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Animadversiones, Part II, articles 54–55: hardness is not rest; cohesion comes from conspiring motion

Reference
GP IV 384–388
Date
1692
Original
Latin
Earlier English
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Physics and dynamicsMetaphysics
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Editor’s note

Descartes held that the parts of hard bodies are joined by nothing but their rest relative to each other. Leibniz first puts Descartes's argument into syllogistic form to show both premises false, with a short defence of formal logic. He then tests the idea with two cubes lying face to face, rejects the atomists' "perfect unity" and the explanations from air pressure, glue and interlocking hooks, and proposes his own: cohesion arises from motion that conspires, as in a jet of water or iron filings arranged by a magnet. Two small figures in the margin (the cubes A and B, and the atoms D and E striking them) are not reproduced.

Original (GP IV 384–388)
English
1
Ad artic. (54. 55). Fluida esse corpora, quorum particulae variis motibus in omnes partes agitantur, Dura, quorum partes juxta se mutuo quiescunt nec alio glutine materiam connecti quam quiete unius apud alterum, non per omnia verum esse arbitror, etsi aliquid insit veri. Duritiem igitur, seu ut ego malim dicere generalius, firmitatem (quae et in mollibus aliqua est) a sola quiete proficisci, Cartesius colligit, quia gluten seu ratio cohaesionis non potest esse corpus (alioqui rediret quaestio), itaque erit modus corporis, recte. Sed non est alia modificatio corporis ad eam rem apta, quam quies. Cur ita? quia quies maxime motui adversatur. Miror tantam rem tam levi et perfunctoria, imo sophistica ratione concludi. Syllogismus foret: Quies est modus corporis, qui maxime motui adversatur; Modus autem corporis qui maxime motui adversatur, est causa firmitatis. Ergo quies est causa firmitatis. Sed utraque praemissarum falsa est, etsi aliquam tenuem veri speciem prae se ferat. Et hoc Cartesio nimis frequens est ut maxime incerta tanquam certissima assumens lectorem facilem dictatoria brevitate absolvat: quemadmodum cum concludit extensionem constituere materiam, et cogitationem a materia independentem esse, et eandem in natura servari motus quantitatem; pronuntiandi magis autoritate quam argumentis. Ego sentio, motum contrarium magis adversari motui quam quietem, et majore oppositione esse opus ut corpus reflectatur, quam ut tantum sistatur, quemadmodum ostensum est ad articul. 47. Sed probanda etiam altera praemissarum erat, nempe id quod maxime motui adversatur esse causam firmitatis. An forte talem prosyllogismum in mente autor habuit? Firmitas maxime motui adversatur; quicquid maxime motui adversatur, ejus et causa maxime motui adversatur. Ergo causa firmitatis maxime motui adversatur. Sed praemissae prosyllogismi rursus ambae laborant. Nego igitur firmitatem motui maxime adversari; fateor eam maxime adversari motui unius partis sine alia, atque hoc illud erat cujus causa debebat quaeri. Nec scio an tutum sit axioma, quicquid maxime rei adversatur, ejus et causa maxime rei adversatur. Quid magis morti adversatur quam vita, quis tamen neget mortem animali persaepe a vivente inferri? Talibus regulis Philosophicis vagis admodum et nondum ad certos limites redactis nulla superstrui demonstratio potest.
