Editor’s note
The first of Gerhardt's "Leibniz against Descartes" pieces, a Latin letter without heading which Gerhardt identifies as addressed to Gerhard Wolter Molanus, abbot of Loccum. Prompted by news of Arnold Eckhard, professor at Rinteln and a Cartesian, Leibniz weighs Descartes: first-rate in natural philosophy, weak on the eternal truths, the idea of God and moral certainty, and outdone in mathematics by the new "Archimedean" geometry. He gives his series for the arc of a circle (the Leibniz series for π/4) and claims a general method for solving equations of any degree. The OCR of the formulas is badly damaged; they are reconstructed from the sense and marked.
Original (GP IV 274–280)
English
1
Quae de Domino Eccardo Professore Rintelensi narrasti, mirifice me delectavere. Gaudeo enim habere nos in vicinia virum cui satis otii, voluntatis atque ingenii sit ad recte philosophandum. Quare, licet per se currentem, tua tamen autoritate et nostris applausibus animandum censeo, ut in tam praeclaro instituto pergat. Cum enim Mathematicarum scientiarum non perfunctoriam notitiam habere, et inprimis in parte generali quam analysin aliqui vocant egregie versatum intelligam, spes est earum exemplo in caeteris quoque Philosophiae partibus aliquid quod nosse intersit, invenire aut demonstrare posse. Neque vero displicet, quod Cartesium prae caeteris probat: illud enim negari non potest demto ex veteribus Archimede, ex novis autoribus Galileo, nullum facile alium extare, qui tam praeclara ratiocinando invenerit. Fateor tamen multa me in Cartesio desiderare etiam post multiplices atque accuratas meditationes, neque de summa rerum cum eo, tametsi vellem, convenire posse. Neque enim admitto corporis naturam consistere in extensione sola, neque illam ejus periculosam admodum sententiam probo, quod materia omnes formas quarum capax est, successive suscipiat. Illud vero mihi videtur admodum incongrue dictum, quod divina voluntate factum sit ut triangulum habeat tres angulos duobus rectis aequales, aut ut circulus sit capacissima figura isoperimetrarum. Quasi Deus hoc velut privilegium circulo dederit, quod potuisset in quadratum transferre. Quae satis certe arguunt autorem nostrum in veritatis intimas rationes non penetrasse. Intelligere autem mihi videor, quo argumento ad haec inductus sit. Statuerat ille veritatis criterium: claram distinctamque perceptionem nostram. Itaque quod verum est, circulum esse capacissimam figurarum ejusdem ambitus, non aliunde agnosci potest, quam quod hanc ejus esse proprietatem clare distincteque percipimus. Quod si jam DEUS ita finxisset naturam nostram, ut contrarium a nobis clare distincteque perciperetur, contrarium fuisset verum. Haec ille, quae minime probo; sed nec Metaphysicum ejus principium universim verum est, quod eorum omnium de quibus cogitamus atque ratiocinamur, necessario in nobis sit idea, exempli causa, figurae mille laterum, aut entis perfectissimi: quo ille velut Achilleo clypeo munitus omnes illos qui de ejus demonstrationibus existentiae divinae dubitavere, non sine supercilio sprevit. Eodem profecto argumento facile effecisset, impossibilium quoque in nobis esse Ideam, exempli causa, Motus celerrimi: quo in numero etiam ens perfectissimum esse dicent, qui ejus demonstrationibus resistere volent. Ego quidem scio, aliam hic longe esse Entis perfectissimi quam motus celerrimi rationem: Cartesii tamen ratiocinationes imperfectas esse arbitror, multaque alia de suo addere debere qui eas absolvere velit.
