Translations · Text 123 · 1111011

On Schweling's reply to Huet's Censure of the Cartesian philosophy (c. 1690–1691)

Reference
GP IV 325–332
Date
c. 1690
Original
Latin
Earlier English
this is a new translation (report tab 2)
MetaphysicsTheology
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Editor’s note

Gerhardt's no. VIII: a letter to an unnamed correspondent who had sent Leibniz Johann Eberhard Schweling's answer to Pierre-Daniel Huet's Censura philosophiae Cartesianae (1689), followed by a revised version that Leibniz labelled "Ad Suelingii responsionem Censurae Huetii oppositam". Page references are to Schweling's book. Doubtful OCR readings ("p. 434", "p. 91", "pp. 100 and 101", εὕρημα, ἀσυμπτώτων) were checked against the page images of the BSB copy.

Original (Latin)
English
1
Gratias ago quod Viri doctissimi, Joh. Eberh. Swelingii, mihi olim libello de animi immortalitate cogniti, Responsionem ad Reverendissimi Episcopi Suessionensis Censuram in Cartesianos strictam transmisisti. Et agnosco, etsi multa in sectam sectaeque studium a Censore dicta sint pulcherrime justissimeque, alicubi tamen relictum Cartesianis defendendi sui locum, illis praesertim qui lectionem veterum et elegantiores literas aestimare didicerunt, et vel sola inficiatione tueri sese possunt.
Thank you for sending me the Response of the very learned Johann Eberhard Schweling, whom I came to know long ago through his little book on the immortality of the soul, to the Censure drawn against the Cartesians by the Most Reverend Bishop of Soissons. And I grant that, although many things were said by the Censor most finely and justly against the sect and sectarian zeal, here and there room has nevertheless been left for the Cartesians to defend themselves: above all for those who have learned to value the reading of the ancients and polite letters, and who can protect themselves by simple denial.
2
Nam Huetium nihil magis ad scribendum excitasse videtur quam multorum in Galliis hominum sciolorum in summa ignorantia temeritas incredibilis, cujus ego ipse testis esse possum. Vidi enim non paucos, ubi globulos et materiam subtilem et particulas striatas et nescio quas alias nugas crepare, et aciditatem aculeis, lubricitatem anguillis, tenacitatem ramositatibus tribuere didicerunt, magnos sibi viros videri et linguarum studia, Historicorum diligentiam, Astronomorum observationes, Chemicorum experimenta contemnere. Et cum nihil ipsi praestare possint alicujus momenti, tamen nescio quam Methodum vel Analysin suam jactare.
For nothing seems to have spurred Huet to write more than the incredible rashness, joined to the deepest ignorance, of many smatterers in France, to which I can myself bear witness. I have seen not a few who, once they had learned to rattle on about globules, subtle matter, striated particles and I know not what other trifles, and to ascribe acidity to little spikes, slipperiness to eels and tenacity to branchings, thought themselves great men and despised the study of languages, the diligence of historians, the observations of astronomers and the experiments of chemists. And though they themselves can achieve nothing of any moment, they boast of some Method or Analysis of their own.
3
Ab his longissime abesse Suelingium satis apparet, vix enim credere potest, extare alicubi terrarum homines, in quos haec jure dicere potuerit Huetius. In Aristotele summum ingenium magnamque doctrinam agnoscit; philosophiam quam vocamus practicam, mirifice ab eo exornatam fatetur, et si nihil aliud quam Organon suum reliquisset, in quo rationis aeternae leges traduntur, genus humanum ei plurimum debiturum judicat. In hujusmodi Cartesianos mitius haud dubie scripsisset celeberrimus philosophiae Cartesianae Censor.
It is plain enough that Schweling is very far from these people; indeed, he can hardly believe that there are men anywhere on earth of whom Huet could rightly have said such things. He acknowledges the highest genius and great learning in Aristotle; he grants that what we call practical philosophy was wonderfully adorned by him; and he judges that, had Aristotle left nothing but his Organon, in which the laws of eternal reason are handed down, mankind would owe him a very great deal. Against Cartesians of this kind the very celebrated Censor of the Cartesian philosophy would no doubt have written more mildly.
4
Cl.° Suelingio id propositum video, ut verbis abstineat quae Adversarium, virum magnum, offendere merito possint. Quod institutum plerumque tenuit, excidere tamen aliqua non cogitanti, quae mutata fuisse mallem vel ideo ut exteri intelligant, etiam in Germania viros eruditos scribere in alios posse gratiis non invitis, ut cum p. 384 egregium philosophum vocat qui manifesta ignoret et asylum ignorantiae amplexetur, et p. 380 rhetoricari ait ingenioque esse hyperbolico; p. 397 temerario judicio Geometriam Cartesii physicae praeferre, p. 430 nugari, p. 434 soloecismum logicum committere, et p. 449 in os Cartesii et Cartesianorum expuisse; qualia nemo liberaliter educatus praesens praesenti dicat.
