Translations · Text 91 · 1011011

Réponse aux réflexions de M. Bayle, Part 3: on disputing well, Bayle's Dictionary, evil and creaturely force

Reference
GP IV 565–568
Date
1702
Original
French
Earlier English
this is a new translation
MetaphysicsMind and body
View

Editor’s note

Leibniz closes the technical exchange, praises Bayle as an opponent, answers in passing Dom François Lamy and the "learned man" of the Acta eruditorum (Sturm), and then turns to Bayle's philosophical articles (Pauliciens, Origen, Pereira, Rorarius, Spinoza, Zeno), giving a compressed first version of the Théodicée's answer on evil and his case against Spinoza. New translation from Gerhardt; Bayle's words that Leibniz quotes are in italics.

Original
English
1
[1] Comme j'avois déja donné cette réponse en substance, que les perceptions confuses enveloppent tout ce qui est au dehors, et renferment des rapports infinis, M. Bayle, aprés l'avoir rapportée, ne la refute pas; il dit plustost que cette supposition, quand elle sera bien developpée, est le vray moyen de resoudre toutes les difficultés; et il me fait l'honneur de dire, qu'il espere que je resoudray solidement les siennes. Quand il ne l'auroit dit que par honnesteté, je n'aurois pas laissé de faire des efforts pour cela, et je crois de n'en avoir passé aucune: et si j'ay laissé quelque chose, sans tacher d'y satisfaire, il faudra que je n'aye point pû voir en quoy consistoit la difficulté qu'on me vouloit opposer; ce qui me donne quelquesfois le plus de peine en répondant. J'aurois souhaité de voir pourquoy l'on croit, que cette multitude de perceptions, que je suppose dans une substance indivisible, n'y sauroit avoir lieu; car je crois que, quand même l'experience et le sentiment commun ne nous en feroient point reconnoistre une grande varieté dans nostre ame, il seroit permis de la supposer. Ce ne sera pas une preuve d'impossibilité de dire seulement, qu'on ne sauroit concevoir une telle ou telle chose, quand on ne marque pas en quoy elle choque la raison, et quand la difficulté n'est que dans l'imagination, sans qu'il y en ait dans l'entendement.
[1] Since I had already given this answer in substance, that confused perceptions envelop everything outside and contain infinite relations, Mr Bayle, after reporting it, does not refute it; rather he says that this supposition, when it is well developed, is the true means of resolving all the difficulties, and he does me the honour of saying that he hopes I shall resolve his own soundly. Had he said it only out of courtesy, I should still have made the effort; and I believe I have passed over none of them. If I have left something without trying to satisfy it, it must be that I could not see what the difficulty put to me consisted in, which is sometimes what gives me most trouble in answering. I should have liked to see why people believe that this multitude of perceptions, which I suppose in an indivisible substance, cannot take place there; for I think that even if experience and common feeling did not make us recognize a great variety in our soul, it would be permissible to suppose it. It is no proof of impossibility merely to say that one cannot conceive such and such a thing, when one does not show how it offends reason, and when the difficulty lies only in the imagination and not in the understanding.
2
[2] Il y a du plaisir d'avoir à faire à un opposant aussi equitable et aussi profond en même temps, que M. Bayle, qui rend tellement justice, qu'il previent souvent les réponses, comme il a fait en remarquant que, selon moy, la constitution primitive de chaque esprit estant differente de celle de tout autre, cela ne doit pas paroistre plus extraordinaire, que ce que disent les Thomistes, aprés leur Maistre, de la diversité specifique de toutes les intelligences separées. Je suis bien aise de me rencontrer encor en cela avec luy, car j'ay allegué quelque part cette même autorité. Il est vray que, suivant ma definition de l'espece, je n'appelle pas cette difference specifique; car comme, selon moy, jamais deux individus ne se ressemblent parfaitement, il faudroit dire que jamais deux individus ne sont d'une même espece; ce qui ne seroit point parler juste. Je suis faché, de n'avoir pas encor pû voir les objections de Dom François Lami, contenues (à ce que M. Bayle m'apprend) dans son second traité de la Connoissance de soy même (edit. 1699), autrement j'y aurois encor dirigé mes réponses.
[2] It is a pleasure to deal with an opponent at once as fair and as profound as Mr Bayle, who does justice so well that he often anticipates the answers, as he did in remarking that, since on my view the primitive constitution of each spirit differs from that of every other, this should seem no more extraordinary than what the Thomists, following their Master, say of the specific diversity of all separate intelligences. I am glad to meet him on this point too, for I have cited that same authority somewhere. It is true that by my definition of species I do not call this difference specific; for since, on my view, no two individuals are ever perfectly alike, one would have to say that no two individuals are ever of the same species, which would not be speaking accurately. I am sorry not yet to have been able to see the objections of Dom François Lamy, contained (as Mr Bayle informs me) in his second treatise De la connoissance de soy-même (1699 edition); otherwise I should have directed my answers to them as well.