What you told me about Mr Eckhard, professor at Rinteln, delighted me greatly. I am glad to have near us a man with enough leisure, will and talent to philosophise rightly. So, although he is running well on his own, I think he should be encouraged by your authority and our applause to go on with so fine an undertaking. Since I understand he has no superficial knowledge of the mathematical sciences, and is especially well versed in the general part that some call analysis, there is hope that following their example he may find or demonstrate something worth knowing in the other parts of philosophy too. Nor am I displeased that he approves of Descartes above the rest; for it cannot be denied that, apart from Archimedes among the ancients and Galileo among the moderns, there is hardly anyone else who has found such fine things by reasoning. I confess, though, that even after many careful meditations I find much lacking in Descartes, and cannot agree with him on the sum of things, much as I should like to. I do not admit that the nature of body consists in extension alone, nor do I approve that very dangerous opinion of his that matter successively takes on all the forms of which it is capable. And it seems to me most unfittingly said that it was by the divine will that a triangle has three angles equal to two right angles, or that the circle is the most capacious of figures with equal perimeter: as if God had given the circle this privilege, which he could have transferred to the square. This surely shows clearly enough that our author did not penetrate the inmost reasons of truth. I think I understand the argument that led him to it. He had laid down as the criterion of truth our clear and distinct perception. So the truth that the circle is the most capacious of figures of the same circumference can be recognised only from our clearly and distinctly perceiving that this is its property; and if God had so made our nature that we perceived the contrary clearly and distinctly, the contrary would have been true. So he says, and I do not approve it at all. Nor is his metaphysical principle universally true, that we necessarily have an idea of everything we think and reason about, for example of a figure of a thousand sides, or of the most perfect being. Armed with this as with the shield of Achilles, he scorned with some disdain all those who doubted his demonstrations of the divine existence. By the same argument he could easily have shown that we have an idea even of impossible things, for example of the swiftest motion, among which those who wish to resist his demonstrations will say the most perfect being is also to be counted. I know, of course, that the case of the most perfect being is very different from that of the swiftest motion; but I think Descartes's reasonings are imperfect, and that whoever wishes to complete them must add much of his own.
2
De re morali praeclare admodum scripsisse judico, revocatis atque explanatis Epicteti et veterum aliorum sententiis. Nititur tota res distinctione eorum quae sunt in nobis, et quae in nostra potestate non sunt: nam si ea solum desideraverimus quae penes nos sunt, nunquam successu frustrati dolebimus. Ut autem alia non nisi leviter expetamus, partim meditatione partim assuetudine efficietur. Est tamen in illis difficultas, nam hic pro certo sumitur, actiones saltem mentis in nostra esse potestate, quod tamen non usque adeo liquidum est, potest enim venenum et canis rabidi morsus et casus gravis et morbus omnem animi statum ita immutare, ut homo ex forti et sapiente meticulosus et querulus, imo furiosus et ut verbo dicam ex beato miser fiat. Quare tametsi concedam, crebra exercitatione hominem efficere posse, ut contentus sit in praesens, illud tamen efficere non potest philosophia ista, ut de futuro securi simus. Quod vero Cartesianae vel si mavis Stoicae philosophiae (nam in re morali eadem est) adimo, illud non ideo omni philosophiae denego: puto enim rationes superesse sublimiores, neque ideo minus certas, quibus ni fallor solis effici potest, ne tranquillitas nostra ullo in futurum metu solicitetur.
On moral matters I judge that he wrote very finely, recalling and explaining the sayings of Epictetus and other ancients. The whole thing rests on the distinction between what is within us and what is not in our power: if we desire only what is in our own hands, we shall never grieve at being disappointed of success; and that we should seek other things only lightly can be brought about partly by meditation and partly by habit. There is a difficulty here, however, for it is taken as certain that at least the actions of the mind are in our power, which is not so very clear. Poison, the bite of a mad dog, a bad fall or a disease can so change the whole state of the mind that a man who was brave and wise becomes timid and querulous, even raving, and, in a word, from happy becomes wretched. So, although I grant that by frequent practice a man can make himself content for the present, this philosophy cannot make us secure about the future. But what I deny to the Cartesian, or if you prefer the Stoic, philosophy (for in morals they are the same) I do not therefore deny to all philosophy. I think there remain higher reasons, no less certain for that, by which alone, unless I am mistaken, it can be brought about that our tranquillity is not troubled by any fear for the future.