On arts. 54 and 55. That fluid bodies are those whose particles are agitated by various motions in every direction, and hard bodies those whose parts are at rest beside one another, and that matter is joined by no other glue than the rest of one part beside another: this I think is not true in every respect, though there is some truth in it. Descartes infers that hardness, or as I should prefer to say more generally, firmness (which is found to some degree even in soft bodies), comes from rest alone. His reason: the glue, the ground of cohesion, cannot be a body (otherwise the question would come back), so it will be a mode of body. Rightly so. But, he says, there is no other modification of body suited to this than rest. Why? Because rest is most opposed to motion. I am surprised that so great a matter is concluded by so light and perfunctory, indeed sophistical, a reason. The syllogism would be: Rest is the mode of body most opposed to motion; the mode of body most opposed to motion is the cause of firmness; therefore rest is the cause of firmness. But both premises are false, though they bear some faint appearance of truth. It is all too common in Descartes to take the most uncertain things as the most certain and dispatch an easygoing reader with dictatorial brevity, as when he concludes that extension constitutes matter, that thought is independent of matter, and that the same quantity of motion is conserved in nature: more by the authority of his pronouncing than by arguments. My view is that contrary motion is more opposed to motion than rest is, and that greater opposition is needed for a body to be reflected than merely to be stopped, as was shown at art. 47. But the other premise also needed proof, namely that what is most opposed to motion is the cause of firmness. Did the author perhaps have some such prosyllogism in mind? Firmness is most opposed to motion; whatever is most opposed to motion has a cause that is most opposed to motion; therefore the cause of firmness is most opposed to motion. But both premises of the prosyllogism are again defective. I deny, then, that firmness is most opposed to motion; I grant that it is most opposed to the motion of one part without the other, and that was precisely the thing whose cause had to be sought. Nor do I know whether the axiom is safe that whatever is most opposed to a thing has a cause most opposed to that thing. What is more opposed to death than life? Yet who will deny that death is very often inflicted on an animal by a living being? On such philosophical rules, quite vague and not yet reduced to definite limits, no demonstration can be built.
2
Erunt qui lectis istis subindignabuntur nobis, Philosophos tantos velut ad scholam per syllogismos revocantibus; erunt etiam fortasse, qui haec tam protrita contemnent. Sed nos compertum habemus, magnos illos Philosophos, quin et alios saepe homines in rebus maxime seriis, puerilis hujus logicae neglectu labi, imo vix aliter labi. Quid enim aliud haec Logica continet, quam dictata supremae rationis maxime generalia, regulis captui facilibus comprehensa? Et placuit semel in hoc specimine ostendere, quam utile sit talia ad formae praescriptum exigi, ut appareat vis argumentorum, praesertim cum imaginatio rationi non ut in Mathematicis succurrit, et negotium nobis est cum scriptore abruptis argumentis res magnas colligente.
Some, on reading this, will be a little indignant with us for calling such great philosophers back to school, as it were, by means of syllogisms; others perhaps will despise things so well worn. But we have found that those great philosophers, and other people too, often slip in the most serious matters through neglect of this childish logic; indeed they hardly slip in any other way. For what else does this logic contain but the most general dictates of supreme reason, gathered into rules easy to grasp? And I wanted to show once, in this sample, how useful it is to hold such things to the requirement of form, so that the force of the arguments may appear, especially where imagination does not come to the aid of reason as it does in mathematics, and where we are dealing with a writer who gathers great conclusions from abrupt arguments.
3
Quoniam ergo nihil nos hic rationibus adjuvat Cartesius, placet ad rerum ipsarum considerationem redire. Non tam igitur quies consideranda est in firmitate quam vis, qua una pars secum aliam trahit. Sint duo cubi perfecti A et B juxta se mutuo quiescentes et hedras habentes omnino laevigatas, sitque cubus B ad sinistram cubi A positus, hedra unius cum alterius hedra congruente, nulloque adeo relicto intervallo. Incurrat jam globulus C in medium cubi A, directione ad duas hedras congruentes parallela; ita directio ictus non perveniet ad cubum B, nisi is adhaerere ponatur cubo A. Et sane quiete sua resistet A incurrenti C, nec nisi imminuta vi ipsius C ab eo poterit propelli, atque ita etiam verum est, A quiete sua in hoc casu resistere separanti a B; sed hoc per accidens, non quia separatur a B, sed quia vim in se debet recipere, quod perinde contingeret, etiamsi B plane abesset. Itaque ubi semel vim recipiet, viam suam inibit deserto B, perinde ac si omnino ab ejus vicinia abfuisset. Sophisma igitur est concludere velle, quia unumquodque in statu suo quantum potest, perseverat, ideo duo apud se quiescentia sibi mutuo adhaerere et ex nuda quiete habere firmitatem, parique jure concluderes etiam, quae decem pedibus a se absunt sibi connecti, atque id agere conari ut semper decem pedibus a sese absint. Causa igitur afferenda est, cur aliquando duo cubi A et B cohaereant, et parallelepipedum firmum AB constituant, quod sola parte A impulsa moveatur totum; seu cur cubus A impulsus secum trahat cubum B, adeoque quaeritur causa tractionis in natura.
