem redigi, et facilius (id est minore oppositione) sisti prorsus et reduci ad quietem, quam in regressum seu motum contrarium mutari potest, quemadmodum proxime animadvertimus. Itaque licet motus motui in genere contrarius non sit, tamen obstat motus praesens praesenti concurrentis, seu progressus progressui contrario; quandoquidem minore mutatione minoreque, ut ostendimus, oppositione opus est ad minuendum progressum quam ad eundem plane tollendum et transformandum in regressum. Perinde autem mihi sese habere videtur Cartesii ratiocinatio, ac si quis argutari vellet, cum duo corpora sibi obstant, nunquam debere frangi et in partes dissilire, sed semper flectere sese atque accommodare sibi mutuo suas figuras, quia scilicet materia distinguitur a figura, nec materia materiae, sed figura figurae contraria est, et quantitas materiae servari in corpore potest, mutata figura, atque hinc proinde magnitudine ejusdem corporis nunquam imminuta figuram solam mutari debere concludat. Si considerasset Cartesius corpus omne in aliud incurrens, antequam reflectatur, a progressu suo remittere, deinde sisti, ac tum demum reflecti, atque ita non per saltum sed per gradus ab una determinatione ad oppositam transire: alias nobis motuum regulas constituisset. Sciendum enim est, omne corpus utcunque durum tamen flexibile aliquo modo et elasticum esse ad instar pilae vento inflatae, quae vel ipsamet illapsa in pavimentum, vel lapillum in se illapsum excipiens, cedit nonnihil, donec impetus ipse concurrendi sive progressus paulatim fractus tandem plane sistatur; quo facto pila se restituens lapillum non jam amplius resistentem repercutit, vel se ipsam rursus attollit a pavimento in quod illapsa erat. Et simile aliquid in omni repercussione contingere, tametsi ipse flexus ipsaque restitutio oculis notari nequeat, manifestis tamen indiciis per experimenta compertum habemus. Cartesius autem explicationem reflexionum per vim Elasticam ab Hobbio primum animadversam alto supercilio contemsit in Epistolis, nimium securus posteritatis. Ratiocinatio autem qua posteriorem hujus quam promulgare voluit naturae Legis partem (quae statuit, quantum motus uni concurrentium decedit, tantum alteri accedere) demonstrare conatur artic. 42, novo examine non indiget, nam assumit eandem manere debere quantitatem motus, quod quam erroneum sit, jam ad artic. 36 ostensum est.
The demonstration, too, that he attempts in art. 44, if it is sound, covers every collision, whether of bodies moving the same way or in opposite directions. But to me it does not have even the appearance of an argument. I grant that the quantity of motion and its determination are rightly distinguished, and that one is sometimes changed while the other is kept; but quite often the reverse happens, that both change together, and indeed the two conspire to protect each other. A body strives with its whole force and the whole quantity of its motion to keep its determination or direction, and whatever is taken from its speed while the direction stays the same is taken from the determination as well, since a body moving more slowly in the same direction is less determined to keep to it. Further: if body A runs into a smaller body B at rest, it will continue in the same direction, though with diminished motion; if it runs into a body B at rest and equal to itself, it will be stopped, so that it is itself wholly at rest and its motion is transferred to B; finally, if A runs into a B that is larger, or equal but moving against it, then A will be fully reflected. From this it is understood that a greater opposition is needed for A to be reflected in the direction opposite to its own than for it to be brought to rest. This flatly contradicts Descartes's decrees, for the opposition is greater when the opposing thing is larger, or when it strives more strongly the other way. As for his saying that motion, being a simple thing, persists until it is destroyed by an external cause, I accept this not only of the quantity of motion but also of its determination. The determination of a moving body, that is, its very striving to go forward, has its own quantity, which can more easily be diminished than reduced to nothing, that is, to rest; and it can more easily (that is, with less opposition) be stopped altogether and reduced to rest than be changed into a going back, a contrary motion, as we noted just now. So, although motion in general is not contrary to motion, the present motion of one body