3
In naturali Philosophia Cartesius meritissimo jure triumphat, et ubi a Galileo abieris, non facile invenias qui ei non dicam praeferri sed comparari possit. Aliud enim longe est experimenta invenire, quod saepius casu quam ratione fit, aliud est abditas rerum causas eruere. Quanquam autem non diffitear, pauca admodum a Cartesio in physicis allata esse plane certa: assero tamen pleraque esse ad miraculum usque ingeniosa. Ex quibus eminent explicationes Iridis et Magnetis. Vellem autem omnes ejus contemplationes Medicas atque Anatomicas haberemus, quarum publicationem acerba literis viri mors intercepit. Ego Parisiis vidi et legi libellum adversarium manu Cartesii scriptum, in quem nonnullas suas anatomicas observationes conjecerat, quarum aliquas excerpsi et amicis communicare possum. Vidi etiam libellum ejus, sed imperfectum de inquisitione veritatis, in quo omnes suas artes, si initiis credimus, explanare decreverat. Multa in eo praeclara pro more: sed quae tamen in ea me sententia confirmavere, in quam dudum veni, a vera Methodo atque ultima analysi Cartesium non parum abfuisse. Totam Hypothesin ejus physicam in summa probare non possum. Prorsus enim a ratione abit quod asserit de materia tota in partes aequales divisa, quarum unaquaeque circa suum centrum gyratur, qua in re Hugenium habeo assentientem, qui vir unus omnium exactissime de his rebus judicat, et quem saepe hortor, ut animadversiones scribat in Cartesium quas dare nobis posset excellentes. Circa leges quoque motus certum plane est Cartesium fuisse deceptum, et quidem modis multis et miris, quod tamen eo minus miror, quod nemo hactenus per omnia satisfecit; puto tamen rem plane in potestate esse. Dixi supra Cartesio defuisse Methodum perfectam atque Analysin veram, nunc addo ingenium illi fuisse aptum inventionibus, sed causarum atque rationum, non vero machinarum atque stratagematum vitae utilium. Nimirum sunt quidam velut limites ingeniorum, neque uni unquam omnia Deus dedit. Nam si exempli causa Cartesius Cardani copiam aut Cardanus Cartesii soliditatem habuisset, profecto habuissemus quicquid ab homine ad scientias excolendas expectari potest. Machina quam Cartesius dedit poliendis vitris Hyperbolicis, non est omnium optima: sed et de tota re Huddenii qui omnium exactissime ista scrutatus est, sententia est posse sphaericis praestari, quicquid in praxi ab Hyperbolicis sperari potest, idque se demonstrasse mihi dixit. Est tamen Huddenius magnus Cartesii aestimator.
