Translations · Text 104 · 1101000

Animadversiones, Part II, articles 1–35

Reference
GP IV 366–370
Date
1692
Original
Latin
Earlier English
this is a new translation (report tab 2)
Physics and dynamicsMetaphysics
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Editor’s note

Part II of Descartes's Principia concerns the principles of material things. Leibniz attacks the proof that bodies exist, the identification of body with extension, the refutation of the void and of atoms, and the relational definition of motion, and praises Descartes on circulation in the plenum and the actual division of matter. New translation from Gerhardt.

Original
English
1
Ad partem secundam. [1] Ad artic. 1. Infirmum est argumentum quo Cartesius demonstrare conatur res materiales existere; praestabat igitur non tentare. Vis argumenti haec est: ratio cur materialia sentiamus, extra nos est, itaque vel a Deo, vel ab alio, vel ab ipsis; non a Deo, si nulla existunt, foret enim deceptor; non ab alio, hoc probare oblitus est; Ergo ab ipsis, ipsa igitur existunt. Responderi potest, posse sensionem ab alio esse quam a Deo, qui ut alia mala permittit, ob graves quasdam rationes, ita hanc quoque deceptionem nostram permittere potest sine nota deceptoris; praesertim quia cum nullo est damno conjuncta, cum potius ingratum nobis futurum sit non falli. Praeterea captio in eo est, quod dissimulat argumentatio, fieri posse, ut sensiones quidem sint a Deo vel alio, judicium tamen (de causa sensionis utrum sit ab objecto reali extra nos) adeoque deceptio, oriatur a nobis. Quemadmodum et contingit, quando colores aliaque id genus pro realibus objectis habentur. Praeterea possent animae peccatis anterioribus meruisse, ut ad hanc vitam deceptionis plenam agendam damnarentur, ubi umbras pro rebus captent; a quo Platonici non videntur abhorruisse, quibus haec vita velut in antro Morphei somnio similis visa est, dementata mente lethaeis haustibus, antequam huc veniret, ut Poetae canebant.
On the second part. [1] On article 1. The argument by which Descartes tries to demonstrate that material things exist is weak; it would have been better not to attempt it. Its force is this: the reason why we perceive material things is outside us, and so it comes either from God, or from something else, or from the things themselves. Not from God, if none exist, for he would be a deceiver; not from something else (this he forgot to prove); therefore from the things themselves, which therefore exist. One may reply that the sensation could come from something other than God, who, as he permits other evils for weighty reasons, could also permit this deception of ours without the stigma of a deceiver; especially since it is joined to no harm, and since it would rather be unwelcome to us not to be deceived. Further, the trick lies in this, that the argument conceals that it is possible for the sensations to come from God or from something else, while the judgment (about whether the cause of the sensation is a real object outside us), and hence the deception, arises from us; as indeed happens when colours and the like are taken for real objects. Further, souls might have deserved by earlier sins to be condemned to live this life full of deception, where they would grasp at shadows for things; an idea from which the Platonists do not seem to have shrunk, to whom this life seemed like a dream in the cave of Morpheus, the mind having been stupefied by draughts of Lethe before it came here, as the Poets sang.
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[2] Ad artic. 4. Corpus in sola extensione consistere, demonstrare tentat Cartesius enumeratione aliorum attributorum quae removet, sed ostendendum erat enumerationem esse sufficientem; deinde non omnia bene removentur, certe qui atomos id est corpora summae duritiei admittunt, negabant duritiem in eo consistere, ut motui manuum corpus non cedat, sed in hoc ut figuram servet. Et qui corporis essentiam constituunt in ἀντιτυπίᾳ seu impenetrabilitate, non a manibus nostris aut sensibus repetent ejus notionem, sed ab hoc ut alteri homogeneo locum non det, nisi aliorsum abire possit. Velut si fingamus in cubum eodem momento aequali celeritate incurrere sex alios cubos, ipsi et prorsus geminos ac similes, ita ut unusquisque eorum una sua hedra uni hedrae cubi excipientis accurate congruat; eo posito impossibile erit vel ipsum excipientem cubum, vel partem ejus loco moveri, sive flexilis sive rigidus intelligatur. Quod si cubus ille medius ponatur esse extensum penetrabile seu spatium nudum, tunc cubi sex concurrentes angulis quidem suis sibi mutuo obsistent; si tamen flexiles sint, nihil obstabit, quo minus partes eorum mediae in locum cubicum excipientem irrumpant. Unde etiam intelligitur, quod sit discrimen inter duritiem quae quorundam est corporum, et inter impenetrabilitatem, quae est omnium, cujus Cartesium meminisse aequum erat, non minus quam duritiei.
