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Animadversiones in partem generalem Principiorum Cartesianorum (1692), Part I, articles 1–13

Reference
GP IV 354–358
Date
1692
Original
Latin
Earlier English
Loemker (selections); this is a new translation (report tab 2)
Physics and dynamicsMetaphysics
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Editor’s note

Leibniz's article-by-article critique of the first two books of Descartes's Principia philosophiae (1644), written about 1692 and circulated in manuscript; it was first printed by Guhrauer in 1844. It is one of the principal works. Gerhardt prints first Descartes's own list of article titles (not translated here, since it is Descartes's) and then Leibniz's remarks, giving in footnotes the readings of Leibniz's original draft where his corrected fair copy differs. The article numbers in the OCR are often garbled ("(4)" for 1, "(A)" for 3, "(43)" for 13); they are restored from the order of Descartes's articles. New translation from Gerhardt; this part covers methodic doubt, the cogito and the first truths, and the Cartesian use of God to guarantee evidence.

Original
English
1
In partem primam. [1] Ad articulum 1. Quod de omnibus in quibus vel minimum est incertitudinis dubitandum a Cartesio dicitur, praestabat hoc meliore atque expressiore praecepto complecti: cogitandum esse quem quodque assensus aut dissensus gradum mereatur; vel simplicius inquirendum esse in cujusque dogmatis rationes. Ita cessassent de dubitatione Cartesiana vitilitigationes. Sed fortasse autor maluit παραδοξολογεῖν, ut torpentem lectorem novitate excitaret. Vellem autem praecepti ipse sui meminisset, vel potius, ut veram ejus vim concepisset animo. Rem reique usum optime explanabimus exemplo Geometrarum. Constat esse apud eos Axiomata et Postulata, quorum veritati reliqua innituntur. Haec admittimus, tum quod statim satis faciunt animo, tum quod infinitis experimentis comprobantur, et tamen interesset ad perfectionem scientiae ut demonstrarentur. Hoc olim aggressi sunt in nonnullis Apollonius et Proclus, nuper Robervallius. Et sane quemadmodum demonstrare Euclides voluit Trianguli duo latera simul esse tertio majora (quod ut quidam veterum jocabatur, etiam asini norunt recta, non per ambages ad pabulum tendentes), quia scilicet volebat veritates Geometricas non imaginibus sensuum sed rationibus niti, ita poterat quoque demonstrare duas rectas (quae productae non coincidunt) unicum tantum punctum commune habere posse, si bonam rectae definitionem habuisset. Et magnum ego usum demonstrationis axiomatum esse scio ad veram analyticen seu artem inveniendi. Itaque si voluisset Cartesius id exequi, quod in praecepto ejus optimum est, debuisset elaborare in demonstrandis principiis scientiarum, et agere in Philosophia, quod Proclus volebat in Geometria, ubi minus necesse est. Sed nostro autori potius visum alicubi est applausum quam certitudinem habere. Nec reprehenderem verisimilitudine subinde contentum, nisi ipse tanta professione severitatis animos erexisset: Euclidem vero quaedam sine probatione assumentem reprehendo multo minus, qui vel id praestitit, ut sciamus paucis hypothesibus admissis, caetera tuta atque adeo jam fide illis paria esse; cui simile aliquid si fecissent Cartesius aut alii Philosophi, non laboraremus. Atque hoc Sceptici quoque sibi dictum putare debent, qui scientias eo praetextu contemnunt, quod principiis non demonstratis passim utuntur. Ego contra potius Geometras laudandos censeo, quod his velut paxillis statuminaverunt scientiam, artemque repererunt progrediendi, atque ex paucis tam multa ducendi; nam si voluissent differre theorematum aut problematum inventiones, dum omnia axiomata et postulata demonstrata fuissent, fortasse nullam hodie Geometriam haberemus.