In natural philosophy Descartes triumphs by the fullest right, and once you leave Galileo you will not easily find anyone who can be, I will not say preferred, but compared to him. For it is one thing to find experiments, which happens more often by chance than by reason, and quite another to dig out the hidden causes of things. Although I do not deny that very little of what Descartes put forward in physics is entirely certain, I maintain that most of it is ingenious to the point of the miraculous, above all his explanations of the rainbow and of the magnet. I wish we had all his medical and anatomical studies, whose publication was cut off by the man's death, a bitter loss to learning. In Paris I saw and read a notebook written in Descartes's hand, into which he had put some of his anatomical observations; I made extracts from some of them and can share them with friends. I also saw his unfinished little work on the search for truth, in which, if we believe its beginning, he had resolved to explain all his methods. There are many fine things in it, as usual; but they confirmed me in the opinion I had long held, that Descartes was some distance from the true method and the ultimate analysis. I cannot approve his physical hypothesis as a whole. It is wholly contrary to reason, what he asserts about all matter being divided into equal parts, each of which turns about its own centre; and here I have Huygens agreeing with me, who judges these things more exactly than anyone, and whom I often urge to write remarks on Descartes, which he could give us excellently. On the laws of motion too it is quite certain that Descartes was deceived, in many and strange ways, which surprises me the less as no one has yet given full satisfaction on them; but I think the matter is entirely within our reach. I said above that Descartes lacked the perfect method and true analysis; I now add that he had a talent for invention, but of causes and reasons, not of machines and devices useful to life. There are, it seems, certain limits to talents, and God has never given everything to one man. If, for example, Descartes had had Cardano's abundance, or Cardano Descartes's solidity, we should surely have had whatever can be expected from a man for the cultivation of the sciences. The machine Descartes gave for polishing hyperbolic lenses is not the best of all; and on the whole matter Hudde, who has examined these things more exactly than anyone, is of the opinion that everything that can be hoped from hyperbolic lenses in practice can be achieved with spherical ones, and he told me he had demonstrated it. Yet Hudde is a great admirer of Descartes.
4
Caeterum ne Cartesio a me sine ratione veram atque ultimam analysin adimi putes, Geometriam ejus in exemplum citabo, qua ille merito maxime gloriabatur. Ait enim alicubi, Methodi suae praestantiam in physicis atque metaphysicis probabilem reddi, in Geometria autem omnino demonstrari. At nos hodie, temporum fateor beneficio, tantum certe Cartesium supergressi sumus, quantum ille Apollonium: neque ea tantum habemus quae ex Cartesii traditis ducuntur, sed longe alia ad quae ex ejus inventis nullus patebat aditus. Cartesius meo judicio partem tantum excoluit Geometriae eamque admodum arctam, quae scilicet illa problemata spectat in quibus non nisi rectarum longitudines dantur atque quaeruntur. Haec Geometria a me vocatur Apolloniana: tantum enim ad altiores gradus promovere docuit Cartesius, quae in inferioribus praestitit Apollonius, ostendendo quomodo curvarum aptarum seu locorum descriptione solvi possint haec problemata. At Geometria in qua curvilineorum magnitudines dantur aut quaeruntur, alterius plane generis est, ego eam vocare soleo Archimedeam. Eam enim solus veterum intellexit Archimedes, reliqui omnes, Apollonius, Pappus, Theodosius aliique, ne unicum quidem ejus specimen memorabile edidere. Artium Archimedearum partem aliquam tantum sed exiguam resuscitavit Cavalerius, aliam Guldinus, aliam Gregorius a S. Vincentio. Nemo enim totam ejus vim hactenus animo complexus est. Nunc si dicendum quod res est, habemus ad quae Archimedes ipse aspirare non fuisset ausus. Cartesius vero hoc argumentum non satis attigit quantum ex ejus scriptis judicari possit. Imo asserere ausus est lineam curvam non posse in rectam Geometrice commutari, quod postea felicitas seculi refutavit. Praeclara profecto sunt quae a Cartesii excessu Wallisius, Heuratius, Hugenius, Mercator aliique dedere aliis plane artibus quam quas Cartesius fuisset suspicatus.