I see that the distinguished Schweling has set himself to refrain from words that might justly offend his adversary, a great man. He has mostly kept to this, yet some things slipped out unawares which I would rather had been changed, if only so that foreigners may understand that in Germany too learned men can write against others with the Graces on their side: as when on p. 384 he calls him an "excellent philosopher" who is ignorant of the obvious and takes refuge in the asylum of ignorance; on p. 380 says he "rhetoricises" and has a hyperbolic cast of mind; on p. 397 that by a rash judgement he prefers Descartes's geometry to his physics; on p. 430 that he talks nonsense; on p. 434 that he commits a logical solecism; and on p. 449 that he has spat in the face of Descartes and the Cartesians. No one liberally educated would say such things to a man's face.
5
Ex carmine quodam operi praefixo video et Schotanum Huetio sese opposuisse, cujus liber nondum ad me pervenit. Meretur certe censura tanti viri ut plures ei respondeant, sed efficacissimum respondendi genus erit, audire monentem, inanem confidentiam deponere, ineptum et saepe in republica periculosum sectae studium abjicere, praeclara veterum recentiorumque inventa Cartesii meditationibus adjungere, Cartesium non transcribere tantum sed et imitari, et quod ille fecit, adjicere aliquid ad humanas opes et longius proferre gradum, cum tam multa agenda restent, ut quae vel Cartesius vel alii fecere, exigui admodum momenti hactenus videantur.
From a poem prefixed to the work I see that Schotanus too has opposed Huet; his book has not yet reached me. The censure of so great a man certainly deserves several answers. But the most effective kind of answer will be to listen to the one who gives the warning: to lay aside empty confidence; to cast off sectarian zeal, which is foolish and often dangerous to the commonwealth; to join the splendid discoveries of ancients and moderns to Descartes's meditations; not merely to transcribe Descartes but to imitate him, and, as he did, to add something to the resources of mankind and carry the step further. So much remains to be done that what Descartes or others have done seems so far of very little moment.
6
Sed Suelingiani libri initia nonnihil percurramus. Non intelligo, quomodo se in praefatione dicat nomine censoris abstinuisse, quod in titulo expressit, qui prae aliis omnibus libri partibus in oculos lectoris incurrere solet.
But let us run briefly through the opening of Schweling's book. I do not understand how he can say in his preface that he refrained from naming the censor, when he put the name in the title, which strikes the reader's eye before any other part of a book.
7
Quod ait p. 3 Cartesium in Meditationibus demonstrationes promisisse, verum est, sed cum ille post multas Mersenni flagitationes tandem in formam Geometricarum demonstrationum redigere sua conatus esset, profecto rem male admodum gessit, ostenditque nondum sibi compertum, quae sit vera demonstrandi ratio in rebus ab imaginatione remotis.
What he says on p. 3, that Descartes promised demonstrations in the Meditations, is true. But when, after many demands from Mersenne, he at last tried to cast his arguments in the form of geometrical demonstrations, he made a very poor job of it indeed, and showed that he had not yet found out what the true manner of demonstrating is in matters remote from the imagination.
8
Quae de summa Cartesii modestia habet p. 5, aliquam exceptionem patiuntur, constat ipsum et Robervallium apud Dn. de Cavendish mutuis sese contumeliis incessivisse, Epistolaeque ipsae viri insolitum quendam fastum et affectatum aliorum contemtum passim spirant, ut ex frivolis illis objectiunculis apparet, quibus gloriam Fermatii, quam suae dictaturae obstare sentiebat, imminuere sperabat. Et hoc Cartesii vitium non dissimulavit egregius Gallosius, cum in Gallico eruditorum Diario Tertium Cartesianarum Epistolarum Tomum recenseret.
What he has on p. 5 about Descartes's supreme modesty admits of some exception. It is well established that he and Roberval assailed each other with insults at Mr Cavendish's, and the letters themselves breathe everywhere an unusual haughtiness and an affected contempt for others. This appears from those frivolous little objections by which he hoped to diminish the glory of Fermat, which he felt stood in the way of his own dictatorship. The excellent Gallois did not conceal this fault of Descartes's when he reviewed the third volume of Descartes's letters in the French Journal des Savants.