On the first part. [1] On article 1. Descartes's saying that we must doubt everything in which there is the least uncertainty would have been better put as a sounder and more explicit precept: we must consider what degree of assent or dissent each thing deserves; or more simply, we must inquire into the reasons for each doctrine. Then the quibbles about Cartesian doubt would have ceased. But perhaps the author preferred to speak in paradoxes [paradoxologein], to rouse a drowsy reader by novelty. I could wish, however, that he had remembered his own precept, or rather had grasped its true force. We shall best explain the matter and its use by the example of the Geometers. It is agreed that they have Axioms and Postulates on whose truth the rest depends. We admit these both because they satisfy the mind at once and because they are confirmed by countless experiments; and yet it would matter for the perfection of science that they be demonstrated. Apollonius and Proclus once undertook this for some of them, and Roberval recently. And indeed, just as Euclid chose to demonstrate that two sides of a triangle together are greater than the third (which, as one of the ancients joked, even donkeys know, who go straight to their fodder and not by roundabout ways), because he wanted geometrical truths to rest not on images of the senses but on reasons, so he could also have demonstrated that two straight lines (which, when produced, do not coincide) can have only one point in common, had he had a good definition of the straight line. And I know that the demonstration of axioms is of great use for true analysis, the art of discovery. So if Descartes had wished to carry out what is best in his precept, he ought to have worked at demonstrating the principles of the sciences, and to have done in Philosophy what Proclus wanted to do in Geometry, where it is less needed. But our author sometimes preferred applause to certainty. Nor would I blame him for being content now and then with probability, had he not raised expectations by so great a profession of rigour. Euclid, who assumes certain things without proof, I blame much less; he at least achieved this, that we know that once a few hypotheses are admitted the rest is secure and as credible as they are. Had Descartes or other philosophers done something similar, we should not be in difficulty. And the Sceptics should take this as said to them too, who despise the sciences on the pretext that they constantly use undemonstrated principles. I, on the contrary, think the Geometers should rather be praised for having propped up science with these, as with stakes, and for having found the art of advancing and of deriving so much from so little; for if they had chosen to postpone the discovery of theorems and problems until all axioms and postulates had been demonstrated, perhaps we should have no Geometry today.
Original
English
2
[2] Ad artic. 2. Caeterum non video quid prosit dubia habere pro falsis: hoc foret non exuere praejudicia, sed mutare. Quod si fictio tantum intelligitur, non erat illa abutendum, quemadmodum et apparebit hinc natum paralogismum infra artic. 8. cum de distinctione Mentis a corpore agetur.
[2] On article 2. Besides, I do not see what good it does to treat doubtful things as false: that would not be to put off prejudices but to change them. If only a fiction is meant, it should not have been abused, as will appear from the paralogism born of it below, in article 8, where the distinction of Mind from body is treated.
3
[3] Ad artic. 3. Nihil autem aliud de rebus sensibilibus aut scire possumus aut desiderare debemus, quam ut tam inter se quam cum indubitatis rationibus consentiant, atque adeo ut ex praeteritis praevideri aliquatenus futura possint. Alia in illis veritas aut realitas frustra expetitur, quam quae hoc praestat, nec aliud vel postulare debent Sceptici vel dogmatici polliceri.
[3] On article 3. About sensible things we can know nothing else, and ought to desire nothing else, than that they agree both with one another and with indubitable reasons, and so that future things can to some extent be foreseen from past ones. Any other truth or reality in them than what provides this is sought in vain; and neither should the Sceptics demand, nor the dogmatists promise, anything else.
4
[4] Ad artic. 5. De mathematicis demonstrationibus non aliter potest dubitari quam quomodo metui potest error in calculo Arithmeticorum. Cui rei mederi non licet nisi examinando calculum saepius aut per diversos, adhibitis etiam comprobationibus. Haec mentis humanae imbecillitas orta ex defectu attentionis et memoriae perfecte tolli non potest, frustraque huc adducitur a Cartesio tanquam remedium allaturo. Sufficeret quod in Mathematicis idem in aliis praestari; sane omnis, etiam Cartesiana, ratiocinatio utcunque proba aut accurata, huic tamen dubitationi obnoxia erit; quicquid demum de potente aliquo genio decepturiente, aut de somnii et vigiliae discrimine statuatur.