Since, then, Descartes gives us no help here with reasons, let us go back to considering the things themselves. In firmness we must consider not so much rest as the force by which one part draws another along with it. Let there be two perfect cubes A and B at rest beside each other, with perfectly smooth faces, and let cube B be placed to the left of cube A, a face of the one coinciding with a face of the other, so that no gap is left. Now let a small ball C strike the middle of cube A in a direction parallel to the two coinciding faces. Then the direction of the blow will not reach cube B, unless B is supposed to adhere to cube A. Certainly A will resist the oncoming C by its rest, and can be pushed on by it only with some loss of C's force; so it is also true that in this case A by its rest resists whatever separates it from B. But this is incidental: not because it is being separated from B, but because it must take the force into itself, which would happen in just the same way even if B were entirely absent. So once it has received the force, it will go on its way and leave B behind, just as if it had never been near it. It is a sophism, then, to try to conclude that because each thing perseveres in its state as far as it can, two things at rest beside each other therefore adhere to each other and have firmness from bare rest. By the same right you could conclude that things ten feet apart are connected and strive always to stay ten feet apart. So a cause must be given why two cubes A and B sometimes cohere and make up a firm parallelepiped AB, which moves as a whole when only the part A is pushed; that is, why cube A, when pushed, draws cube B along with it. And so what is sought is the cause of traction in nature.
4
Sunt quidam egregii Viri, qui ipsam perfectam unitatem causam firmitatis esse ajunt, eamque sententiam video placere nonnullis Atomorum Patronis. Nempe si qua sit atomus parallelepipeda AB, quae mente sit divisibilis in duos illos cubos A et B, re autem non divisa, eam dicunt re etiam divisibilem non esse, semperque firmam mansuram. His multa obstant, primum enim nullam afferunt demonstrationem dicti. Ponamus in parallelepipedum AB duas atomos D et E ipsis cubis A et B hedris suis anterioribus respondentes, simul incurrere directionibus parallelis ad hedram communem cuborum A et B, et quidem D venientem retrorsum a plaga F, tota sua hedra incurrere in totam hedram congruentem A, similiterque E venientem antrorsum a plaga G, incurrere in B; quaeritur causa cur A non propellatur versus G, deserto B, et cur B non propellatur in contrarium versus F, deserto A. Hujus ego in dictis rationem invenio nullam. Quid aliud enim hic est, unum componi ex duobus cubis A et B, quam eos actu non esse divisos. Quodsi cum quibusdam dicas, in continuo ante actualem divisionem nullas esse partes, alterutrum sequetur, vel id separationi non obstare, cum scilicet ratio ad actualem quandam divisionem tendens adeoque partes velut designans ac distinguens (contactus nempe incurrentium D et E) supervenit, vel continuum nullum unquam in partes posse divelli. Quid ergo si duae Atomi cubicae A et B prius diversae semel ita sibi accedant, ut hedrae earum duae congruant, nonne hoc contactus momento nihil different ab atomo illa parallelepipeda AB paulo ante descripta? Itaque capientur a se mutuo duae Atomi simplici contactu velut visco quodam, idemque fieri debet etiamsi partes tantum hedrarum congruant. Ex his porro sequitur progressu naturae, continue debere crescere atomos, instar pilae nivis per nivem provolutae, ac tandem futurum esse, ut omnia in plusquam adamantinam duritiem coalescant et aeterna glacie obtorpescant, quando causa coalitionis datur, dissolutionis non datur. Unum effugium superest iis, qui haec tuentur, ut dicant, nullas dari in natura hedras planas, aut si quae sint, coalitu esse desinere, Atomos autem omnes superficiebus curvis iisque minime invicem applicabilibus terminari, quemadmodum sane fieret, si omnes atomi essent sphaericae, atque ita nullus contactus esset totius alicujus superficiei. Sed praeterquam quod corpora planis vel aliis sibi congruentibus superficiebus praedita ex rebus nulla satis ratione excluduntur, huc redimus ut rationem nobis afferant, cur continuum in partes resolvi non possit. Alia quoque habemus magna in Atomos argumenta, sed nobis hanc materiam hoc loco exhaurire propositum non est.