9
De dubitatione Cartesiana non multum laboro, facileque Cl.° Suelingio p. 17 assentior, nihil aliud quam Aversionem quandam animi intelligi debere, durioribus autem verbis usum, ut animos lectorum novitate quadam excitaret. Videtur quidem eo inclinare (p. 15 et alibi) ut necessariam hanc dubia pro incertis rejiciendi Methodum putet, et huc usque a nemine demonstratum alium modum promovendi philosophiam. Sed ego caeremonias istas ad veritatem inveniendam non necessarias judico, et viam ni fallor meliorem innui in meditatione de veris falsisque ideis. Et quod ab eventu Cartesii consilium commendat, ego ab eventu reprehendendum censeo, nam video Cartesii discipulos ultra Magistri placita non profecisse, quod signum est veram ipsis Methodum deesse. Itaque tempus est ut excitentur e veterno et sibi dicant: pudet haec opprobria nobis / Et dici potuisse, et non potuisse refelli.
About Cartesian doubt I do not trouble myself much, and I readily agree with the distinguished Schweling (p. 17) that nothing more should be understood by it than a certain turning-away of the mind, and that Descartes used harsher words in order to rouse his readers with a kind of novelty. He does seem (p. 15 and elsewhere) inclined to think this method of rejecting doubtful things as uncertain necessary, and that no other way of advancing philosophy has so far been shown by anyone. But I judge those ceremonies unnecessary for finding truth, and, unless I am mistaken, I indicated a better way in the meditation on true and false ideas. And whereas he commends Descartes's plan by its outcome, I think it should be faulted by its outcome. For I see that Descartes's disciples have not got beyond their master's tenets, which is a sign that they lack the true method. So it is time they were roused from their torpor and said to themselves: "It shames us that these reproaches could be spoken, and could not be refuted."
10
Prima Experimenta nostra constat esse ipsas internas perceptiones, nempe non tantum me esse qui cogitem, sed et varietatem esse in meis cogitationibus (quae duo a se invicem independentia et aeque originaria judico) ab ipsis Scepticis est inculcatum, qui apparentias a se admitti fatebantur; itaque nullum hic εὕρημα (de quo p. 21) agnosco. Et illud: cogito ergo sum, quemadmodum et rejectionem omnium de quibus dubitare licet, inter phaleras ad populum numero. Scilicet callide Cartesius pilas quasdam plebejis ingeniis objicere voluit, quibus luderent. Atque interim magnum aliquid nacti sibi viderentur, ut pueri in nuce aut faba. Itaque vix a risu mihi temperare possum, cum video optimum virum p. 6 Divina consilia, Divinum facinus hic sibi videre videri. Sed justius a risu ad dolorem versus viros altioribus pares his crepundiis immorari inter publica damna censeo, mallemque Cartesium profectui ingeniorum quam ambitioni suae consuluisse.
That our first experiences are the inner perceptions themselves (namely, not only that I am who think, but also that there is variety in my thoughts, two facts I judge independent of each other and equally original) was urged by the Sceptics themselves, who confessed that they admitted appearances. So I recognise no discovery [εὕρημα] here (on which see p. 21). And I count I think, therefore I am, together with the rejection of everything that can be doubted, among the trappings for the crowd [cf. Persius 3.30]. Descartes, that is, cleverly chose to toss some balls to common minds to play with, while they meanwhile thought they had come upon something great, like boys with a nut or a bean. So I can hardly keep from laughing when I see the excellent man (p. 6) seem to himself to see here divine counsels, a divine deed. But turning, more justly, from laughter to grief, I count it among public losses that men equal to higher things linger over these rattles, and I could wish that Descartes had served the progress of minds rather than his own ambition.
11
Recte reprehensus est Cartesius, quod inter veritates quas initio rejiciendas censebat, etiam eas collocavit quarum oppositum contradictionem implicare constat. Nam ut experimenta interna sunt fundamentum omnium veritatum facti, ita principium contradictionis est principium omnium veritatum rationis, eoque sublato omnis tollitur ratiocinatio, neque quicquam vel de Deo vel de ulla alia re colligere licet. Itaque nihil fuit absurdius quam asserere mathematicas veritates non posse certo sciri nisi praecognito DEO, adeo ut aliqui qui Cartesii acumen norunt, nescio quid scaevi artificii hic suspicentur. Pudet me seculi profecto quod sibi talibus illudi patitur. Sed bene habet quod vindices non desunt, praestante Huetio et aliis, ne aliquando posteritati ineptiisse videamur.
Descartes has rightly been blamed for placing among the truths he thought should be rejected at the outset even those whose opposite is known to imply a contradiction. For as inner experiences are the foundation of all truths of fact, so the principle of contradiction is the principle of all truths of reason; take it away and all reasoning is taken away, and nothing can be inferred about God or about anything else. So nothing was more absurd than to assert that mathematical truths cannot be known with certainty unless God is known first, so much so that some who know Descartes's acuteness suspect some sinister artifice here. I am truly ashamed of an age that lets itself be mocked with such things. But it is well that champions are not lacking, Huet foremost among them, and others, so that posterity may not one day think we were fools.