But so that you do not think I deny Descartes the true and ultimate analysis without reason, I shall cite as an example his geometry, in which he most justly gloried. For he says somewhere that the excellence of his method is made probable in physics and metaphysics, but is fully demonstrated in geometry. Yet today, thanks, I admit, to the times, we have certainly gone as far beyond Descartes as he went beyond Apollonius; and we have not only what can be derived from what Descartes handed down, but much else to which his discoveries gave no access. In my judgement Descartes cultivated only a part of geometry, and a very narrow one: the part concerned with problems in which only the lengths of straight lines are given and sought. I call this geometry Apollonian, for Descartes taught how to carry to higher degrees what Apollonius had done in the lower ones, by showing how these problems can be solved by describing suitable curves, or loci. But the geometry in which the magnitudes of curvilinear figures are given or sought is of an entirely different kind; I usually call it Archimedean. Of the ancients only Archimedes understood it; all the others, Apollonius, Pappus, Theodosius and the rest, published not a single memorable specimen of it. Of the Archimedean arts Cavalieri revived some part, but a small one, Guldin another, Gregory of St Vincent another; no one has yet grasped its whole power. Now, to tell the truth, we have things to which Archimedes himself would not have dared aspire. Descartes, as far as one can judge from his writings, did not touch this subject enough. Indeed he dared to assert that a curved line cannot be geometrically converted into a straight one, which the good fortune of the age has since refuted. Truly splendid are the things that, since Descartes's death, Wallis, Heuraet, Huygens, Mercator and others have produced by arts quite different from any Descartes would have suspected.
Original (GP IV 277–280, continued)
English
5
Inter caetera eminet mea sententia inventum serierum infinitarum, quod pro Hyperbola ab Huddenio atque Mercatore aptatum, ego ad circulum feliciter transtuli. Est enim illa serierum infinitarum Methodus tam generalis ut ejus ope quantitatis incognitae omnis valor exprimi possit analytice, pure, rationaliter, per formulam tamen infinitam, quanquam ejus Methodi generalitas forte paucis nota sit. Exemplo me explicabo. Sit centro R descriptus circulus, cujus radius AR sit unitas sive 1, tangens vero AT ipsius arcus circuli AC sit t, quae tamen non sit radio major, ajo ipsius arcus AC valorem analyticum, purum, rationalem, sed infinitum esse hunc: arc. aequal. t/1 − t³/3 + t⁵/5 − t⁷/7 + t⁹/9 etc. [reconstructed] Valor iste est exacte verus si totam seriem infinitam consideres, et eatenus mentem illustrat; parte autem sumta ad usum idem mirifice aptus est; pone exempli causa AT esse quintam partem radii AR seu unitatis, sive ipsam t esse 1/5, erit arcus aequal. 1/5 − 1/375 + 1/15625 etc. [reconstructed] ac proinde si duobus tantum hoc casu prioribus seriei terminis utare, habebis sufficienter ad usum valorem talis arcus, nempe si ponatur esse arcus ille 1/5 − 1/375 seu 74/375, erit quidem minor vero, sed error non erit 1/15625 radii: quo autem pluribus terminis utere, hoc propius accedes. Si AT ponatur aequalis radio AR, id est si arcus AC sit semiquadrans, tunc erit arcus aequ. 1/1 − 1/3 + 1/5 − 1/7 + 1/9 etc. Unde sequitur illud mirum, circulum esse ad quadratum circumscriptum, ut series ista 1/1 − 1/3 + 1/5 − 1/7 + 1/9 − 1/11 etc. est ad unitatem, quae quidem series ita uti hic jacet non est apta ad appropinquationem promtam (alias enim habemus longe velociores etiam in infinitum continuabiles), verum ad veram proportionem circuli ad quadratum, aut quadrantis ad diametrum, mente complectendam, nescio an quicquam aptius vel simplicius fingi possit.
