Translations · Text 103 · 1100111

Animadversiones, Part I, articles 40–75

Reference
GP IV 363–366
Date
1692
Original
Latin
Earlier English
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Physics and dynamicsMetaphysics
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Editor’s note

Freedom and preordination, the rule of clear and distinct ideas, simple notions, the definition of substance, extension as derivative, real distinction, secondary qualities, and the defence of Aristotle's logic. New translation from Gerhardt.

Original
English
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[1] Ad artic. 40. Si quis ratus Deum omnia praeordinare, et se tamen liberum esse, argumentis pugnam inter haec ostentantibus, hoc unum respondeat, quod Cartesius jubet, nempe suam mentem esse finitam, quae talia non capiat, is mihi videtur respondere ad conclusionem, non ad argumentum, et scindere, non solvere nodum. Non quaeritur an rem ipsam capias, sed potius an non in ea me monstrante capias tuam absurditatem. Certe etiam in mysteriis fidei oportet contradictionem abesse, nedum in mysteriis naturae. Itaque si philosophum praestare velis, convenit, ut argumentum resumas, quod contradictorium ex assertis tuis aliqua veri specie infert, vitiumque in eo ostendas, quod utique semper fieri posse certum est, nisi errasti.
[1] On article 40. If someone who believes that God preordains everything and yet that he himself is free answers arguments that show a conflict between these only with what Descartes prescribes, namely that his mind is finite and cannot grasp such things, he seems to me to answer the conclusion and not the argument, and to cut the knot rather than untie it. The question is not whether you grasp the thing itself, but rather whether, when I point it out, you do not grasp your own absurdity. Certainly even in the mysteries of faith contradiction must be absent, much more in the mysteries of nature. So if you wish to play the philosopher, you should take up the argument that infers a contradiction from your assertions with some appearance of truth, and show the flaw in it; which it is certain can always be done, unless you have erred.
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[2] Ad artic. 43, 45, 46. Alibi a me admonitum est non magnam esse utilitatem jactatae illius regulae: de claris tantum et distinctis approbandis, nisi meliores afferantur notae clari et distincti, quam quas Cartesius dedit. Praestant regulae Aristotelis et Geometrarum, ut scilicet exceptis principiis (id est primis veritatibus aut hypothesibus) nihil admittamus nisi legitimo argumento probatum: legitimo inquam, id est nec formae nec materiae vitio laborante. Materiae autem vitium est, si quicquam praeter principia, aut rursus ex principiis legitimo argumento probata assumatur. Formam autem rectam intelligo non tantum vulgarem syllogisticam, sed et aliam quamcunque praedemonstratam, quae vi suae dispositionis concludit; quod faciunt etiam formae operationum arithmeticarum et Algebraicarum, formae librorum computatoriorum, quin et aliquo modo formae judiciarii processus: nam interdum contenti sumus ad agendum certo verisimilitudinis gradu. Quanquam supersit adhuc tractanda pars Logicae maxime in vita utilis de Gradibus Probabilitatum aestimandis, de qua non pauca a me sunt annotata. De forma adde infra ad artic. 75.
[2] On articles 43, 45, 46. I have pointed out elsewhere that the much-vaunted rule, to approve only what is clear and distinct, is of little use unless better marks of the clear and distinct are offered than those Descartes gave. The rules of Aristotle and of the Geometers are better: that, apart from principles (that is, first truths or hypotheses), we admit nothing that is not proved by a legitimate argument; legitimate, I say, that is, suffering from no defect either of form or of matter. It is a defect of matter if anything is assumed other than principles, or again what has been proved from principles by a legitimate argument. By correct form I understand not only the common syllogistic form but any other previously demonstrated form that concludes by force of its arrangement: as do the forms of arithmetical and algebraic operations, the forms of account books, and even in a way the forms of judicial procedure; for sometimes we are content, for action, with a certain degree of probability. Yet there still remains to be treated a part of Logic most useful in life, on estimating the Degrees of Probability, on which I have made a good many notes. On form, see further below on article 75.
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[3] Ad artic. 47, 48. Recte olim animadvertit nescio quis (puto Comenius) Cartesium artic. 47 promittentem summatim enumerare omnes simplices notiones, mox in sequente 48 nos deserere, et quibusdam nominatis subjicere: et talia; praeterquam quod pleraque quae nominat, simplicia non sunt. Est ea disquisitio majoris momenti quam putatur.
[3] On articles 47, 48. Someone (I think Comenius) once rightly noticed that Descartes, promising in article 47 to list summarily all simple notions, soon abandons us in the next article, 48, adding after a few names, and the like; besides the fact that most of those he names are not simple. This inquiry is of greater importance than is thought.