[2] On article 4. Descartes tries to demonstrate that body consists in extension alone by enumerating other attributes and removing them; but he should have shown that the enumeration is sufficient. Besides, not all are properly removed. Certainly those who admit atoms, that is, bodies of the utmost hardness, denied that hardness consists in a body's not yielding to the motion of our hands; it consists rather in keeping its shape. And those who place the essence of body in antitypy or impenetrability will not take its notion from our hands or senses, but from this: that a body does not give place to another homogeneous one unless it can go off elsewhere. Suppose, for instance, that six other cubes, exactly twin and alike to a given cube, run into it at the same moment with equal speed, so that each of them fits one of its faces exactly to one face of the receiving cube. On this supposition it will be impossible for the receiving cube, or any part of it, to be moved from its place, whether it is taken as flexible or rigid. But if that middle cube is supposed to be penetrable extension, or bare space, then the six colliding cubes will indeed obstruct one another with their corners; yet if they are flexible, nothing will prevent their middle parts from bursting into the cubic place that receives them. From this one also understands the difference between hardness, which belongs to some bodies, and impenetrability, which belongs to all; Descartes ought to have taken account of the latter no less than of the former.
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[3] Ad artic. 5, 6, 7. Egregie explicuit Cartesius, rarefactionem et condensationem, quales sensu percipimus, posse locum habere, licet nec vacuum interspersum nec mutatio dimensionum ejusdem partis materiae admittatur.
[3] On articles 5, 6, 7. Descartes explained excellently that rarefaction and condensation, such as we perceive by sense, can take place even though neither interspersed void nor a change in the dimensions of the same part of matter is admitted.
Original
English
4
[4] Ad artic. 8 usque ad 19. Qui vacuum tuentur, eorum non pauci spatium habent pro substantia, nec Cartesianis argumentis refutari possunt; aliis principiis opus est ad hanc litem finiendam. Concedent quantitatem et numerum non subsistere extra res quibus attribuuntur, negabunt vero spatium seu locum esse quantitatem corporis, et potius ipsummet habere credent quantitatem seu capacitatem, ei quam contentum corpus habet aequalem. Ostendendum a Cartesio erat, spatium seu locum internum non differre a substantia corporis. Contra sentientes se communi mortalium notione tuebuntur, qui existiment corpus corpori succedens eundem locum idemque spatium ingredi quod a priore corpore erat desertum, id vero dici utique nequit, si spatium cum ipsa corporis substantia coincidit. Etsi autem situm quendam habere, vel in loco dato esse sit accidens corporis, ipsum tamen locum esse corporis accidens, non magis admittent, quam ut contactus est accidens, ita quoque quod tangitur accidens esse. Et quidem videtur mihi Cartesius non tam suae sententiae probas rationes afferre, quam contrariis argumentis respondere, quod hoc loco non infeliciter praestat. Eoque artificio saepe utitur in demonstrationis vicem. Sed nos expectabamus majus aliquid, et ni fallor expectare jussi eramus. Quod nihili nulla sit extensio, fatendum est, recteque in illos torquetur, qui statuunt spatium nescio quod imaginarium. Sed quibus spatium substantia est, hoc argumento non tanguntur; tangerentur utique si demonstrasset supra Cartesius, quod hic assumit, omnem substantiam extensam esse corpus.
[4] On articles 8 to 19. Of those who defend the void, not a few take space for a substance, and they cannot be refuted by Cartesian arguments; other principles are needed to end this dispute. They will grant that quantity and number do not subsist outside the things to which they are attributed, but they will deny that space or place is the quantity of body; rather they will believe that space itself has a quantity or capacity equal to that of the body it contains. Descartes ought to have shown that space, or internal place, does not differ from the substance of body. His opponents will defend themselves with the common notion of mankind, who think that a body succeeding another enters the same place and the same space that the former body left; which certainly cannot be said if space coincides with the very substance of body. And although having a certain position, or being in a given place, is an accident of body, they will no more admit that place itself is an accident of body than, because contact is an accident, that what is touched is an accident. And indeed Descartes seems to me not so much to bring sound reasons for his own view as to answer the arguments for the contrary, which he does here not unsuccessfully; and he often uses this device in place of demonstration. But we were expecting something greater, and, if I am not mistaken, had been told to expect it. That nothing has no extension must be granted, and it is rightly turned against those who posit some imaginary space or other. But those for whom space is a substance are not touched by this argument; they certainly would be, if Descartes had demonstrated above what he assumes here, that every extended substance is body.