Original
English
3
[3] M. Bayle m'a voulu epargner exprés les objections communes à d'autres systemes, et c'est encor une obligation que je luy ay. Je diray seulement, qu'à l'egard de la force donnée aux creatures, je crois d'avoir répondu dans le mois de Septembre du Journal de Leipzic 1698 * à toutes les objections du memoire d'un savant homme, contenues dans le même Journal 1697, que M. Bayle cite à la marge lit. s, et d'avoir demonstré même, que sans la force active dans les corps, il n'y auroit point de varieté dans les phenomenes, ce qui vaudroit autant, que s'il n'y avoit rien du tout. Il est vray que ce savant adversaire a repliqué (May 1699), mais c'est proprement en expliquant son sentiment, et sans toucher assés à mes raisons contraires: ce qui a fait, qu'il ne s'est point souvenu de repondre à cette demonstration, d'autant qu'il regardoit la matiere comme inutile à persuader et à eclaircir d'avantage, et même comme capable d'alterer la bonne intelligence. J'avoue que c'est le destin ordinaire des contestations, mais il y a de l'exception; et ce qui s'est passé entre M. Bayle et moy, paroist d'une autre nature. Je tache tousjours de mon côté de prendre des mesures propres à conserver la moderation, et à pousser l'eclaircissement de la chose, afin que la dispute non seulement ne soit pas nuisible, mais puisse même devenir utile. Je ne sçay si j'ay obtenu maintenant ce dernier point; mais quoyque je ne puisse me flatter de donner une entiere satisfaction à un esprit aussi pénetrant que celuy de M. Bayle, dans une matiere aussi difficile que celle dont il s'agit, je seray tousjours content, s'il trouve que j'ay fait quelque progrés dans une si importante recherche.
[3] Mr Bayle has deliberately spared me the objections common to other systems, and that is one more obligation I owe him. I will say only that, as regards the force given to creatures, I believe I answered, in the September 1698 number of the Leipzig Journal,* all the objections in the memoir of a learned man contained in the same Journal for 1697, which Mr Bayle cites in the margin, letter s; and that I even demonstrated that without active force in bodies there would be no variety in phenomena, which would amount to there being nothing at all. It is true that this learned adversary replied (May 1699), but properly by explaining his own view, without touching enough on my reasons against it; which is why he did not think to answer that demonstration, the more so as he regarded the matter as useless for further persuasion and clarification, and even as liable to spoil good relations. I admit that this is the usual fate of disputes, but there are exceptions, and what has passed between Mr Bayle and me seems to be of another kind. For my part I always try to take measures fit to preserve moderation and to press the clarification of the matter, so that the dispute may not only do no harm but may even become useful. I do not know whether I have now achieved this last point; but though I cannot flatter myself that I give entire satisfaction to a mind as penetrating as Mr Bayle's in so difficult a matter, I shall always be content if he finds that I have made some progress in so important an inquiry.
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[4] Je n'ay pû m'empecher de renouveller le plaisir, que j'avois eu autresfois, de lire avec une attention particuliere plusieurs articles de son excellent et riche Dictionnaire, et entre autres ceux qui regardent la Philosophie, comme les articles des Pauliciens, Origene, Pereira, Rorarius, Spinosa, Zenon. J'ay esté surpris tout de nouveau de la fecondité, de la force et du brillant des pensées. Jamais ancien Academicien, sans excepter Carneade, n'aura mieux fait sentir les difficultés. M. Foucher, quoyque tres habile dans ces meditations, n'y approchoit pas, et moy je trouve que rien au monde n'est plus utile pour surmonter ces mêmes difficultés. C'est ce qui fait que je me plais extremement aux objections des personnes habiles et moderées, car je sens que cela me donne des nouvelles forces, comme dans la fable d'Antée terrassé. Et ce qui me fait parler avec un peu de confiance, c'est que ne m'estant fixé qu'aprés avoir regardé de tous costez et bien balancé, je puis peutestre dire sans vanité: Omnia praecepi atque animo mecum peregi. Mais les objections me remettent dans les voyes, et m'epargnent bien de la peine: car il n'y en a pas peu de vouloir repasser par tous les ecarts, pour deviner et prevenir ce que d'autres peuvent trouver à redire, puisque les preventions et les inclinations sont si differentes, qu'il y a eu des personnes fort penetrantes, qui ont donné d'abord dans mon hypothese, et ont pris même la peine de la recommander à d'autres. Il y en a eu encor de tres habiles, qui m'ont marqué l'avoir deja eue en effect; et même quelques autres ont dit, qu'ils entendoient ainsi l'hypothese des causes occasionnelles, et ne la distinguoient point de la mienne, dont je suis bien aise. Mais je ne le suis pas moins, lorsque je vois qu'on se met à l'examiner comme il faut.