There are some distinguished men who say that perfect unity itself is the cause of firmness, and I see that this opinion pleases some patrons of atoms. That is, if there is a parallelepiped atom AB, divisible in thought into those two cubes A and B but not divided in fact, they say it is also not divisible in fact and will always remain firm. Much stands against this. First, they give no demonstration of what they say. Suppose two atoms D and E, whose front faces match the cubes A and B, strike the parallelepiped AB at the same moment in directions parallel to the common face of cubes A and B: D, coming backward from the region F, strikes with its whole face the whole matching face of A, and likewise E, coming forward from the region G, strikes B. We ask the cause why A is not driven toward G, leaving B behind, and why B is not driven the opposite way toward F, leaving A behind. In what they say I find no reason for this. For what else does it mean here that one thing is composed of two cubes A and B, but that they are not actually divided? And if you say with some that in a continuum there are no parts before actual division, one of two things will follow: either this does not stand in the way of separation, when a reason supervenes that tends toward an actual division and so as it were marks out and distinguishes parts (namely the contact of the striking bodies D and E); or no continuum can ever be torn into parts. What, then, if two cubic atoms A and B, formerly distinct, once come together so that two of their faces coincide? At this moment of contact, will they not differ in no way from the parallelepiped atom AB described a little earlier? So two atoms will be caught by each other by simple contact, as if by birdlime, and the same must happen even if only parts of their faces coincide. From this it further follows that in the course of nature atoms must keep growing, like a snowball rolled through snow, and that at last everything will grow together into a more than adamantine hardness and stiffen in eternal ice, since a cause of coalescence is given and none of dissolution. One escape remains for those who defend this: to say that there are no flat faces in nature, or that if there are any they cease to be so on coalescing, and that all atoms are bounded by curved surfaces that cannot be fitted to one another at all, as would indeed be the case if all atoms were spherical, so that there would be no contact of any whole surface. But apart from the fact that bodies with flat or other mutually fitting surfaces are excluded from the world by no sufficient reason, we come back to this: let them give us a reason why a continuum cannot be resolved into parts. We also have other strong arguments against atoms, but it is not our purpose to exhaust this subject here.
5
Sunt qui duritiem corporum explicant per eam causam, qua videmus duas tabulas politas a se divelli nisi magna vi non posse, obstante scilicet ambiente, quod se tam subito insinuare in locum divulsione inter tabulas relinquendum non potest. Atque ita duritiem ajunt oriri a compressione, recte quidem in plurimis casibus, sed non potest haec intelligi causa duritiei in universum, quoniam ea rursus aliquam duritiem vel firmitatem jam tum praeconstitutam ponit, ipsarummet scilicet Tabularum. Porro nec refert, si quis dicat cubos A et B glutine aliquo connecti, nam ipsius glutinis firmitas requiritur qua partes ejus adhaereant tam utrique corporum quae connectit, quam inter se. Quod si quis concipiat ex A eminentiolas quasdam transire in B, ac sese ejus valliculis insinuare, idemque a B fieri in A, atque ita non posse propelli unum sine alio, quin apices illi frangantur, jam nova quaestio est, unde illis ipsis apicibus firmitas sua. His igitur omissis, quae vel non prosunt, vel rem non absolvunt, arbitror primigeniam cohaesionis causam (praeter impenetrabilitatem ipsam, cum cedendi locus non est, aut ratio non est cur unum prae alio cedat, qua ratione globus perfectus in pleno quiescente uniformi circulans aliquid vi centrifuga emittere prohibetur) esse Motum eumque conspirantem. Nam ipsam materiam, per se homogeneam et aeque divisibilem, arbitror solo motu distingui; videmus autem fluida quoque motu acquirere quandam firmitatem. Ita vehemens aquae jactus extraneis in radium suum magis vetabit ingressum, quam eadem aqua quiescens faceret. Ingressu enim novae materiae magna motus conspirantis perturbatio oriatur necesse est, ad perturbandum autem, id est valde mutandum motum opus est vi. Jactum aquae digito tange, videbis huc illuc guttulas dispergi, non sine vehementia, atque adeo et quod jactui accedit nonnihil repelli. Et quae per se dissoluta sunt, et ut ita dicam arena sine calce, solo motu connexionem quandam acquirere posse, eleganti experimento magnes docet, limaturae chalybis admotus, subito enim velut funiculi nectuntur ex arena, et nascuntur filamenta, subrigente sese materia velut in pilos, nec dubium est quodam quasi genere magnetismi, id est motus intestini conspirantis, etiam alias quorundam corporum partes connecti. Haec igitur primitiva ratio consistentiae seu cohaesionis non minus rationi quam sensibus satisfacit.