[4] On article 5. Mathematical demonstrations can be doubted only in the way one may fear an error in the reckoning of Arithmeticians. The only remedy is to examine the calculation several times, or by different people, using checks as well. This weakness of the human mind, arising from defects of attention and memory, cannot be wholly removed, and Descartes brings it in here to no purpose, as if he were going to supply a remedy. It would be enough if what is achieved in Mathematics were achieved in other matters [?]; certainly all reasoning, Descartes's included, however sound or exact, will remain subject to this doubt, whatever one may finally decide about some powerful deceiving genius or about the difference between sleeping and waking.
5
[5] Ad artic. 6. Liberum arbitrium habemus non in sentiendo, sed in agendo. Non est in meo arbitrio utrum mel mihi dulce an amarum videatur, sed nec in meo arbitrio est, utrum theorema propositum mihi verum an falsum videatur, sed conscientiae tantum res est, inspicere quid videatur. Quisquis aliquid statuit, conscius est aut sensus rationisve praesentis aut saltem praesentis memoriae praeteritum sensum praeteritaeve rationis perceptionem referentis; quanquam in eo saepe infidelitate memoriae aut defectu attentionis fallamur. Conscientia autem praesentis aut praeteriti utique in arbitrio nostro non est. Unum hoc penes voluntatem esse agnoscimus, ut attentionem et studium imperet, atque ita etsi sententiam in nobis non faciat, potest tamen ad eam oblique conferre. Ita fit ut saepe homines quod verum esse vellent, tandem credant, postquam assuevere animum, ut ad ea attendat potissimum quae favent: qua ratione postremo obtinent, ut non tantum voluntati, sed et conscientiae satisfiat. Add. artic. 31.
[5] On article 6. We have free choice not in perceiving but in acting. It is not in my choice whether honey seems sweet or bitter to me; nor is it in my choice whether a proposed theorem seems true or false to me: it is solely a matter for consciousness to observe what seems so. Whoever decides something is conscious either of a present sensation or reason, or at least of a present memory reporting a past sensation or the perception of a past reason; though in this we are often deceived by the unfaithfulness of memory or a lack of attention. But consciousness of what is present or past is certainly not in our choice. The one thing we acknowledge to be in the will's power is to command attention and application; and so, although it does not make our judgment, it can contribute to it indirectly. Thus it often happens that people end by believing what they would like to be true, once they have accustomed the mind to attend chiefly to what favours it; in this way they finally manage to satisfy not only the will but conscience as well. Compare article 31.
6
[6] Ad artic. 7. Ego cogito, adeoque sum, inter primas veritates esse praeclare a Cartesio notatum est. Sed aequum erat ut alias non negligeret huic pares. In universum ergo sic dici potest: Veritates esse vel facti vel rationis. Veritatum rationis prima est principium contradictionis vel quod eodem redit identicorum, quemadmodum et Aristoteles recte animadvertit. Veritates facti primae tot sunt quot perceptiones immediatae sive conscientiae, ut sic dicam. Non tantum autem mei cogitantis sed et meorum cogitatorum conscius sum, nec magis verum certumve est me cogitare, quam illa vel illa a me cogitari. Itaque veritates facti primas non incommode referre licebit ad has duas: Ego cogito, et: Varia a me cogitantur. Unde consequitur non tantum me esse, sed et me variis modis affectum esse.
[6] On article 7. I think, therefore I am was excellently noted by Descartes as among the first truths. But it was only fair that he should not neglect others equal to it. In general, then, one may say this: truths are either of fact or of reason. The first of the truths of reason is the principle of contradiction, or, what comes to the same, of identicals, as Aristotle also rightly observed. The first truths of fact are as many as there are immediate perceptions, or consciousnesses, so to speak. For I am conscious not only of myself thinking but also of my thoughts, and it is no more true or certain that I think than that this or that is thought by me. So the first truths of fact may conveniently be reduced to these two: I think, and Various things are thought by me. From which it follows not only that I am, but that I am affected in various ways.