does resist the present motion of a body colliding with it, that is, a going forward resists a contrary going forward, since, as we have shown, less change and less opposition are needed to diminish a going forward than to remove it entirely and turn it into a going back. Descartes's reasoning seems to me just as if someone tried to argue that when two bodies obstruct each other they must never break and fly apart, but must always bend and adapt their shapes to each other, because matter is distinct from shape, and matter is not contrary to matter, only shape to shape; and the quantity of matter can be kept in a body while its shape changes; and so concluded that the size of a body is never diminished and only its shape must change. Had Descartes considered that every body running into another, before it is reflected, slackens its going forward, then stops, and only then is reflected, and so passes from one determination to the opposite not by a leap but by degrees, he would have given us other rules of motion. For it must be understood that every body, however hard, is still in some way flexible and elastic, like a ball inflated with air, which, whether it falls on the floor itself or receives a pebble falling on it, gives a little, until the impetus of the collision, the going forward, is gradually broken and at last stopped altogether. When that has happened, the ball restores itself and throws back the pebble, which no longer resists, or lifts itself again from the floor on which it fell. We know from clear evidence found by experiment that something similar happens in every rebound, even though the bending and the restoring cannot be seen by the eye. Descartes, however, in his Letters scorned with lofty disdain the explanation of reflections by elastic force first noticed by Hobbes, being too sure of posterity. The reasoning by which he tries in art. 42 to prove the second part of this law of nature he wished to publish (the part that says that as much motion as one of the colliding bodies loses, the other gains) needs no fresh examination, for it assumes that the same quantity of motion must remain, and how wrong this is has already been shown at art. 36.
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Ad artic. (45). Antequam ad speciales motuum regulas ab autore nostro traditas examinandas veniam, criterion generale dabo, et velut lapidem Lydium ad quem examinari possint, quod appellare soleo Legem continuitatis. Rem alibi dudum explicui, sed hic repetenda est ampliandaque. Nimirum cum hypotheses duae seu duo data diversa ad se invicem continue accedunt, donec tandem unum eorum in alterum desinat, necesse est etiam quaesita sive eventa amborum continue ad se invicem accedere, et tandem unum in alterum abire et vice versa. Ita uno Ellipseos foco manente immoto, si alter focus ab ipso magis magisque recedat, manente interim latere recto, tunc novae Ellipses quae ita nascentur, continue accedent ad Parabolam ac postremo plane in eam abibunt, cum scilicet distantia recedentis foci facta erit immensa. Unde et proprietates talium Ellipsium magis magisque ad Parabolae proprietates accedent, usque adeo ut postremo in eas abeant, et Parabola considerari possit tanquam Ellipsis, cujus alter focus infinite absit; adeoque omnes proprietates Ellipseos in genere etiam de Parabola tanquam tali Ellipsi verificentur. Et hujusmodi quidem exemplorum plena est Geometria: sed natura, cujus sapientissimus Auctor perfectissimam Geometriam exercet, idem observat, alioqui nullus in ea progressus ordinatus servaretur. Sic Motus paulatim decrescens tandem evanescit in quietem, et inaequalitas continue diminuta in accuratam aequalitatem abit, ita ut quies considerari possit tanquam motus infinite parvus, aut tanquam tarditas infinita, et aequalitas tanquam inaequalitas infinite parva; atque ea ratione quicquid vel de motu in genere vel de inaequalitate in genere demonstratum est, etiam de quiete aut aequalitate secundum hanc interpretationem verificari debet, ita ut regula quietis aut aequalitatis certo modo concipi possit tanquam casus specialis regulae de motu aut de inaequalitate. Si vero id non succedat, pro certo habendum est, regulas esse inconcinnas et male conceptas. Unde etiam infra in artic. 53 ostendetur, quomodo lineae repraesentatrici variationis hypothesium respondere debeat linea repraesentatrix variationis eventuum, cum tamen Cartesianae regulae delineationem eventuum praebeant monstrosam et incohaerentem.