Among the rest, in my opinion, the discovery of infinite series stands out. Hudde and Mercator adapted it to the hyperbola, and I have successfully carried it over to the circle. This method of infinite series is so general that by it the value of any unknown quantity can be expressed analytically, purely and rationally, though by an infinite formula; though perhaps few know how general the method is. I shall explain myself by an example. Let a circle be described with centre R, its radius AR being unity, or 1, and let the tangent AT of the arc AC of the circle be t, not greater than the radius. I say that the analytic, pure, rational, but infinite value of the arc AC is this: arc = t/1 − t³/3 + t⁵/5 − t⁷/7 + t⁹/9 etc. This value is exactly true if you consider the whole infinite series, and in that respect it enlightens the mind; and a part of it, taken for use, is wonderfully suited to practice. Suppose, for example, that AT is a fifth of the radius AR, or unity, that is, t is 1/5: the arc will equal 1/5 − 1/375 + 1/15625 etc. So if in this case you use only the first two terms of the series, you will have a value of the arc good enough for use: if the arc is taken to be 1/5 − 1/375, or 74/375, it will be less than the true value, but the error will not be 1/15625 of the radius; and the more terms you use, the closer you will come. If AT is taken equal to the radius AR, that is, if the arc AC is half a quadrant, then the arc will equal 1/1 − 1/3 + 1/5 − 1/7 + 1/9 etc. From this follows the remarkable result that the circle is to the circumscribed square as the series 1/1 − 1/3 + 1/5 − 1/7 + 1/9 − 1/11 etc. is to unity. As it stands, this series is not suited to quick approximation (we have others, far faster, which can also be continued to infinity); but for grasping in the mind the true proportion of the circle to the square, or of the quadrant to the diameter, I do not know whether anything more fitting or simpler could be devised.
6
Magni momenti sunt hae expressiones per series infinitas, nam in eo differunt ab appropinquationibus, quod series aliquod theorema nobis exhibent valoris exacti, et simul ac semel appropinquationes praebent infinitas sine novo calculo, cum aliae appropinquationes quales sunt Ludolphinae, non nisi novo calculo longius produci possint. Atque hac arte quantitates illae quas Cartesius a sua Geometria exclusit, analytice tractari possunt: et efficere possumus, quod antea nemo, ut problemata trigonometrica aliquis sine instrumentis atque tabulis sinuum in casu quolibet oblato solvere possit modico admodum calculi labore, cum antea opus fuerit Tabulas integras ordine calculare ad unicum aliquod oblatum exemplum Trigonometricum solvendum. Nunc vero ope aequationis superioris infinitae vel ubi libet finitae valorem arcus dati exprimentis facile possumus in Triangulo ex datis lateribus invenire angulos, imo et contra, idque sine ullis Tabulis. Quod magni usus erit itinera suscipientibus qui libros et instrumenta perdere possunt, sed regulam usque adeo simplicem non facile obliviscentur. Ea autem ad observationes atque trigonometricas operationes in media barbarie sufficit sine ulla librorum ope. Eadem Methodo possunt omnes lineae curvae mensurari, et omnia spatia quadrari, et omnia solida et superficies et centra gravitatum atque agitationum inveniri, aliaque innumera praestari quae alioqui vix in potestate esse videntur.
These expressions by infinite series are of great importance. They differ from approximations in that a series shows us a theorem of the exact value, and at the same time gives infinitely many approximations at once without new calculation, whereas other approximations, such as Ludolph's, can be carried further only by new calculation. By this art the quantities Descartes excluded from his geometry can be treated analytically; and we can bring about what no one could before, that anyone can solve trigonometric problems in any given case without instruments or tables of sines, with quite moderate labour of calculation, whereas formerly whole tables had to be calculated in order to solve a single given trigonometric example. Now, by means of the infinite equation above, or a finite one where you like, expressing the value of a given arc, we can easily find the angles of a triangle from its given sides, and conversely, without any tables. This will be of great use to travellers, who may lose their books and instruments but will not easily forget so simple a rule; and it suffices for observations and trigonometric operations in the midst of barbarous lands without the help of any books. By the same method all curved lines can be measured, all areas squared, all solids and surfaces and centres of gravity and of oscillation found, and countless other things done that otherwise seem hardly within our power.