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[4] Ad artic. 50. Veritates simplices admodum, sed quae tamen non admittuntur ob praejudicatas hominum opiniones, consultissimum est demonstrari per simpliciores.
[4] On article 50. Truths that are quite simple, but are nevertheless not admitted because of people's prejudiced opinions, are best demonstrated by simpler ones.
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[5] Ad artic. 51. Definitio substantiae, quod solius Dei concursu indigeat ad existendum, nescio an ulli substantiae creatae nobis cognitae competat, nisi sensu quodam minus pervulgato interpreteris. Non tantum enim aliis substantiis indigemus, sed et multo magis accidentibus nostris. Cum ergo substantia et accidens sese mutuo indigeant, aliis indiciis opus erat ad substantiam ab accidente discriminandam, inter quae hoc esse potest quod licet substantia aliquo accidente indigeat, saepe tamen non opus habet uno determinato, sed eo sublato alterius surrogatione contenta est, accidens autem non tantum aliqua substantia indiget generaliter, sed etiam hac sua cui semel inest, ut eam non mutet. Supersunt tamen alia majoris momenti discussionisque profundioris de natura substantiae alias dicenda.
[5] On article 51. The definition of substance, that it needs only God's concurrence in order to exist, I doubt fits any created substance known to us, unless it is interpreted in some less common sense. For we need not only other substances but, much more, our own accidents. Since, then, substance and accident need each other, other marks were needed to distinguish substance from accident. Among them may be this: although a substance needs some accident, it often does not need one particular accident, but when that is removed is content with another put in its place; whereas an accident needs not only some substance in general, but this very one in which it once inheres, so that it cannot change it. But other things remain, of greater importance and requiring deeper discussion, to be said elsewhere about the nature of substance.
Original
English
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[6] Ad artic. 52. Fateor unum esse praecipuum substantiae cujusque attributum, essentiam ejus exprimens, sed nescio an verbis iisque paucis explicari possit, si intelligas substantiam singularem, genera substantiarum ut alia definitionibus explicantur. Quod autem extensio substantiae corporeae naturam communem constituat, pronuntiatum video a multis magna confidentia, probatum nusquam; certe nec motus sive actio, nec resistentia sive passio inde derivantur; nec leges naturae quae in corporum motu concursuque observantur ex sola notione extensionis nascuntur, quemadmodum alibi a me ostensum est. Et vero extensionis notio non primitiva est, sed resolubilis. Nam in extenso requiritur, ut sit totum continuum, in quo plura simul existant. Et ut amplius dicam, ad extensionem quippe cujus relativa est notio, requiritur aliquid, quod extenditur seu continuatur, ut in lacte albedo, in corpore id ipsum quod ejus essentiam facit: hujus (qualecunque sit) repetitio extensio est. Et plane assentior Hugenio (cujus in rebus naturalibus et mathematicis magna apud me est opinio), eundem esse loci vacui et solius extensionis conceptum; nec meo judicio ipsa mobilitas aut ἀντιτυπία, ex sola extensione intelligi potest, sed ex subjecto extensionis, a quo non constituatur tantum locus, sed et impleatur.
[6] On article 52. I admit that each substance has one principal attribute expressing its essence; but I doubt whether it can be explained in words, and few of them, if you mean an individual substance (the kinds of substances are explained by definitions like other things). That extension constitutes the common nature of corporeal substance I see asserted by many with great confidence, but proved nowhere. Certainly neither motion or action, nor resistance or passion, are derived from it; nor do the laws of nature observed in the motion and collision of bodies arise from the notion of extension alone, as I have shown elsewhere. And indeed the notion of extension is not primitive but resolvable. For in what is extended it is required that there be a continuous whole in which many things exist at once. And to say more: extension, being a relative notion, requires something that is extended or continued, as whiteness in milk, and in body that very thing which makes its essence; the repetition of this (whatever it may be) is extension. And I fully agree with Huygens (whose opinion in natural and mathematical matters counts for much with me) that the concept of empty place and of mere extension is the same; nor, in my judgment, can mobility itself or antitypy [impenetrability] be understood from extension alone, but from the subject of extension, by which place is not only constituted but filled.
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[7] Ad artic. 54. Nondum perfecte demonstratum memini vel ab autore nostro vel ab ejus sectatoribus, substantiam cogitantem extensione aut extensam cogitatione carere, ut inde constet alterum attributum ad alterum non requiri in eodem subjecto, imo nec cum ea consistere posse. Neque id mirum est, recte enim animadvertit autor libri de inquirenda veritate (a quo nonnulla egregia monentur), nullam a Cartesianis afferri distinctam cogitationis notionem, itaque nihil mirum est, si, quid in ea lateat, ipsis non constat.