Original
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7
[7] Ad artic. 8. Non procedit: possum assumere vel fingere corporea nulla existere, sed non possum fingere me non existere, aut non cogitare, ergo ego non sum corporeus, nec cogitatio est modus corporis. Et miror virum egregium tam levi sophismati tantum tribuere potuisse, certe in hoc articulo nihil ultra addit; quae in meditationibus attulit, suo loco examinabuntur. Qui putabit animam esse corpoream, non admittet te posse ponere quod nulla corporea existant, sed hoc tantum concedet te posse dubitare (quamdiu naturam animae ignores), utrum corporea existant vel non existant; et cum videas tamen clare animam tuam existere, hoc unum inde sequi fatebitur, dubitare te adhuc posse utrum anima sit corporea; nec ullis fidiculis quicquam amplius extorquebitur ex hoc argumento: paralogismo autem ansam praebuit illa supra artic. 2. sumta licentia dubia rejiciendi tanquam falsa, quasi ponere liceat nulla esse corporea, quia dubitare licet utrum existant, quod concedi non debet. Secus foret si tam perfecte naturam animae quam existentiam cognosceremus, ita enim quicquid in ea non appareret, constaret nec ei inesse.
[7] On article 8. This does not follow: I can assume or feign that no bodily things exist, but I cannot feign that I do not exist or do not think; therefore I am not bodily, nor is thought a mode of body. And I am surprised that so eminent a man could make so much of so slight a sophism; at any rate he adds nothing more in this article (what he brought forward in the Meditations will be examined in its place). Whoever thinks the soul is bodily will not admit that you can posit that no bodily things exist, but will grant only that you can doubt (so long as you do not know the nature of the soul) whether bodily things exist or not; and since you nevertheless see clearly that your soul exists, he will admit that this alone follows: that you can still doubt whether the soul is bodily. No rack will extort anything more from this argument. The paralogism was occasioned by the licence taken above in article 2 of rejecting doubtful things as false, as if one might posit that there are no bodily things because one may doubt whether they exist; which should not be granted. It would be otherwise if we knew the nature of the soul as perfectly as its existence; for then whatever did not appear in it would certainly not be in it.
8
[8] Ad artic. 13. Jam notavi ad artic. 5 errores qui ex defectu memoriae aut attentionis nasci et arithmeticis quoque calculis intervenire possunt (etiam post perfectam methodum repertam ut in Numeris), frustra hic memorari, quia nulla ars excogitari potest, in qua non metui debeant, praesertim cum ratiocinatio longe producenda est, itaque ad examina est recurrendum. Caeterum ad speciem quandam sive pompam huc acciri Deus videtur, nam ut taceam, exoticam illam fictionem vel dubitationem, an non ad errandum etiam in evidentissimis facti simus, neminem movere debere, cum obstet natura evidentiae, et contrarium totius vitae experimenta successusque testentur; et si semel jure moveri posset haec dubitatio, insuperabilis prorsus futura sit, etiam ipsi Cartesio et alteri cuivis, cui licet evidentissima afferenti semper obstaret: haec inquam ut taceam, sciendum est nec Deo negato hanc dubitationem poni, nec admisso tolli. Nam etsi Deus nullus esset, modo possibile maneret nos existere, non ideo minus essemus capaces veri; et licet concedatur esse Deum, non ideo sequitur non existere creaturam fallibilem admodum atque imperfectam, praesertim cum fieri possit ut ejus imperfectio non sit nativa, sed forte peccato magno superinducta, ut de originis peccato Theologi Christiani docent, ita malum hoc non posset Deo imputari. Etsi autem Deus hic non apte introductus videatur, sentio tamen, sed alio modo, veram Dei cognitionem altioris sapientiae principium esse; est enim Deus non minus causa prima quam ultima ratio rerum; nec res melius quam ex suis causis et rationibus cognoscuntur.