7
Fateor tamen non id esse ultimum quod in Analysi optamus, perfecti enim incognitarum quantitatum valores consistunt in quadam finita expressione, quando ea haberi potest, aut quando non potest, demonstratione impossibilitatis. Et quidem semper illa haberi potest, quando problemata redeunt ad aequationem communi more expressam, gradus licet cujuscunque. Primus quidam Arabs, quem Mahometem vocant, invenit aequationis generalis secundi gradus x² + px + q = 0 (quam Vietae et Cartesii more facilitatis causa exprimo) radicem x habere valorem −½p ± √(¼p² − q) [reconstructed]. Primus Scipio Ferreus invenit aequationis generalis tertii gradus (cujus secundus terminus est sublatus) nempe x³ + px + q = 0 radicem x valere ∛(−½q + √(¼q² + p³/27)) + ∛(−½q − √(¼q² + p³/27)) [reconstructed]. Primus Ludovicus Ferrarius, Cardani aequalis, invenit resolutionem aequationis quadrato-quadraticae interventu aequationis cubicae, unde etiam radix ejus generali ejusmodi formula exprimi posset. His inventis mea sententia vere analyticis (quoniam valorem incognitae pure et absolute exhibent) nihil a Vieta aut Cartesio adjectum est, quod ad hanc quidem rem pertineat: quin imo cum de progressu ad altiora et de analytica extractione radicum ex aequationibus desperassent, studium alio flexere. Vieta inventum dedit sane pulcherrimum extrahendi radices quantumlibet veris propinquas in numeris; at Cartesius eas construxit in lineis, itaque cum unus Arithmeticam, alter Geometricam solutionem dedisset, vere analyticam quae caeteras virtute continet, ambo declinavere. Hodie loco extractionis Vietaeae in numeris habemus longe commodiorem per series infinitas, et loco constructionum Cartesianarum per varias lineas curvas, inventum habeo instrumentum unicum, quod multiplicatis pro re nata partibus omnes aequationes construit. Itaque etiam in his duobus longe et Vietam et Cartesium hodie supergressi sumus.
I admit, however, that this is not the ultimate thing we wish for in analysis. The perfect values of unknown quantities consist in some finite expression, when one can be had, or, when it cannot, in a demonstration of impossibility. And one can always be had when problems come down to an equation expressed in the usual way, of whatever degree. A certain Arab whom they call Mahomet first found that the root x of the general equation of the second degree, x² + px + q = 0 (which I write in the manner of Viète and Descartes for convenience), has the value −½p ± √(¼p² − q). Scipione del Ferro first found that the root x of the general equation of the third degree (with its second term removed), namely x³ + px + q = 0, is ∛(−½q + √(¼q² + p³/27)) + ∛(−½q − √(¼q² + p³/27)). Lodovico Ferrari, Cardano's contemporary, first found the solution of the biquadratic equation by means of a cubic equation, so that its root too could be expressed by a general formula of this kind. To these discoveries, truly analytic in my opinion (since they show the value of the unknown purely and absolutely), nothing was added by Viète or Descartes that bears on this matter; on the contrary, having despaired of progress to higher degrees and of the analytic extraction of roots from equations, they turned their efforts elsewhere. Viète gave a very fine method of extracting roots in numbers as close to the true ones as you like; Descartes constructed them in lines. So, one having given an arithmetical solution and the other a geometrical one, both avoided the truly analytic solution, which contains the others in its power. Today, instead of Viète's extraction in numbers we have a far more convenient one by infinite series; and instead of the Cartesian constructions by various curves, I have devised a single instrument which, by multiplying its parts as needed, constructs all equations. So in these two respects too we have today gone far beyond both Viète and Descartes.