Text 123, continued (GP IV 328–330)

Original (Latin)
English
12
Quod ait p. 55 Veritatis criterium nihil aliud esse quam visionem, id joco ut alii forte facerent lacessere nolo, quibus hoc videri posset principium eorum qui visionarii appellantur. Intelligit scilicet, quicquid conscientia nostra nobis evidens esse dictitat, id verum esse; sed ego puto hic conscientiam erroneam locum habere. Itaque principium illud toties decantatum: quicquid clare distincteque percipio, verum est, nobis parum prodest, quamdiu non satis exhibentur indicia clari et distincti. Cuilibet sua somnia admodum manifesta videntur. Veras notas alibi explicuimus. Malebranchius fassus est, nullam se habere ideam Mentis et Cogitationis, quam caeteri Cartesiani sibi habere videntur. De corporis quoque idea res multis minime confecta videtur. Si Euclides beneficio visionis atque evidentiae opinione contentus esse voluisset, multa assumsisset sine demonstratione, magna scientiae jactura, cujus ille naturam melius intellexit quam nonnullis videtur.
His saying on p. 55 that the criterion of truth is nothing other than vision, I will not tease with a joke, as others perhaps would, to whom this might look like the principle of those called visionaries. He means, of course, that whatever our consciousness keeps telling us is evident is true. But I think an erring conscience has its place here too. So that principle chanted so often, whatever I perceive clearly and distinctly is true, is of little use to us so long as the marks of the clear and distinct are not adequately set out. Everyone's own dreams seem perfectly manifest to him. We have explained the true marks elsewhere. Malebranche has confessed that he has no idea of mind and thought, which the other Cartesians believe they have. And of the idea of body too, many think the matter far from settled. Had Euclid been willing to be content with the benefit of vision and the opinion of evidence, he would have assumed many things without demonstration, to the great loss of science, whose nature he understood better than some think.
13
Quod ait p. 89 nihil claritatis vel nitoris esse in falso, miror. Ita sequeretur nunquam falsum habere veri speciem. Cartesianis omnibus et multis aliis et mihi ipsi olim evidens videbatur, eandem servari quantitatem motus, et corpore in corpus agente tantum uni motus accedere quantum alteri detrahitur, quod tamen falsum esse certa demonstratione comperi. Scilicet quantitatem motus cum quantitate virium confuderamus omnes. Plerique matheseos gnari, si quis ab eis concedi sibi postulet, lineam alteri lineae continue accedentem tandem ad eam pervenire, facile largientur postulatum, et mirabuntur etiam, si audiant esse qui dubitent de veritate tam evidenti. Contrarium tamen constat exemplo τῶν ἀσυμπτώτων.
I am surprised at his saying on p. 89 that there is no clarity or brightness in what is false. It would follow that the false never has the appearance of truth. To all the Cartesians and many others, and once to me myself, it seemed evident that the same quantity of motion is conserved, and that when body acts on body as much motion is added to the one as is taken from the other; yet I found by a certain demonstration that this is false. We had all, that is, confused quantity of motion with quantity of forces. Most people versed in mathematics, if asked to grant that a line continually approaching another line finally reaches it, will readily grant the postulate, and will even be amazed to hear that anyone doubts so evident a truth. Yet the contrary is established by the example of the asymptotes.
14
Miror etiam quod ait p. 91 clare et distincte percepisse Cartesium dari in materia particulas indefinitae parvitatis. Quasi possit quicquam esse indefinitum in rebus. Id certum est, omni parte materiae dari partem minorem; itaque nulla est parvitas ultima in natura, etsi parti cuique definita sit sua. Unumquodque aut nullos habet terminos aut definitos.
I am surprised too that he says on p. 91 that Descartes clearly and distinctly perceived that there are particles of indefinite smallness in matter. As if anything in things could be indefinite! This much is certain: for every part of matter there is a smaller part, so there is no ultimate smallness in nature, although each part has its own definite one. Each thing has either no bounds or definite ones.
15
P. 92 plane repugnat, inquit, Cartesium in doctrinis fundamentalibus erroris convinci posse. At convictus est erroris in doctrina de lumine, quam adeo fundamentalem ipse credebat, ut alicubi in Epistolis audacter dixerit, se totam suam philosophiam una litura delere velle, si error hic sibi monstrari posset.
On p. 92, he says, it is flatly impossible that Descartes should be convicted of error in his fundamental doctrines. But he has been convicted of error in his doctrine of light, which he himself thought so fundamental that he boldly said somewhere in his letters that he would wipe out his whole philosophy at a single stroke if an error could be shown him here.