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[5] Ad artic. 20. Non videtur Autor satis bene pugnare in Atomos; concedent earum defensores, posse eas dividi tam cogitatione, quam divina potentia. An vero naturaliter existere possint corpora, quae firmitatem habeant naturae viribus insuperabilem (quae vera apud eos Atomi notio est), quaestio est quam Cartesius (quod mirere) hoc loco ne attingit quidem, et tamen Atomos a se profligatas hic profitetur, et in toto operis decursu assumit. Plura infra de Atomis dicturi sumus ad artic. 54 [?].
[5] On article 20. The Author does not seem to fight well enough against Atoms. Their defenders will grant that they can be divided both in thought and by divine power. But whether bodies can exist naturally that have a firmness insuperable by the forces of nature (which is the true notion of the Atom among them) is a question Descartes (surprisingly) does not even touch here; and yet he claims here to have routed the Atoms, and assumes it throughout the whole course of the work. We shall say more about Atoms below, on article 54 [?].
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[6] Ad artic. 21, 22, 23. Mundum nullos extensionis fines habere adeoque non nisi unicum esse posse, tum totam materiam ubique esse homogeneam nec nisi motibus adeoque et figuris discriminari, sententiae sunt quae hic inaedificantur pronuntiato neque ab omnibus admisso, neque ab autore demonstrato, quod idem sit extensum et corpus.
[6] On articles 21, 22, 23. That the world has no limits of extension and so can only be one, and that all matter is everywhere homogeneous and distinguished only by motions and hence by shapes: these are views built here on a pronouncement neither admitted by all nor demonstrated by the author, that the extended and body are the same.
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[7] Ad artic. 25. Si motus nihil aliud est quam mutatio contactus seu viciniae immediatae, sequitur nunquam posse definiri, quaenam res moveatur. Ut enim in Astronomicis eadem phaenomena diversis hypothesibus praestantur, ita semper licebit, motum realem vel uni vel alteri eorum tribuere quae viciniam aut situm inter se mutant; adeo ut uno ex ipsis pro arbitrio electo, tanquam quiescente, aut data ratione in data linea moto geometrice definiri queat, quid motus quietisve reliquis tribuendum sit, ut data phaenomena prodeant. Unde si nihil aliud inest in motu, quam haec respectiva mutatio, sequitur nullam in natura rationem dari cur uni rei potius quam aliis ascribi motum oporteat. Cujus consequens erit, motum realem esse nullum. Itaque ad hoc, ut moveri aliquid dicatur, requiremus non tantum ut mutet situm respectu aliorum, sed etiam ut causa mutationis, vis, actio, sit in ipso.
[7] On article 25. If motion is nothing but change of contact or of immediate vicinity, it follows that it can never be determined which thing is moved. For as in Astronomy the same phenomena are accounted for by different hypotheses, so it will always be permissible to attribute real motion to one or another of the things that change their vicinity or position relative to each other; so that, choosing one of them at will as at rest, or as moving in a given way along a given line, one can determine geometrically what motion or rest must be attributed to the rest so that the given phenomena result. Hence, if there is nothing in motion but this relative change, it follows that there is no reason in nature why motion should be ascribed to one thing rather than to others; and the consequence will be that there is no real motion. So for something to be said to move, we shall require not only that it change its position relative to others, but also that the cause of the change, force, action, be in it.
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[8] Ad artic. 26. Ex dictis paragrapho praecedente intelligitur, stare non posse quod affirmat Cartesius, non plus actionis in corpore requiri ad motum, quam ad quietem. Fateor vi opus esse, ut quiescens quietem tueatur contra corpora incurrentia; sed ea vis non est in quiescente, nam ipsa ambientia mutua vi motus sui sibi obluctantia efficiunt ut quiescens in situ priore manere cogatur.