8
Analyticam vero aequationum omnium extractionem non Cartesio tantum, sed et hodie maximis viris prope desperatam videor mihi non ita pridem feliciter assecutus, Methodum scilicet cujus ope valor radicis incognitae cujusque aequationis generali (pro gradu suo) formula exprimi potest, quemadmodum Scipio Ferreus in cubica fecit, quanquam in altioribus (ex. gr. quinto gradu) tantum absint hactenus a formula generali, ut ne unam quidem dederint particularem: demonstrationem methodi habeo, specimen vero in quinto gradu (quem hactenus omnes frustra attentavere) dabo ubi otium erit. Equidem certum est, vix quicquam in tota Analysi suscipi posse difficilius, et Methodus mea catena tam longe producta constat, ut satis appareat non me in illam obiter incidisse. Continetur vero in ea totius Algebrae (Algebram enim voco proprie aequationum resolutionem per se consideratam sine respectu ad numeros et lineas) perfectio; ubi enim semel omnium aequationum radices habebuntur, habebuntur omnium problematum ad aequationes revocabilium solutiones. Sed me arctissimum quod superest chartae spatium admonet non opinatae prolixitatis. Finiam igitur ubi te rogavero, ut doctissimum Eccardum a me salutes, atque etiam si ita videtur, haec cum eo communices. Equidem et colloquium viri et cum eo commercium mihi gratissimum erit. Vale faveque.
The analytic extraction of all equations, which not only Descartes but the greatest men today have almost despaired of, I think I have recently achieved: a method, namely, by which the value of the unknown root of any equation can be expressed by a general formula (for its degree), as Scipione del Ferro did for the cubic. In the higher degrees (for example the fifth) they are so far from a general formula that they have not given even a single particular one. I have the demonstration of the method, and I shall give a specimen in the fifth degree (which everyone has so far attempted in vain) when I have leisure. Certainly hardly anything harder can be undertaken in the whole of analysis, and my method consists of a chain drawn out so long that it is clear enough I did not stumble on it by chance. In it is contained the perfection of the whole of algebra (for I call algebra, properly, the solving of equations considered in itself, without regard to numbers and lines); for once the roots of all equations are had, the solutions of all problems reducible to equations will be had. But the very narrow space left on the paper warns me of an unexpected length. I shall finish, then, after asking you to greet the most learned Eckhard for me and, if you think fit, to share this with him. Conversation with the man and correspondence with him would be most welcome to me. Farewell, and keep me in your favour.
Notes to text 116
- Gerhardt's table of contents describes this piece as "without heading, containing a letter to Molanus". Gerhard Wolter Molanus (1633–1722), abbot of Loccum, was Leibniz's partner in the church-reunion negotiations. Arnold Eckhard, professor at Rinteln, corresponded with Leibniz in 1677 on Descartes's proof of God. The letter is undated; the reference to Eckhard and to the arithmetical quadrature as recent suggests about 1677–1679 [?].
- Descartes's "dangerous opinion" that matter takes on successively all the forms it can: Principia III.47. The creation of the eternal truths by God's will: letters to Mersenne of April–May 1630.
- Descartes's anatomical notebook seen in Paris, and the unfinished dialogue La recherche de la vérité par la lumière naturelle, which Leibniz saw and copied in Paris in 1676 (the copy survives at Hanover). Gerhardt notes that the anatomical excerpts were still among Leibniz's papers.
- The series t − t³/3 + t⁵/5 − … for the arc with tangent t, and its special case π/4 = 1 − 1/3 + 1/5 − 1/7 + …, is Leibniz's arithmetical quadrature of the circle (1673–1674), published in the Acta Eruditorum in 1682. The series had been found earlier by Madhava's school in Kerala and by James Gregory (1671), which Leibniz did not know. Gerhardt notes that in the original a comma marks multiplication in the denominators.
- All formulas in this text are reconstructed from the sense, because the OCR renders them unreadably; the arithmetic (1/5 − 1/375 = 74/375, error below 1/15625) is Leibniz's and checks.
- "Mahomet": al-Khwārizmī (ninth century). Scipione del Ferro solved the depressed cubic about 1515; the formula became known through Cardano's Ars magna (1545), which also published Ferrari's solution of the quartic.
- Leibniz's claim of a general method for solving equations of any degree, including the fifth, was never made good. Abel (1824) and Galois later showed that no general solution by radicals exists for degree five and above.
- Heuraet (Hendrik van Heuraet) rectified the semicubical parabola in 1659, refuting Descartes's claim (Géométrie II) that curved lines cannot be exactly compared with straight ones.