16
P. 97 fatetur Cartesium noluisse negare contradictoria a DEO effici posse. At si DEus nos fallere non potest, utique nec contradictoria efficere potest, quid enim magis fallere est quam efficere ut aliquid quod esse evidens est, non sit; et quis est usus veritatis, si cum falsitate stare potest. Si quis alius haec portenta dixisset, omnes eum exploderent; nunc quia Cartesio exciderunt, misere se torquent viri alioqui docti ut defendant vel saltem excusent. Sapientius longe anteriores philosophi statuunt, quae contradictionem implicant, inania esse verba, nec ullius potentiae objecta.
On p. 97 he admits that Descartes would not deny that contradictories can be brought about by God. But if God cannot deceive us, he certainly cannot bring about contradictories either. For what is more deceiving than to make something that is evidently so not be so? And what use is truth if it can stand together with falsehood? Had anyone else uttered these monstrosities, everyone would hiss him off the stage. As it is, because they slipped from Descartes, men otherwise learned twist themselves wretchedly to defend or at least excuse them. Far more wisely, earlier philosophers held that what implies a contradiction is empty words and the object of no power.
17
Dum noster claram et distinctam perceptionem pro criterio veritatis venditat, ipse praeter opinionem cogente vi veritatis recurrere cogitur ad aliquid certius; provocat scilicet ad immediatam experientiam p. 98 fin. Immediata enim experientia, ut alibi notavimus, est primum principium veritatum facti, uti principium contradictionis est primum principium veritatum rationis, et ambo ita comparata sunt, ut illis non admissis cesset omnis ratio comprobandi veritatem. Immediatas autem experientias voco illas propositiones, quibus percipimus aliquid nobis apparere, ipsa vero claritas non est res immediatae experientiae, sed colligitur ex notis.
While our author peddles clear and distinct perception as the criterion of truth, he is himself compelled by the force of truth, against his own view, to fall back on something more certain: at the end of p. 98 he appeals to immediate experience. For immediate experience, as we have noted elsewhere, is the first principle of truths of fact, as the principle of contradiction is the first principle of truths of reason; and both are such that, if they are not admitted, every means of proving truth ceases. I call immediate experiences those propositions by which we perceive that something appears to us. But clarity itself is not a matter of immediate experience; it is inferred from marks.
18
Quatuor Cartesianae Methodi Regulae quas repetit p. 100 et 101, non video quid habeant Cartesio proprium. Et parum abest ut dicam similes praecepto Chemici nescio cujus: Sume quod debes et operare ut debes, et habebis quod optas. Nihil admitte nisi evidenter verum (seu nisi quod debes admittere), divide rem in partes quot requiruntur (id est quot facere debes), procede ordine (quo debes), enumera perfecte (seu quae debes), prorsus ut quidam inter praecepta ponunt, Bonum esse appetendum, Malum fugiendum; recte profecto, sed indicia boni malique desiderantur. Et tamen audet vir doctus petere p. 103 ut significetur sibi quid his regulis desit. At ego majori jure ab ipso peterem, ut significet nobis quid illis insit. Usque adeo vacuae mihi videntur.
The four rules of the Cartesian method, which he repeats on pp. 100 and 101: I do not see what in them is Descartes's own. I very nearly call them like the precept of some chemist or other: Take what you ought, work as you ought, and you will get what you wish. Admit nothing unless it is evidently true (that is, unless it is what you ought to admit); divide the matter into as many parts as are required (that is, as many as you ought to make); proceed in order (the order you ought); enumerate completely (that is, what you ought). It is exactly as when some put among their precepts that good is to be sought and evil shunned. Quite right, but the marks of good and evil are what is missing. And yet the learned man dares to ask (p. 103) to be told what these rules lack. With greater right I would ask him to tell us what they contain, so empty do they seem to me.
19
Sed consideremus paulo propius: Prima reducitur ad illam supra examinatam, quod clare distincteque percepta sint vera, de qua diximus satis superque ad p. 55 et seqq. Nempe claritatem seu evidentiam habere notas quae tradi debent, cum multos hic falli videamus. Altera de difficultate in partes secanda aptas ad eam minuendam, etiam parvi momenti est, quamdiu ars secandi, hoc est vera Analysis non est explicata. Nam qui juncturas non novit, is in secando potius laniat quam anatomen exercet; ita fit ut imperitus analyticus rem in partes minime convenientes resolvendo augeat sibi difficultatem quam minuere credit, ut illi experiuntur qui difficilia problemata in mathesi non recte aggrediuntur. Tertia, ut a simplicibus ordine progrediamur ad composita, proba est, sed cui non dictus Hylas? Verum ne hinc quidem multum proficietur sine artificiis a Cartesio non explicatis. Nam qui iter illud a simplicibus ad composita instituet, sine magnetica quadam directione, is diu per minuta vagabitur, et ob vitae brevitatem tarde admodum aliquid reconditum et tanto molimine dignum praestabit, ut plerisque contingere videmus. Quarta, ut nihil in enumerando omittatur, longe difficillima est et saepe inutilis, cum plerumque quaedam sufficiant quaesito indagando, id vero maxime artis est combinationes utiles ab inutilibus discernere, ne labor frustra in immensum augeatur.