[8] On article 13. I have already noted on article 5 that the errors which arise from defects of memory or attention, and which can creep into arithmetical calculations too (even after a perfect method has been found, as with Numbers), are mentioned here to no purpose, since no art can be devised in which they need not be feared, especially when reasoning must be drawn out at length; so one must have recourse to checks. For the rest, God seems to be summoned here for show, or for pomp. To say nothing of the outlandish fiction or doubt whether we may not have been made to err even in the most evident things, which ought to move no one, since the nature of evidence stands against it and the experience and successes of our whole life testify to the contrary (and if this doubt could once rightly be raised, it would be utterly insuperable, even for Descartes himself or anyone else, since it would always stand in the way of whoever brought forward the most evident things), to say nothing of this, I say, one must know that this doubt is neither posited by denying God nor removed by admitting him. For even if there were no God, provided it remained possible that we exist, we should be no less capable of truth; and even if it is granted that there is a God, it does not follow that there does not exist a very fallible and imperfect creature, especially since its imperfection might not be native but perhaps brought on by a great sin, as Christian Theologians teach of original sin; so this evil could not be imputed to God. Yet although God seems not to be fittingly introduced here, I nevertheless hold, though in another way, that true knowledge of God is the principle of a higher wisdom; for God is no less the first cause than the ultimate reason of things, and things are not known better than from their causes and reasons.

Notes to text 101

  1. The work. The Animadversiones answer Descartes's Principia philosophiae Parts I and II article by article. Leibniz circulated them in manuscript about 1692, hoping for a Cartesian response (the usual account names Henri Basnage de Beauval among the intermediaries; to be checked); they were not printed until G. E. Guhrauer's edition (1844), and Gerhardt prints Leibniz's corrected fair copy with the draft's variants in footnotes. Some of these variants are worth knowing: on article 1 the draft says Descartes "preferred to write things more plausible though less certain" and adds that Proclus reports Thales of Miletus's attempts at such proofs; on article 6 it inserts "even in doubtful matters it is for consciousness to recognise what we feel, or how arguments affect us".
  2. Proving the axioms. The demand that axioms themselves be demonstrated, by reducing them to identities through definitions, is central to Leibniz's logic (compare the Meditationes de cognitione, veritate et ideis, text 66, and the Nouveaux essais IV.7). The donkey that goes straight to its fodder is the ancient Epicurean jibe at Euclid I.20 reported by Proclus in his commentary on Euclid. Roberval's attempt to prove axioms is mentioned also in the Nouveaux essais.
  3. Sensible truth. Article 3 gives Leibniz's criterion for the reality of phenomena: agreement among themselves and with reason, so that the future can be foreseen from the past. The same criterion distinguishes real phenomena from dreams in the Réponse aux réflexions (text 92, row [2]) and the paper De modo distinguendi phaenomena realia ab imaginariis.
  4. Will and belief. Article 6 is a compact statement of Leibniz's doxastic involuntarism: we cannot choose what seems true, but the will can direct attention and so shape belief indirectly, sometimes into self-deception.
  5. Two kinds of first truths. Article 7 is a classic text: truths of reason (first principle: contradiction or identity) and truths of fact (first ones: I think and Various things are thought by me). The second primary truth of fact, the variety of our thoughts, recurs in the Nouveaux essais IV.2 and IV.9.
  6. The paralogism of real distinction. Article 8 states the standard objection to Descartes's argument from doubt: from "I can doubt that bodies exist but not that I exist" only "I can doubt whether the soul is bodily" follows. Leibniz's own case for the soul's immateriality rests elsewhere (unity and perception; compare Monadology §17).
  7. God and the deceiving demon. Article 13 rejects the Cartesian use of God to guarantee clear and distinct perception: the doubt is "neither posited by denying God nor removed by admitting him". Yet knowledge of God remains "the principle of a higher wisdom", since God is both first cause and ultimate reason.
  8. Reading marked [?]. In article 5 the sentence Sufficeret quod in Mathematicis idem in aliis praestari is elliptical in Gerhardt; it is taken as "it would be enough if as much were achieved in other matters as in Mathematics".
  9. Part 2 (text 102) continues with articles 14 onward: the ontological argument (GP IV 358).
This text in the whole · 1692, a year from which 198 pieces are catalogued166316901716