[4] I could not keep from renewing the pleasure I once had of reading with particular attention several articles of his excellent and rich Dictionary, among others those concerning Philosophy, such as the articles Paulicians, Origen, Pereira, Rorarius, Spinoza, Zeno. I was struck afresh by the fertility, the force and the brilliance of the thoughts. No ancient Academic, not excepting Carneades, ever made the difficulties better felt. Mr Foucher, though very able in these meditations, came nowhere near it; and for my part I find that nothing in the world is more useful for overcoming those same difficulties. That is why I take great pleasure in the objections of able and moderate people, for I feel that they give me new strength, as in the fable of Antaeus thrown to the ground. And what makes me speak with a little confidence is that, having settled my view only after looking on all sides and weighing well, I can perhaps say without vanity: I have foreseen all things and gone through them in my mind. But objections set me back on the road and spare me much trouble; for it is no small labour to go back over every byway to guess and forestall what others may find to criticize, since prejudices and inclinations differ so much that some very penetrating people took to my hypothesis at once and even took the trouble to recommend it to others. Others again, very able, have told me they had in effect held it already; and some others still have said that they understood the hypothesis of occasional causes in this way and did not distinguish it from mine, which pleases me. But I am no less pleased when I see people set about examining it properly.
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[5] Pour dire quelque chose sur les articles de M. Bayle, dont je viens de parler, et dont le sujet a beaucoup de connexion avec cette matiere, il semble que la raison de la permission du mal vient des possibilités eternelles, suivant lesquelles cette maniere d'Univers qui l'admet et qui a esté admise à l'existence actuelle, se trouve la plus parfaite en somme parmy toutes les façons possibles. Mais on s'egare, en voulant monstrer en detail, avec les Stoiciens, cette utilité du mal qui releve le bien, que S. Augustin a bien reconnue en general, et qui, pour ainsi dire, fait reculer pour mieux sauter; car peut-on entrer dans les particularités infinies de l'Harmonie universelle? Cependant s'il falloit choisir entre deux, suivant la raison, je serois plustost pour l'Origeniste, et jamais pour le Manicheen. Il ne me paroist pas aussi qu'il faille oster l'action ou la force aux Creatures, sous pretexte qu'elles creeroient si elles produisoient des modalités. Car c'est Dieu qui conserve et cree continuellement leur forces, c'est à dire, une source de modifications, qui est dans la creature, ou bien un estat, par lequel on peut juger qu'il y aura changement de modifications; parce que sans cela je trouve (comme j'ay dit cy dessus d'avoir monstré ailleurs) que Dieu ne produiroit rien, et qu'il n'y auroit point de substances hormis la sienne, ce qui nous rameneroit toutes les absurdités du Dieu de Spinosa. Aussi paroist il, que l'erreur de cet Auteur ne vient que de ce qu'il a poussé les suites de la doctrine, qui oste la force et l'action aux creatures.
[5] To say something on the articles of Mr Bayle I have just mentioned, whose subject has much connection with this matter: it seems that the reason for the permission of evil comes from the eternal possibilities, according to which this kind of Universe, which admits it and which has been admitted to actual existence, proves to be the most perfect on the whole among all possible ways. But people go astray in trying to show in detail, with the Stoics, that usefulness of evil which sets off the good, which St Augustine rightly recognized in general and which, so to speak, makes one step back the better to leap; for can one enter into the infinite particulars of the universal Harmony? Yet if one had to choose between the two according to reason, I should rather be for the Origenist, and never for the Manichean. Nor does it seem to me that we must take action or force away from Creatures on the pretext that they would be creating if they produced modes. For it is God who conserves and continually creates their forces, that is, a source of modifications that is in the creature, or a state from which one may judge that there will be a change of modifications; because without this I find (as I said above that I have shown elsewhere) that God would produce nothing, and there would be no substances except his own, which would bring back upon us all the absurdities of the God of Spinoza. Indeed it seems that this Author's error comes only from his having pushed to their consequences the doctrine that takes force and action away from creatures.