But let us look a little closer. The first rule comes down to the one examined above, that what is clearly and distinctly perceived is true, about which we said more than enough at p. 55 and following: namely, that clarity or evidence has marks, which must be set out, since we see many deceived here. The second, on cutting a difficulty into parts suited to diminishing it, is also of little moment so long as the art of cutting, that is, true analysis, has not been explained. For one who does not know the joints mangles rather than dissects when he cuts; and so the unskilled analyst, by resolving the matter into quite unsuitable parts, increases the difficulty he believes he is reducing, as those find who tackle hard problems in mathematics the wrong way. The third, that we proceed in order from simple things to composite, is sound; but who has not sung of Hylas? Yet not much will come of it either without devices Descartes did not explain. Whoever sets out on that road from simple to composite without some magnetic guidance will wander long among small things and, life being short, will very slowly achieve anything recondite and worth so much toil, as we see happen to most. The fourth, that nothing be left out in enumerating, is by far the hardest and often useless, since usually a few things are enough to track down what is sought. It is above all a matter of art to tell useful combinations from useless ones, so that labour is not swollen beyond measure to no purpose.
20
Atque haec est jactata illa Methodus Cartesiana (ut creditur) quae pro thesauro exhibet carbones. Ego vero conabor Cartesianos, optimos doctissimosque Viros, ab errore liberare, quo passim irretitos video, eademque opera honori ipsius Cartesii, magni utique viri, consulere. Valde igitur falluntur Cartesiani, qui se Cartesii Methodum seu inveniendi artem in scriptis ejus tenere putant, cum ipse alicubi in Epistolis suppressam a se fateatur, nec Methodum sese, sed de methodo scribere, ac specimina tantum dare voluisse protestetur. Et nisi dixisset ille, res ipsa clamaret, neque enim alia causa est, cur tot viri ingenio et doctrina praestantes sed unius Magistri notionibus occupati, nihil alicujus momenti reperire potuerint. Et cum pulchra quaeque inventa nostri temporis quibusvis potius quam Cartesianis deberi videamus, profecto isti, si certam progrediendi rationem tenerent, minime sibi praeripi omnia paterentur. Etsi autem non putem Cartesii Methodum fuisse valde perfectam, uti res ipsa docet, cum videamus eum ad multa quae nunc in proclivi sunt, etiam quaesita magno studio, pervenire tamen non potuisse, non dubito tamen quin praeclara quaedam artificia habuerit, quae cum a sectatoribus ejus ignorari soleant, non mirum est, si interpretes potius magistri quam naturae agunt.
And this is that vaunted Cartesian method (as it is believed to be), which shows coals for treasure. For my part I shall try to free the Cartesians, most excellent and learned men, from the error in which I see them caught on every side, and by the same effort to serve the honour of Descartes himself, certainly a great man. The Cartesians are much mistaken, then, who think they hold Descartes's method, or art of discovery, in his writings. He himself admits somewhere in his letters that he suppressed it, and declares that he meant to write not the method but about the method, and to give only samples of it. And had he not said so, the thing itself would cry it aloud. For there is no other reason why so many men outstanding in mind and learning, but taken up with the notions of a single master, have been unable to find anything of moment. And since we see that all the fine discoveries of our time are owed to anyone rather than to the Cartesians, surely these men, if they held a sure way of advancing, would never let everything be snatched from them. Although I do not think Descartes's method was very perfect, as the facts show (for we see that he could not reach many things that are now easy, even when he sought them with great effort), I do not doubt that he had some splendid devices. Since his followers usually do not know them, it is no wonder that they act as interpreters of the master rather than of nature.

Text 123, revised version (GP IV 331–332). Gerhardt prints it "from a copy revised by Leibniz"; on the surviving original Leibniz wrote "Ad Suelingii responsionem Censurae Huetii oppositam" (On Schweling's response opposed to Huet's Censure). Paragraphs that repeat the first version almost word for word are given in full, with the changes noted.

Original (Latin)
English
21
Responsio ad celeberrimi Huetii censuram Cartesianae Philosophiae videtur scripta a Viro doctissimo et in Cartesii libris bene versato, sed nescio an aeque exercitato in veritate proprio Marte inquirenda.