[7] On article 54. I do not remember it ever being perfectly demonstrated, either by our author or by his followers, that thinking substance lacks extension or extended substance lacks thought, so as to establish that the one attribute is not required for the other in the same subject, or even that it cannot coexist with it. Nor is that surprising; for the author of the book De la recherche de la vérité (from whom some excellent advice is to be had) rightly observed that the Cartesians offer no distinct notion of thought; so it is no wonder that they do not know what lies hidden in it.
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[8] Ad artic. 60, 61. Distinctionem inter modos realem negare, non necessaria est usus verborum recepti mutatio. Hactenus enim et modi habiti sunt inter res, et realiter differre sunt visi, ut figura cerae sphaerica a quadrata; certe vera est mutatio ex una figura in aliam, adeoque reale fundamentum habet.
[8] On articles 60, 61. To deny a real distinction between modes is an unnecessary change in the received use of words. For until now modes have been counted among things and have been seen to differ really, as the spherical shape of wax from the square; certainly the change from one shape to another is a true change, and so has a real foundation.
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[9] Ad artic. 63. Cogitationem et extensionem concipere ut ipsam substantiam cogitantem aut extensam, mihi nec rectum videtur nec possibile. Machinatio haec est suspecta et illi similis, qua dubia pro falsis haberi jubebantur. Praeparantur animi his rerum detorsionibus ad pertinaciam et paralogismos.
[9] On article 63. To conceive thought and extension as the thinking or extended substance itself seems to me neither right nor possible. This device is suspect, and similar to the one by which doubtful things were to be taken as false. By such distortions of things minds are prepared for obstinacy and paralogisms.
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[10] Ad artic. 65 usque ad 68. Utilem Cartesius operam navavit post Veteres in eradicando hoc praejudicio, quo calores, colores aliaque phaenomena ut res quasdam spectamus extra nos, cum constet eadem manu quod valde calidum videbatur, mox tepidum sentiri; et qui viridem colorem animadvertit in mistura pulverea, eum armato mox oculo non virorem amplius, sed misturam flavi et caerulei deprehendere, et meliore armatura vel aliis experimentis aut rationibus et horum duorum causas deprehendi posse, ex quibus apparet nullam talem rem extra nos consistere, cujus phantasma imaginationi nostrae obversatur. Similes pueris vulgo sumus, quibus persuasum est reperiri patellam auream in ipso extremo arcus coelestis, quo scilicet terram attingit, quam frustra currendo invenire conantur.
[10] On articles 65 to 68. After the Ancients, Descartes did useful work in rooting out the prejudice by which we regard heat, colour and other phenomena as certain things outside us; for it is known that with the same hand what seemed very hot is soon felt as lukewarm; and that someone who notices a green colour in a mixture of powders will, with an aided eye, soon find there no longer green but a mixture of yellow and blue; and that with better instruments, or by other experiments or reasons, the causes of these two can also be found. From which it appears that there is no such thing outside us as the image presented to our imagination. In common we are like children who are persuaded that a golden bowl is to be found at the very end of the rainbow, where it touches the earth, and who try in vain to find it by running.
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[11] Ad artic. 71 usque ad 74. De causis errorum supra diximus nonnihil ad artic. 31, 35. Ex his etiam praesentium ratio reddi potest, nam infantiae quoque praejudicia pertinent ad assumtiones non probatas, defatigatio autem attentionem minuit, et verborum ambiguitas pertinet ad abusum notarum, facitque vitium in forma; et perinde est, ut Germani proverbio dicunt ac si in calculo ponatur x pro v, aut velut si pharmacopola pro sanguine draconis sandaracam in praescripta formula legat.
[11] On articles 71 to 74. We said something above on the causes of errors, on articles 31 and 35. From that the present ones can also be explained: for the prejudices of infancy belong to unproved assumptions, fatigue diminishes attention, and ambiguity of words belongs to the misuse of signs and makes a defect in form; it is just as if, as the Germans say in their proverb, an x were put for a v in a reckoning, or as if an apothecary read sandarac for dragon's blood in the written prescription.
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[12] Ad artic. 75. Aequum mihi videtur ut suum quoque tribuamus veteribus, neque maligno silentio et nobis ipsis damnoso eorum merita obruamus. Quae in Logica sua praescripsit Aristoteles, etsi non sufficiant ad inveniendum, sufficiunt tamen fere ad judicandum, ubi de necessariis saltem consequentiis agitur: magnaque res est consequentias humanae mentis velut mathematicis quibusdam regulis stabilitas haberi. Et a me notatum est, qui paralogismos in rebus seriis admittunt, saepius in formam Logicam peccare quam vulgo creditur. Itaque ad vitandos errores omnes nihil aliud opus est quam magna constantia et severitate logicorum vulgatissimis regulis uti. Sed quoniam saepe rerum complicatio non patitur hanc morositatem, hinc speciales quasdam formas Logicas adhibemus in scientiis et rebus agendis, quae per regulas illas generales accedente peculiari natura subjecti debent esse praedemonstratae; prorsus quemadmodum Euclides suam quandam Logicam propriam habet circa rationum conversiones, compositiones, divisiones, peculiari libro elementorum prius comprobatam, et postea in tota Geometria regnantem. Ita simul et compendio et securitati consulitur; et quanto plura ejus generis habentur, eo magis scientia quaeque exculta est. Addantur quae notavimus ad artic. 43 seqq. de argumentationibus quas dicunt fieri in forma, latius quam vulgo creditur extendendis.