[8] On article 26. From what was said in the preceding paragraph it is understood that Descartes's assertion cannot stand, that no more action is required in a body for motion than for rest. I grant that force is needed for a body at rest to maintain its rest against bodies running into it; but that force is not in the body at rest: it is the surrounding bodies themselves, struggling against one another by the mutual force of their motion, that bring it about that the resting body is forced to stay in its former position.
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[9] Ad artic. 32. Primus autorum qui ad nos pervenerunt compositionem motuum attigit Archimedes, de spiralibus tractans; primus eam ad reddendam rationem aequalitatis angulorum incidentiae et reflexionis in paralipomenis opticis applicuit Keplerus, diviso motu obliquo in perpendicularem et parallelum quem ea in re hic pariter et in dioptricis secutus est Cartesius; primus amplissimum in Physicis et Mechanicis compositionis motuum usum ostendit Galilaeus.
[9] On article 32. Of the authors who have come down to us, the first to touch on the composition of motions was Archimedes, in treating spirals; the first to apply it to explain the equality of the angles of incidence and reflection was Kepler, in his Paralipomena on optics, dividing the oblique motion into a perpendicular and a parallel one, whom Descartes followed in this matter both here and in the Dioptrics; the first to show the very wide use of the composition of motions in Physics and Mechanics was Galileo.
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[10] Ad artic. 33, 34, 35. Quae hoc loco dicit Cartesius, pulcherrima sunt, et ingenio ejus digna, quod scilicet omnis motus in loco pleno involvat circulationem, et quod necesse sit materiam actu dividi alicubi in partes data quavis minores, cujus postremae conclusionis momentum non videtur ipse satis expendisse.
[10] On articles 33, 34, 35. What Descartes says here is very fine and worthy of his genius: that every motion in a plenum involves a circulation, and that matter must somewhere be actually divided into parts smaller than any given; the importance of this last conclusion he does not seem to have weighed sufficiently himself.

Notes to text 104

  1. Proof of the external world. Leibniz's three objections to Principia II.1 (God might permit a harmless deception; the error could lie in our judgment, not our sensations; souls might be condemned for earlier sins to a life of shadows) are followed in his draft by a couplet he later struck out, warning the soul not to drink too deep of Lethe "when you go out by the gate of the burning Crab" (the Neoplatonic gate of descent of souls through Cancer, as in Macrobius's commentary on the Dream of Scipio). The draft also refers to his account elsewhere of "what the reality of material things consists in" (compare text 101, article 3). The draft reads "it would now be unwelcome to us to see things otherwise" for "not to be deceived".
  2. Hardness versus impenetrability. The thought experiment of six cubes striking a seventh from all sides distinguishes hardness (keeping shape), which some bodies have, from impenetrability (antitypy), which all bodies have and which bare extension lacks.
  3. Space as substance. Leibniz grants that the defenders of the void who take space for a substance (Gassendi, Henry More, later Newton and Clarke) are not refuted by Descartes; his draft adds his own view: "it will one day appear that the material mass is not a substance but an aggregate resulting from substances, while space is nothing but the common order of all coexistents, as time is of non-coexistents." This is one of the earliest statements of the relational theory he defended against Clarke in 1715–1716.
  4. Atoms. The draft adds that he judges there are no atoms "by other arguments". The cross-reference "article 54" is read from the OCR's "5%"; it fits Part II article 54, on hardness and fluidity.
  5. Relativity of motion. Article 25 states the equivalence of hypotheses: if motion were only change of relative position, there would be no fact about which body moves; real motion requires force in the moving body. This is the argument of the Specimen dynamicum (texts 68, 75) and the Clarke letters. The draft adds on article 26 "although in reality nothing is found perfectly at rest".
  6. Composition of motions. Archimedes (On Spirals), Kepler (Ad Vitellionem paralipomena, 1604) and Galileo; Leibniz's history of the parallelogram of motions, with Descartes as Kepler's follower in optics.
  7. Actual division of matter. Leibniz praises Descartes's conclusion that motion in a plenum requires matter to be actually divided into parts smaller than any given, and says Descartes did not see its importance: for Leibniz it leads to the actually infinite division of matter and to substances in every part of it (Monadology §§65–66).
  8. Part II continues in text 105 with article 36, the conservation of motion and Leibniz's measure of force (GP IV 370).
This text in the whole · 1692, a year from which 198 pieces are catalogued166316901716