The Response to the very celebrated Huet's censure of the Cartesian philosophy seems to have been written by a very learned man, well versed in Descartes's books, but I do not know whether he is equally practised in seeking the truth by his own efforts.
22
Principium illud toties decantatum: Quicquid clare distincteque percipio, verum est, nobis parum prodest, quamdiu non satis exhibentur criteria clari et distincti. Cuilibet sua somnia admodum manifesta videntur. Veras notas praxi aptas explicuimus aliquando in meditatione de veris falsisque ideis. Malebranchius fassus est, nullam se habere ideam distinctam Mentis et Cogitationis, quam caeteri Cartesiani sibi habere videntur. Alii dubitant an corporis ideam distinctam habeant.
That principle chanted so often, whatever I perceive clearly and distinctly is true, is of little use to us so long as the criteria of the clear and distinct are not adequately set out. Everyone's own dreams seem perfectly manifest to him. We once explained true marks, fit for practice, in the meditation on true and false ideas. Malebranche has confessed that he has no distinct idea of mind and thought, which the other Cartesians believe they have. Others doubt whether they have a distinct idea of body.
23
Praeceptum Cartesii de difficultate in partes secanda, aptas ad eam minuendam, etiam parvi momenti est, quamdiu ars secandi, hoc est vera Analysis non est explicata. Nam qui juncturas non novit, is in secando potius laniat, quam anatomen exercet. Ita fit, ut imperitus analyticus rem in partes minime convenientes resolvendo augeat sibi difficultatem, uti experiuntur qui difficilia problemata in Mathesi non recte aggrediuntur.
Descartes's precept on cutting a difficulty into parts suited to diminishing it is also of little moment so long as the art of cutting, that is, true analysis, has not been explained. For one who does not know the joints mangles rather than dissects when he cuts. So the unskilled analyst, by resolving the matter into quite unsuitable parts, increases his difficulty, as those find who tackle hard problems in mathematics the wrong way.
24
Tertium Cartesii praeceptum, ut a simplicibus progrediamur ad composita, probum est, sed cui non dictus Hylas? At ne sic quidem multum proficitur sine artificiis a Cartesio non explicatis. Nam qui iter illud a simplicibus ad composita instituet sine magnetica quadam directione, is diu per minuta vagabitur, et ob brevitatem vitae tarde admodum aliquid reconditum et tanto molimine dignum praestabit.
Descartes's third precept, that we proceed from simple things to composite, is sound; but who has not sung of Hylas? Even so, not much is gained without devices Descartes did not explain. Whoever sets out on that road from simple to composite without some magnetic guidance will wander long among small things and, life being short, will very slowly achieve anything recondite and worth so much toil.
25
Quartum praeceptum de perfecta enumeratione facienda et plerumque difficile et saepe inutile est, cum quaedam ad scopum sufficere soleant, itaque id potissimum artis est, combinationes utiles ab inutilibus secernere.
The fourth precept, on making a complete enumeration, is usually difficult and often useless, since a few things are commonly enough for the purpose; so the chief point of art is to separate useful combinations from useless ones.
26
Valde igitur falluntur Cartesiani qui putant se Cartesii Methodum seu inveniendi artem in ejus scriptis tenere, cum ipse alicubi in Epistolis sese eam suppressisse fateatur, nec Methodum suam, sed de sua Methodo scribere ac specimina ejus tantum exhibere voluisse protestetur. Licet autem non putem Cartesii Methodum inveniendi fuisse perfectam, uti res ipsa docet, cum videamus eum ad multa quae nunc in proclivi sunt, adhibito licet studio pervenire non potuisse, non dubito tamen quin praeclara quaedam artificia habuerit, quae cum a sectatoribus ejus ignorari soleant, non mirum est, si interpretes potius Magistri quam Naturae agunt.
The Cartesians are much mistaken, then, who think they hold Descartes's method, or art of discovery, in his writings, since he himself admits somewhere in his letters that he suppressed it, and declares that he meant to write not his method but about his method, and to show only samples of it. Although I do not think Descartes's method of discovery was perfect, as the facts show (for we see that he could not reach many things that are now easy, even when he applied himself to them), I do not doubt that he had some splendid devices. Since his followers usually do not know them, it is no wonder that they act as interpreters of the Master rather than of Nature.
27
Haec igitur non eo animo dico, quasi spernam Cartesii doctrinam aut Cartesianos, libenter enim fateor scientiam humanam progressus non contemnendos hujus viri opera fecisse, et Cartesianum (quoties inanis fiducia abest) aptiorem esse ad progrediendum ulterius, quam eum qui nil nisi Scholae placita novit; sed quod video plurimos ubi psittacos Cartesii agere didicerunt, nullo difficultatum superandarum experimento capto, sibi videri jam conscendisse Edita doctrina sapientum templa serena; quo nihil magis veris profectibus adversum et cum generis humani damno conjunctum est, dum praeclara ingenia (quae passim inter Cartesianos agnosco, nec Autorem responsionis in minimis habeo) a vero studiorum labore, quo augere possent scientias, ad frivolas repetitiones inanium placitorum traducuntur.