Notes to text 91

  1. Imagination and understanding. "The difficulty is only in the imagination, not in the understanding" is Leibniz's standing rule against arguments from inconceivability; only a shown contradiction proves impossibility.
  2. The Thomists and separate intelligences. Aquinas held that each angel is its own species, since immaterial forms cannot be multiplied by matter (Summa theologiae I q.50 a.4). Leibniz had cited this in the Discours de métaphysique §9 for his identity of indiscernibles; here he declines the word "specific" because on his principle every individual would be its own species.
  3. Dom François Lamy. The Benedictine François Lamy (1636 to 1711) criticised the pre-established harmony in his De la connoissance de soi-même (second treatise, 1699 edition, as Bayle reports). Leibniz did answer the book, from the extract in the Journal des sçavans of September 1698, in the Addition à l'explication du système nouveau (GP IV 571 onward), which follows this piece in the queue; how its date fits his remark here that he had not yet seen Lamy's objections is to be checked.
  4. The learned man of the Leipzig Journal. Gerhardt's footnote (*) points to De ipsa natura sive de vi insita actionibusque creaturarum (Acta eruditorum, September 1698), Leibniz's answer to Johann Christoph Sturm's memoir of 1697. The reply of "May 1699" is taken here to be Sturm's; the identification of that reply is to be checked against the Acta.
  5. Bayle's philosophical articles. Pauliciens and Manichéens (the problem of evil and dualism), Origen (universal restoration), Pereira (Gómez Pereira's Antoniana Margarita, 1554, an early doctrine of animal automatism), Rorarius (animal souls), Spinoza and Zeno (the paradoxes of the continuum). These are the articles that later shaped the Théodicée (1710).
  6. Carneades, Foucher, Antaeus. Carneades was the great sceptic of the New Academy; Simon Foucher, Leibniz's correspondent and first critic of the Système nouveau (texts 77 to 79), styled himself a restorer of the Academic philosophy. Antaeus regained strength each time he was thrown to the earth, his mother.
  7. Omnia praecepi. Virgil, Aeneid VI.105, the Sibyl's answer to Aeneas: omnia praecepi atque animo mecum ante peregi ("I have foreseen all things and gone through them beforehand in my mind"); Leibniz drops ante.
  8. The best possible universe, in brief. Row [5] is an early compact statement of the Théodicée answer: evil is permitted because the universe that includes it is the most perfect on the whole among the eternal possibilities; one should not try, with the Stoics, to justify each evil in detail. Between Bayle's two foils Leibniz would rather be an Origenist (all things finally restored) than a Manichean (two principles).
  9. Force against Spinoza. Continual creation does not take force from creatures; it conserves in them a "source of modifications". Without such force there would be no substance but God, which is Spinoza's conclusion: Leibniz traces Spinoza's error to occasionalism pushed to its consequences, a judgment he repeats in De ipsa natura §8 and the Théodicée (the continual-creation sections).
  10. Translated from GP IV 565–568; Part 4 (text 92) begins "Je reconnois que le temps, l'étendue, le mouvement..." (GP IV 568).
This text in the whole · 1702, a year from which 727 pieces are catalogued166316901716