On art. 45. Before I come to examine the particular rules of motion our author gives, I shall offer a general criterion, a touchstone, as it were, against which they can be tested. I usually call it the Law of Continuity. I explained it elsewhere long ago, but it must be repeated here and enlarged. It is this: when two hypotheses, or two different data, continually approach each other until at last one of them ends in the other, then what is sought, that is, the outcomes of both, must also continually approach each other and at last pass one into the other, and conversely. Thus if one focus of an ellipse stays fixed and the other moves farther and farther away from it while the latus rectum stays the same, the new ellipses that arise in this way will continually approach the parabola and at last pass entirely into it, namely when the distance of the receding focus has become immeasurable. Hence the properties of such ellipses too will approach the properties of the parabola more and more, until at last they pass into them, and the parabola can be considered as an ellipse whose other focus is infinitely far away; and so all the properties of the ellipse in general are also verified of the parabola, taken as such an ellipse. Geometry is full of examples of this kind. But nature, whose most wise Author practises the most perfect geometry, observes the same, otherwise no orderly progression would be kept in it. So motion that gradually decreases finally vanishes into rest, and inequality that is continually diminished passes into exact equality, so that rest can be considered as an infinitely small motion, or as an infinite slowness, and equality as an infinitely small inequality. For that reason, whatever has been demonstrated of motion in general, or of inequality in general, must on this interpretation also be verified of rest or of equality, so that the rule for rest or for equality can in a certain way be conceived as a special case of the rule for motion or for inequality. If this does not work, we must take it as certain that the rules are ill-fitting and badly conceived. This is why it will also be shown below, at art. 53, how the line representing the variation of the outcomes must answer to the line representing the variation of the hypotheses, whereas the Cartesian rules yield a monstrous and incoherent drawing of the outcomes.

Notes to text 106

  1. Descartes, Principia philosophiae II, arts. 40–44, sets out his third law of nature: a body striking a stronger one loses none of its motion but only its direction; striking a weaker one, it loses as much motion as it transfers. Art. 41 (proof of the first part) and art. 42 (proof of the second part, resting on the conservation of the quantity of motion) are the targets here; art. 44 argues that motion is not contrary to motion but only to rest, and determination only to determination. Leibniz's reply turns on the claim that "determination" has a quantity of its own.
  2. The cases of A striking a smaller, equal or larger body at rest are stated as experience teaches them for elastic bodies, not as Descartes's rules give them. The point is that reflection needs more opposition than rest, so rest is an intermediate case between going on and going back, which prepares the Law of Continuity in art. 45.
  3. The universal elasticity of bodies (the inflated ball) is a constant in Leibniz's dynamics from the 1680s; compare the Specimen dynamicum (1695), Part II. On this view there are no perfectly hard bodies, and every change of motion passes through degrees.
  4. Hobbes explained reflection by the restoring motion of the struck body's parts (De corpore, 1655, ch. 22 [to be checked]). Leibniz says Descartes treated this with contempt "in his Letters" (the Clerselier edition, 1657–1667). The particular letter is not identified here [?].
  5. The Law of Continuity was first published by Leibniz in the "Lettre de M. L. sur un principe général utile à l'explication des loix de la nature", Nouvelles de la République des Lettres, July 1687 (GP III 51–55), also aimed at Descartes and Malebranche on collision. "I explained it elsewhere long ago" points back to that letter, which uses the same ellipse and parabola example.
  6. "Lapis Lydius": the Lydian stone, the touchstone used to test gold, a common figure for a test of truth.
  7. Art. 53 contains Leibniz's figure, the "Repraesentatio Regularum", comparing a continuous curve of outcomes with the broken one that the Cartesian rules produce. It will be translated in a following text.
This text in the whole · 1692, a year from which 198 pieces are catalogued166316901716