I do not say these things, then, as though I despised Descartes's doctrine or the Cartesians. I gladly admit that human knowledge made no contemptible progress through this man's work, and that a Cartesian (whenever empty confidence is absent) is better fitted to go further than one who knows nothing but the tenets of the School. I say them because I see very many who, once they have learned to play Descartes's parrots, without any trial of overcoming difficulties, think they have already climbed "the serene temples built high by the teaching of the wise." Nothing is more opposed to real progress or more bound up with harm to mankind, since splendid minds (which I recognise here and there among the Cartesians, and I do not count the author of the response among the least of them) are drawn away from the true labour of study, by which they could enlarge the sciences, to frivolous repetitions of empty tenets.
28
Quod Censuram Reverendissimi Episcopi Suessionensis attinet, multa merito admonuisse mihi videtur, non nego tamen alicubi relictum Cartesianis justae defensionis locum, sed efficacissimum respondendi genus erit, audire monentem, inanem sui opinionem deponere, ineptum et litigiis natum ac saepe in republica periculosum sectae studium abjicere, praeclara veterum recentiorumque inventa Cartesii meditationibus adjungere; Cartesium non transcribere tantum, sed et imitari, et (quod ille fecit) adjicere aliquid ad humanas opes, longiusque proferre gradum, cum tam multa agenda restent, ut quae Cartesius vel alii fecere, exigui admodum momenti hactenus videantur.
As for the Censure of the Most Reverend Bishop of Soissons, it seems to me to have rightly warned of many things. I do not deny, however, that here and there room for a just defence has been left to the Cartesians. But the most effective kind of answer will be to listen to the one who gives the warning: to lay aside an empty opinion of oneself; to cast off sectarian zeal, which is foolish, born for quarrels and often dangerous to the commonwealth; to join the splendid discoveries of ancients and moderns to Descartes's meditations; not merely to transcribe Descartes but to imitate him, and (as he did) to add something to the resources of mankind and carry the step further. So much remains to be done that what Descartes or others have done seems so far of very little moment.

Notes to 123

  1. Persons and books. Johann Eberhard Schweling (Swelingius, Suelingius) taught philosophy at Bremen; his reply to Huet appeared as Exercitationes cathedrariae in P. D. Huetii Censuram philosophiae Cartesianae (Bremen 1690) [?: title and date from memory, to be checked]. Huet's Censura philosophiae Cartesianae appeared in Paris in 1689. Huet had been nominated bishop of Soissons in 1685, but was never installed there and became bishop of Avranches; Leibniz still gives him the Soissons title. The date c. 1690–1691 is inferred from the books, not given by Gerhardt.
  2. "Schotanus". Probably the Franeker philosopher Johannes Schotanus, who also answered Huet [?].
  3. Particle shapes. The "spikes", "eels" and "branchings" mock the Cartesian practice of explaining sensible qualities by particle shapes (Descartes himself made water particles long and flexible "like eels").
  4. Cavendish. Probably the Paris gathering of 1648 at William Cavendish, Marquess of Newcastle's (with his brother Sir Charles), where Descartes, Hobbes and Gassendi met; Leibniz alone is the source here for the Descartes–Roberval clash there [?].
  5. Gallois. Jean Gallois, editor of the Journal des Savants, reviewed Clerselier's third volume of Descartes's letters (1667).
  6. "Meditation on true and false ideas". The Meditationes de cognitione, veritate et ideis (Acta Eruditorum, November 1684).
  7. Quotations. "Pudet haec opprobria…" is Ovid, Metamorphoses 1.758–759. "Phalerae ad populum" echoes Persius 3.30. "Cui non dictus Hylas?" is Virgil, Georgics 3.6 ("who has not told of Hylas?", i.e. it is a commonplace). "Edita doctrina sapientum templa serena" is Lucretius 2.8. "Pro thesauro carbones" is the proverb of finding coals instead of treasure (Phaedrus 5.6).
  8. Doctrine. The two first principles (immediate inner experience for truths of fact, contradiction for truths of reason) and the complaint that "clear and distinct" needs marks repeat Leibniz's 1684 Meditationes and the Animadversiones on Descartes's Principia (texts 101–111). The conservation of force against quantity of motion refers to the Brevis demonstratio of 1686.
This text in the whole · 1690, a year from which 98 pieces are catalogued166316901716