Editor’s note
Leibniz's article-by-article critique of the first two books of Descartes's Principia philosophiae (1644), written about 1692 and circulated in manuscript; it was first printed by Guhrauer in 1844. It is one of the principal works. Gerhardt prints first Descartes's own list of article titles (not translated here, since it is Descartes's) and then Leibniz's remarks, giving in footnotes the readings of Leibniz's original draft where his corrected fair copy differs. The article numbers in the OCR are often garbled ("(4)" for 1, "(A)" for 3, "(43)" for 13); they are restored from the order of Descartes's articles. New translation from Gerhardt; this part covers methodic doubt, the cogito and the first truths, and the Cartesian use of God to guarantee evidence.
Notes to text 101
- The work. The Animadversiones answer Descartes's Principia philosophiae Parts I and II article by article. Leibniz circulated them in manuscript about 1692, hoping for a Cartesian response (the usual account names Henri Basnage de Beauval among the intermediaries; to be checked); they were not printed until G. E. Guhrauer's edition (1844), and Gerhardt prints Leibniz's corrected fair copy with the draft's variants in footnotes. Some of these variants are worth knowing: on article 1 the draft says Descartes "preferred to write things more plausible though less certain" and adds that Proclus reports Thales of Miletus's attempts at such proofs; on article 6 it inserts "even in doubtful matters it is for consciousness to recognise what we feel, or how arguments affect us".
- Proving the axioms. The demand that axioms themselves be demonstrated, by reducing them to identities through definitions, is central to Leibniz's logic (compare the Meditationes de cognitione, veritate et ideis, text 66, and the Nouveaux essais IV.7). The donkey that goes straight to its fodder is the ancient Epicurean jibe at Euclid I.20 reported by Proclus in his commentary on Euclid. Roberval's attempt to prove axioms is mentioned also in the Nouveaux essais.
- Sensible truth. Article 3 gives Leibniz's criterion for the reality of phenomena: agreement among themselves and with reason, so that the future can be foreseen from the past. The same criterion distinguishes real phenomena from dreams in the Réponse aux réflexions (text 92, row [2]) and the paper De modo distinguendi phaenomena realia ab imaginariis.
- Will and belief. Article 6 is a compact statement of Leibniz's doxastic involuntarism: we cannot choose what seems true, but the will can direct attention and so shape belief indirectly, sometimes into self-deception.
- Two kinds of first truths. Article 7 is a classic text: truths of reason (first principle: contradiction or identity) and truths of fact (first ones: I think and Various things are thought by me). The second primary truth of fact, the variety of our thoughts, recurs in the Nouveaux essais IV.2 and IV.9.
- The paralogism of real distinction. Article 8 states the standard objection to Descartes's argument from doubt: from "I can doubt that bodies exist but not that I exist" only "I can doubt whether the soul is bodily" follows. Leibniz's own case for the soul's immateriality rests elsewhere (unity and perception; compare Monadology §17).
- God and the deceiving demon. Article 13 rejects the Cartesian use of God to guarantee clear and distinct perception: the doubt is "neither posited by denying God nor removed by admitting him". Yet knowledge of God remains "the principle of a higher wisdom", since God is both first cause and ultimate reason.
- Reading marked [?]. In article 5 the sentence Sufficeret quod in Mathematicis idem in aliis praestari is elliptical in Gerhardt; it is taken as "it would be enough if as much were achieved in other matters as in Mathematics".
- Part 2 (text 102) continues with articles 14 onward: the ontological argument (GP IV 358).