Editor’s note
The closing article of the Animadversiones. Descartes ends Part II by saying physics needs no principles but those of abstract mathematics. Leibniz agrees that every particular phenomenon can be explained mechanically, but holds that the laws of mechanics themselves come from force, something metaphysical, and from the wisdom of God. The passage states in compressed form the "two kingdoms" of efficient and final causes and the harmony between them, which Leibniz later made public in the Système nouveau and the Monadology. With it the Animadversiones are complete (texts 101–111).
Original (GP IV 390–392)
English
1
Ad artic. (64). Claudit Auctor Partem secundam, id est generalem de rerum materialium principiis admonitione quadam quae mihi restrictione egere videtur. Nimirum ait ad naturae phaenomena explicanda non aliis esse opus principiis, quam ex Mathesi abstracta petitis, seu doctrina de magnitudine, figura et motu, nec aliam se materiam agnoscere quam quae subjectum est Geometriae. Ego plane quidem assentior omnia naturae phaenomena specialia mechanice explicari posse, si nobis satis essent explorata, neque alia ratione causas rerum materialium posse intelligi; sed illud tamen etiam atque etiam considerandum censeo, ipsa Principia Mechanica, Legesque adeo naturae generales ex altioribus principiis nasci nec per solam quantitatis ac rerum Geometricarum considerationem posse explicari, quin potius aliquid Metaphysicum illis inesse, independens a notionibus quas praebet imaginatio, referendumque ad substantiam extensionis expertem. Nam praeter extensionem ejusque variabilitates inest materiae vis ipsa seu agendi potentia quae transitum facit a Metaphysica ad naturam, a materialibus ad immaterialia. Habet illa vis Leges suas ex principiis non illis solis absolutae atque ut ita dicam brutae necessitatis, ut in Mathematicis, sed perfectae rationis deductas.
On art. 64. The author closes Part II, the general part on the principles of material things, with a remark that seems to me to need qualification. He says that to explain the phenomena of nature no principles are needed but those taken from abstract mathematics, that is, from the doctrine of magnitude, figure and motion, and that he acknowledges no matter but that which is the subject of geometry. I fully agree that all the particular phenomena of nature could be explained mechanically if we had explored them well enough, and that the causes of material things cannot be understood in any other way. But I think we must consider again and again that the principles of mechanics themselves, and so the general laws of nature, arise from higher principles and cannot be explained by the consideration of quantity and geometrical things alone. Rather, there is something metaphysical in them, independent of the notions that imagination supplies, and to be referred to a substance without extension. For besides extension and its variations there is in matter force itself, the power of acting, which makes the passage from metaphysics to nature, from material things to immaterial. That force has its own laws, derived from principles not merely of absolute and, so to speak, brute necessity, as in mathematics, but of perfect reason.
2
His vero semel in generali tractatione constitutis, postea cum phaenomenorum naturae ratio redditur, omnia mechanice expediri possunt, et tam frustra perceptiones et appetitus archaei, et ideae operatrices, et formae substantiarum, ipsaeque animae tunc adhibentur, quam frustra causam universalem omnium Deum ex machina ad res naturales singulas simplici voluntate ejus expediendas advocaremus, quod autorem Philosophiae Mosaicae verbis Scripturae sacrae male acceptis facere memini. Haec qui probe considerabit, medium in philosophando tenebit, et non minus Theologis quam Physicis satisfaciet, intelligetque non tam peccatum olim a Schola fuisse in tractandis formis indivisibilibus quam in applicandis, tunc cum potius de modificationibus atque instrumentis substantiae quaeritur, agendique modo, id est Mechanismo.
But once these have been established in a general treatment, then afterwards, when an account is given of the phenomena of nature, everything can be settled mechanically. It is as useless then to bring in the perceptions and appetites of an archeus, formative ideas, substantial forms, or souls themselves, as it would be to call on God, the universal cause of all things, as a god from the machine, to settle individual natural things by his simple will, which I remember the author of the Mosaic Philosophy doing on the strength of the words of Holy Scripture wrongly understood. Whoever considers this properly will keep to the middle way in philosophising and will satisfy theologians no less than physicists. He will understand that the Schools formerly went wrong not so much in treating indivisible forms as in applying them, at the point where the question is rather about the modifications and instruments of substance and its manner of acting, that is, about mechanism.