Some explain the hardness of bodies by the cause through which we see that two polished plates cannot be pulled apart except by great force, because the surrounding medium resists, being unable to slip so suddenly into the place that the separation would leave between the plates. And so they say hardness arises from compression. This is right in very many cases, but it cannot be taken as the cause of hardness in general, since it in turn presupposes some hardness or firmness already established, namely that of the plates themselves. Nor does it help if someone says that cubes A and B are joined by some glue, for the firmness of the glue itself is needed, by which its parts adhere both to each of the bodies it joins and to one another. And if someone imagines that little projections pass from A into B and work their way into its little hollows, and the same from B into A, so that one cannot be pushed on without the other unless those tips are broken, there is now a new question: where do those tips get their own firmness? Setting aside, then, these explanations, which either do not help or do not settle the matter, I think the primary cause of cohesion (besides impenetrability itself, when there is no room to give way, or no reason why one part should give way rather than another, which is how a perfect sphere turning in a uniform plenum at rest is kept from throwing anything off by centrifugal force) is motion, and motion that conspires. For I think that matter itself, homogeneous in itself and equally divisible, is distinguished by motion alone; and we see that fluids too acquire a certain firmness through motion. Thus a strong jet of water will bar the entry of foreign bodies into its stream more than the same water would at rest, since the entry of new matter must cause a great disturbance of the conspiring motion, and force is needed to disturb motion, that is, to change it greatly. Touch a jet of water with your finger: you will see droplets scattered here and there, not without violence, so that what comes up to the jet is somewhat repelled. And that things which are loose in themselves, sand without lime, so to speak, can acquire some connection by motion alone is taught by an elegant experiment with a magnet brought near steel filings: suddenly little cords are knotted out of the sand, as it were, and threads arise, the matter raising itself up as if into hairs. Nor is there any doubt that the parts of certain other bodies are also connected by a kind of magnetism, so to speak, that is, by a conspiring internal motion. This primitive ground of consistency or cohesion, then, satisfies the senses no less than reason.

Notes to text 109

  1. Descartes, Principia II.54–55: hard bodies are those whose parts are at rest relative to one another, and no glue joins them but that rest, since rest is the mode most contrary to motion.
  2. The examples of Descartes's "dictatorial brevity" are the three doctrines Leibniz contests throughout: extension as the essence of matter, the real distinction of mind and matter as Descartes argued it, and conservation of the quantity of motion.
  3. The defence of syllogistic form echoes Leibniz's Meditationes de cognitione, veritate et ideis (1684) and anticipates the Nouveaux essais IV.17 on the usefulness of formal logic.
  4. "Perfect unity" as the cause of the firmness of atoms: the view of Gassendi and his followers, and of Géraud de Cordemoy (Le discernement du corps et de l'âme, 1666), who argued that indivisible bodies are hard because they are one [identification of the "egregii Viri" is ours].
  5. The polished plates: the explanation of cohesion by the pressure of the surrounding air or ether, discussed by Boyle and by Huygens. Hooks and hollows: the corpuscular explanation going back to the Epicureans.
  6. Cohesion from "conspiring motion" is Leibniz's standard view in these years; he gives the same water-jet and magnet examples in his correspondence with Huygens and in the New Essays II.23 [to be checked].
This text in the whole · 1692, a year from which 198 pieces are catalogued166316901716