[12] On article 75. It seems fair to me that we also give the ancients their due, and not bury their merits in a spiteful silence that harms ourselves. What Aristotle prescribed in his Logic, though not sufficient for discovery, is nearly sufficient for judging, at least where necessary consequences are concerned; and it is a great thing to have the consequences of the human mind fixed as if by mathematical rules. And I have noted that those who commit paralogisms in serious matters sin against logical form more often than is commonly believed. So to avoid all errors nothing else is needed than to use the commonest rules of the logicians with great constancy and strictness. But since the complexity of things often does not allow this fastidiousness, we use in the sciences and in practical affairs certain special logical forms, which must be demonstrated beforehand by those general rules together with the particular nature of the subject; just as Euclid has a logic of his own concerning the conversion, composition and division of ratios, first established in a particular book of the Elements and then reigning throughout Geometry. In this way both brevity and security are served; and the more such forms we have, the more developed each science is. Add what we noted on articles 43 and following about arguments said to be "in form", which should be extended more widely than is commonly believed.

Notes to text 103

  1. Cutting the knot. Article 40 rejects Descartes's appeal to the finitude of our mind as an answer to the conflict between providence and freedom: one must find the flaw in the argument, since even mysteries of faith cannot contain a contradiction. Leibniz's draft applies the same complaint to Descartes's article 26 on the infinite. This is the method of the Discours préliminaire of the Théodicée (above reason but not against it).
  2. Clear and distinct. Leibniz's draft names "my essay in the Leipzig Acta on truth and ideas", that is the Meditationes de cognitione, veritate et ideis (1684, text 66), as the place where he criticised the Cartesian criterion. The "forms" that conclude by their arrangement (algebra, account books, legal procedure) are an early statement of his idea of a general formal logic, and the projected logic of "degrees of probability" is the programme of Nouveaux essais IV.16.
  3. Comenius. The remark that Descartes promised a list of simple notions and then broke off with "and the like" is attributed, with Leibniz's hesitation, to Jan Amos Comenius; the source is to be checked. The inventory of simple notions is the alphabet of human thoughts that Leibniz pursued from De arte combinatoria (1666) on.
  4. Substance and accident. Against the Cartesian definition (a thing needing only God's concurrence to exist), Leibniz notes that substances need other substances and their own accidents; his provisional mark is that a substance can exchange one accident for another, while an accident cannot change its subject.
  5. Extension resolvable. Article 52 is a central text for Leibniz's critique of Cartesian body: extension is relative and presupposes something repeated or diffused ("as whiteness in milk"), which in body must include force; motion, resistance and the laws of collision do not follow from extension alone. The agreement with Huygens that empty place and mere extension are the same concept is notable. Antitypia (resistance, impenetrability) is the term of the Specimen dynamicum.
  6. Malebranche. "The author of the Recherche de la vérité" is Malebranche, who held that we have no clear idea of the soul. Leibniz's draft adds: "Yet it is very true that Soul and matter are wholly different in kind, as will one day appear better from our views."
  7. Secondary qualities. Leibniz accepts the Cartesian critique of colours and heat as things outside us (the green powder resolved under a microscope into yellow and blue grains), while his draft adds the qualification of text 94: "we rightly say that colours and heat are in things, when we understand the foundations of these phenomena." The rainbow's golden bowl is a children's tale.
  8. The apothecary. Dragon's blood (a red resin) and sandarac (another resin) were easily confused drug names; the German proverb about writing x for v (that is, 10 for 5) means cheating or blundering in accounts.
  9. Defence of Aristotle's logic. Article 75 is Leibniz's well-known vindication of syllogistic for judging, if not for discovery, and his doctrine that sciences develop special "logical forms" proved in advance, like Euclid's Book V on ratios. Compare the letter to Wagner on logic (1696) and Nouveaux essais IV.17.
  10. Part I of the Animadversiones is complete as texts 101–103. Part II (text 104) begins with Descartes's proof of the existence of material things (GP IV 366).
This text in the whole · 1692, a year from which 198 pieces are catalogued166316901716