3
Habet natura velut imperium in imperio, et ut ita dicam regnum duplex, rationis et necessitatis, sive formarum et particularum materiae, quemadmodum enim omnia sunt plena animarum, ita et organicorum corporum. Haec regna inter se inconfusa suo quodque jure gubernantur, nec magis ratio perceptionis atque appetitus in modificationibus extensionis, quam ratio nutritionis, caeterarumque functionum organicarum in formis sive animabus quaerenda est. Sed summa illa substantia, quae causa est universalis omnium, pro infinita sua sapientia et potestate efficit, ut duae diversissimae series in eadem substantia corporea sese referant, ac perfecte consentiant inter se, perinde ac si una alterius influxu regeretur, et sive necessitatem materiae et ordinem efficientium intueare, nihil sine causa imaginationi satisfaciente aut praeter mathematicas mechanismi Leges contingere animadvertas, sive finium velut auream catenam et formarum orbem tanquam mundum intelligibilem contemplere, conjunctis in unum ob perfectionem Autoris supremi, Ethicae ac Metaphysicae apicibus, nihil sine ratione summa fieri animadvertas. Idem enim DEUS et forma eminens et efficiens primum, et finis est sive ultima ratio rerum. Nostrum autem est, vestigia ejus in rebus adorare, nec tantum instrumenta ipsius in operando rerumque materialium effectricem mechanicen, sed et admirandi artificii sublimiores usus meditari, et quemadmodum Architectum corporum, ita et maxime Regem mentium DEUM ejusque optime ordinantem omnia intelligentiam agnoscere, quae perfectissimam Universi Rempublicam sub potentissimi ac sapientissimi Monarchae dominatu constituit. Ita in singularibus naturae phaenomenis utriusque considerationis conjunctione vitae pariter utilitatibus et perfectioni mentis, nec minus sapientiae quam pietati consulemus.
Nature has, as it were, an empire within an empire, and, so to speak, a double kingdom, of reason and of necessity, or of forms and of the particles of matter. For just as all things are full of souls, so they are also full of organic bodies. These kingdoms are governed without confusion between them, each by its own law, and the reason of perception and appetite is no more to be sought in modifications of extension than the reason of nutrition and the other organic functions is to be sought in forms or souls. But that supreme substance which is the universal cause of all things brings it about, by its infinite wisdom and power, that two most different series in the same corporeal substance correspond to each other and agree perfectly, just as if one were governed by the influence of the other. Whether you look at the necessity of matter and the order of efficient causes, you will see that nothing happens without a cause that satisfies the imagination, or outside the mathematical laws of mechanism; or whether you contemplate the golden chain, as it were, of ends and the sphere of forms as an intelligible world, you will see, the summits of ethics and metaphysics being joined into one by the perfection of the supreme Author, that nothing happens without the highest reason. For the same God is the eminent form and the first efficient cause, and the end or ultimate reason of things. Our part is to adore his traces in things, and to reflect not only on his instruments in working, the mechanics that produces material things, but also on the higher uses of his admirable artifice; and to acknowledge God not only as the Architect of bodies but above all as the King of minds, and his intelligence, which orders all things for the best and has established the most perfect Republic of the universe under the rule of the most powerful and wisest Monarch. So, in the particular phenomena of nature, by joining both considerations we shall serve the needs of life and the perfection of the mind alike, and wisdom no less than piety.
Notes to text 111
- Descartes, Principia II.64: "I acknowledge no matter in corporeal things except that which the geometers call quantity... and I consider nothing in it but divisions, shapes and motions", with no other principles needed in physics.
- "Archaei" and "ideae operatrices": the vital principles of Paracelsus and of Jan Baptist van Helmont, and the "plastic natures" of the Cambridge Platonists. Leibniz rejects them as explanations of particular phenomena, while keeping forms at the level of principles; compare the Système nouveau (1695) and De ipsa natura (1698, text 65).
- "The author of the Mosaic Philosophy": Robert Fludd, Philosophia Moysaica (Gouda, 1638), which explains natural events directly by divine will and Scripture. The identification is the usual one but is not stated in the text [?]; the point is Fludd's mixing of theology into physics.
- "Imperium in imperio": the phrase Spinoza uses (Ethics III, preface) to deny that man is a kingdom within a kingdom; Leibniz turns it to describe the two orders within nature.
- "Aurea catena": the golden chain of Homer (Iliad VIII.19), read since antiquity as the chain of causes linking heaven and earth; it was also the title of the alchemical Aurea Catena Homeri (1723), which postdates this text.
- The "two kingdoms" passage is an early statement, about 1692, of the doctrines of Monadology §§79 and 87–90 (the kingdoms of efficient and final causes, and of nature and grace) and of the City of God.